In affirming the actuality of a Transcendent Reality as a somewhat which is not determined by or derived through empiric consciousness I am proceeding in a course frowned upon by nearly the whole of modern psychology and philosophy. OfthisI am well aware; since the Transcendent which I affirm is not identical with the "transcendent function" of Dr. Jung of the "transcendental" (a priori) factors in experience of Kant. For Jung makes it quite clear that by "transcendent function" he does not mean a metaphysical quality but only a function which makes possible the transition from one attitude to another. Likewise, the transcendental element accepted by Kant does not go beyond experience but only beyond the empirically given factors in experience. When I affirm a Transcendent Reality I do not merely mean some function which is to be valued in terms of experience, though the realization of this Reality does affect the relationship to experience. Accordingly, the question arises as to how I can avoid the pitfalls of Christian Wolff's metaphysics which rendered the latter so vulnerable before the criticism of Kant.

From the standpoint of empiric cognition any affirmation of a Transcendent Reality is dogmatic. Such an affirmation may be grounded upon the real or supposed revelation of some scripture or it may be grounded on the basis of mere conceptions taken in abstraction from experience. In the former case, we have the familiar form of religious dogmatism, in the latter the dogmatic metaphysics such as that of Leibnitz or Wolff. Both forms have proven vulnerable before psychologic or epistemological criticism. As a result of such criticism, the religious conceptions lose their metaphysical validity.
but retain in the hands of Jun a psychological validity and have certainly been cheapened in the process. With Kant the transcendental remains merely as something which conditions possible experience, but ceases to be an order quite independent of experience. The total effect is to destroy all certainty in the transcendental sense and in its place we have only Experience (spelled with a capital E), which on one side is subjectively-conditioned while on the other, it is empirically filled. Beyond this all is dark.

I do reaffirm a transcendental certainty, but not on the basis of pure subjectivity alone. But in doing this I do not ignore the critical problem. I do not affirm that by the action of pure thought, as defined by our logic whether formal or epistemological, it is possible to attain Transcendent Reality. In other words, it is not possible by pure analysis alone to attain the Transcendent. Therefore the actuality of the Transcendent cannot be proven by reference to common knowledge. I can only suggest its possibility.

It appears to be pretty clear today that our familiar cognition is conditioned by a conative-affective complex. In other terms, the "I am aware" is guided by the "it pleases me" and the "I desire it", or by the opposite attitudes of displeasure or "turning away from". Today we have ceased to view pure mathematics as transcendently based by regarding the primary propositions as being merely "fundamental assumptions" instead of as "necessary truths". Hence such mathematics deals only with hypothetical implication without the affirmation of a non-empiric actuality. The result is our whole body of knowledge is empirically oriented. We feel that we have lost all certainties and must be content with probable
knowledge alone. If the modern analytic psychologist in dealing with psychotic problems finds that the resolution of a psychosis cannot be effected on the basis of the belief that the best possible knowledge is only probable knowledge, then he may encourage belief in certainties, provided they resolve the psychosis. But this is merely a therapeutic device which may be expected to work only so long as that fact is not realized by the patient. I must confess that I find in this procedure something that is not quite honest.

If we exclude thought in the sense of pure mathematics and pure logic, which in the modern sense is viewed as providing only rational possibility but no certain actuality, then it does appear that all our actual thinking is conditioned by pleasure-displeasure and desire-antagonism. In other words, cognition is led and conditioned by an attitude of unrest. It is thinking toward a goal. In the ordinary case the goal is something objective; in other rarer cases, the goal is a subjective formless state of Bliss, i.e., Nirvana or Moksha. In either case, desire or aspiration leads the cognitive process and therefore there is an element of unrest which underlies the cognitive movement. Choice in some sense is always present. The recognition of this fact has led to the judgment that all thinking is wishful-thinking. *

* Incidentally, this gives us an exact equivalent of the function which the Oriental psychology designates as Kama-Manas or mind led by desire.
Stated in psychological terms, the judgment "all thinking is wishful-thinking" implies the primacy of the life-energy called "libido". It is thought entrained behind an active libido, which appears as a restless stream always moving in one or another of alternative directions. A man thinks out his problems because he is interested or because a solution may lead to some object which appeals to one other another of his functions, or to some functional complex. But in assuming that this kind of cognition is the only possible cognition we are implying that the libido necessarily exists only in the form of a restless stream. What would happen to cognition if the libido attained a state of absolute rest?

The libido in a state of rest corresponds to an effective state of absolute indifference and a state where conation equals zero. Herein there is no sense of "it pleases me" nor "it displeases me", and, further, there is no "I desire" or "I reject". Such a condition we might conceive as an absolute absence of libido and, therefore, identical with death in the absolute sense. But it also may be conceived as a state of libido in complete equilibrium, even at a level of unlimited tension. In this case, it is not a state identical with absolute death, but it would be life in the fullest possible sense. So much, I think, must be obviously so, since where there is libido there is life. But what state of cognition would correspond to this?

Clearly there could be none of that kind of cognition which is necessarily led by desire, for desire rests in the zero-state of complete equilibrium. I suspect that most psychologists and philosophers would affirm that it must be a condition of cognitive unconsciousness. There certainly
could be no consciousness of content standing in opposition to an apperceiving Self or "I". Hence, in so far as consciousness is conceived as a relationship necessarily dependent upon the opposition of an "I" and the World, there certainly would be no consciousness. But to affirm that the state is therefore only unconsciousness implies the presupposition that all consciousness is necessarily relative. But this is only a dogma. The psychologist may very properly affirm that in so far as he is familiar with consciousness it always involves a relationship between an "I" and a content in some sense, but to go further than that is to be guilty of an indefensible extrapolation. A frank agnosticism is justified, but no more than that.

Now, to affirm a Transcendental Reality is equivalent to affirming that a conscious cognitive state corresponds to the libido in the condition of complete equilibrium. It is transcendental for the reason that the whole meaning of "experience" is conditioned by the Self-object kind of cognition. Unless I have misunderstood him, it is just this kind of cognition which Kant submitted to criticism and only that. In this restricted sense I concede that Kant has established his thesis. But once it is recognized that a form of cognition may exist which does not involve the self-object relationship, then the Kantian repudiation of the Transcendent ceases to be valid in principle. It remains possible that there is another way of consciousness.

Admittedly, so far I have not proven the actuality of that other way of consciousness, but have merely suggested it as a hypothetical possibility. To go further implies more than
is possible within the limits of familiar knowledge no matter how acutely analysed. The only possible way of demonstration relative to the non-relative cognition must be by immediate realization, and then only the individual himself would be in a position to know. It would be both a logical and epistemological impossibility to prove his knowledge in terms of the self-object complex. All that I may ask for is open-mindedness in this direction, and, perhaps, a willingness to undergo the process of psychical transformation which is the precondition of individual verification. But a profound psychological difficulty lies in the fact that it is incompatible with the nature of desire to desire desirelessness. The usual mystical or Yogic motivation does not go this far and by its own unaided effort cannot arrive that far. The Bliss of pure subjectivity can be desired if there have been some premonitory sampling of this Bliss. A supreme sort of Bliss obviously can be valued, but a state which is purely neutral with respect to Bliss or pain is beyond every possibility of relative valuation. Every picture that relative consciousness can devise with respect to such a state makes it seem unattractive. Only to a totally different, genuinely non-human way of consciousness can it seem superior to the relativity of stupendous Bliss. The realization of such a Transcendent Consciousness must, accordingly, be dependent upon a spontaneous development quite apart from any self-seeking effort. The pre-condition is detachment from the loftiest Bliss as well as from objective consciousness. Clearly, a two-fold transformation of the psychical orientation is implied both of which are difficult. First, the somewhat familiar mystical transformation, and
then a still profounder transformation which affects the mystical state proper in the same way that the latter affected the ordinary orientation to the objective world.

I can and do affirm that I know directly whereof I speak, but it is useless to expect that this affirmation can change the state of cognition of anyone who hears it. It may awaken Faith, by which is meant a stirring of a recognition in the deeps of the unconscious which is far too dim to be called knowledge. To arrive at the state of conative and affective indifference is to transcend Faith by attaining unequivocal Knowledge. But in the interim only faith can lead the way. I say this because I am constrained to say it and not because I have ever been temperamentally oriented to faith rather than to knowledge. The facts are quite the reverse. But when a psychical transformation is required such that it necessitates something like the death of the only way of cognition that is known, then one must rest his trust in Faith or in nothing. But Faith is a temporary thread leading through the darkness of transition to the Light of a new kind of Knowledge. The profound instinct which keeps affirming that Knowledge is greater than Faith is correct, but since Faith is the way to the higher kind of Knowledge it is superior to the way of cognition which must be transcended.

To know the Transcendent Reality and yet to function again in the way of relative cognition is no path of roses, for one pays the price of appalling solitude. All the old problems seem so childish. One sees the concern and desires of those on every side oriented to objectives known to be of but transitory and small worth. I am not judging these objectives on their own plane as being of but little worth, but simply
reporting the valuation they acquire in contrast to that other or Transcendent way of cognition. But, on the other hand, this realization destroys the personal religious problem forever. The aspirations that had been dulled by doubt become sealed in certainty.

There are two ways of cognition corresponding respectively to the libido as the restless stream and the libido in the state of equilibrium at high tension. It is possible to know both ways and at once and the same time by effecting a kind of division in consciousness. In this way the state of Trance is rendered unnecessary. Also, under this condition of simultaneity it is possible to transform the Transcendent Reality into a sort of object for the relative consciousness and the latter can be remembered. Of course, in this something like distortion is implied since THAT which in its own nature is neither subject nor object can never be truly reflected as an object. But, acknowledging the distortion, yet with it something like a guiding line is preserved for the relative way of consciousness which is something more than a mere Suchness.

To know directly the Transcendent Reality is to attain a perspective from which the kernel of the philosophic Buddhist Suttras becomes intelligible. In his "Awakening of Faith" Ashvaghosha says: "The mind has two doors from which issue its activities. One leads to the realization of the mind's Pure Essence, the other leads to the differentiations of appearing and disappearing, of life and death." These are the two ways of cognition. The philosophic Buddhist Sutras seem to be very obscure, but they are so simply for the reason that all expression is, of necessity, by means of the second "door" which, being the relative form of cognition, can suggest
the Higher Cognition only by a use of language which suggests the annihilation of everything that can be known relatively. For this reason, to the superficial view Buddhism seems nihilistic or agnostic, but when truly understood it is known to be absolute Gnosis.

So far, I have found nowhere in literature outside the Buddhist Suttras any reference to a reality which, from the standpoint of cognition, would have to be called "Consciousness-without-an-object-and-without-a-subject." But in the Suttras there is abundant verification. Now, the point I wish to drive home to the critical psychology and philosophy of our day is that the Transcendental Reality understood in this sense is not touched by the Kantian criticism. What Kant said is valid only for the second "door" of Ashvaghosha. Since Christian Wolff attempted to establish his metaphysics by means of the way of cognition, symbolized by the second "door", he was vulnerable before Kant. But no philosopher nor psychologist who has not himself opened the first "door" can possibly know its reality or unreality. He remains in bondage to the nescience of dualism.