Book II

The Problems of Individual Psychology

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BOOK I
THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY
Chapter I
Introduction

In peculiar degree the present is the hour of social ideologies. This is a special manifestation of the western cult of consciousness. The greatest achievement of the West has been an enlightenment of the intellect, but this has been accomplished at the price of repression of other functions of consciousness that are vital parts of the total constitution of man. Individual and social adjustment are not necessarily ideological problems. Typically they are not so viewed in the Orient, nor were they regarded from this perspective during our own Middle Ages. Viewing the social situation as a problem is merely typical of a particular psychological attitude, and this is not the only attitude which enlightened consciousness may assume. However, this is the day of the dominance of the ideological approach to problems and we must view the situation as we find it.

Within the span of a single generation we have seen several of these ideologies emplaced in the seats of governmental power. Conspicuous among these are the dialectic materialism of the present Russia, the national socialism of Germany and Italy and the "New Deal" in our own country. If we examine these various systems we will find, within a number of deviations of ideation and policy, a very real agreement in the most fundamental assumption. All of them emphasize the principle of collectivism, in contrast to attitudes conceived in some way as not collectivistic. It is this wide-spread collectivistic tendency that
proves to be psychologically significant.

Just what is "collectivism"? A very common popular conception defines it as a system of social organization that stands in contrast to "capitalism". But as one submits modern, so-called, "capitalistic society" to a careful examination it does not appear to be clearly anti-collectivistic. A large modern corporation, owned by hundreds of thousands of stock-holders, managed by their representatives and employing tens of thousands of workers organized into a system of inter-locked functioning, certainly appears to be a highly collectivistic entity. We have to seek further to find the principle which stands in polar contrast to collectivism, and this we do find in the opposition of collectivism with individualism. If "capitalism" means a society organized on the basis of an accumulated capital, then a capitalistic society may be either collectivistic or individualistic. Thus the contrast of collectivism and capitalism is not logically sound. We shall find the real meaning of collectivism by examining the polar notions of collectivism and individualism.

In the present stage of this discussion I am not primarily interested in the economic sense of these terms, as I am seeking the underlying psychological basis of the attitudes represented by each. Now, the individualistic ideal envisages the man as an integrated unit, relatively complete in himself, while the collectivistic ideal views the group as the unit of which the human components are merely functional parts. In one case, the single human being
is an entity while, in the other, the group alone is an entity. In this we see the real contrast.

In determining whether or not a given man is an individualist or a collectivist, in the real sense, we must consider far more than the social theory entertained by him. A highly developed individualist may hold a collectivist social theory and visa versa. What a man thinks and what he is are by no means necessarily the same thing. A man's real nature is more reflected in his spontaneous preferences than in the doctrines he espouses. For ethical considerations an individual may work for a social organization which would provide a form of life quite unattractive to him personally. So we find that many socialistic leaders are really highly developed individualists in their own proper persons. In fact, it is inevitable that real leaders should be individuals, rather than functional fractions. In contrast, there are men who, in reality, are only functional fractions but who aspire to become individuals and thus hold individualistic social theories. However, instances like the above appear to be more on the order of exceptions to the rule, for most men seem to project as a social ideal that which they personally prefer.

Unquestionably, a prime source of the higher appeal of collectivistic ideologies lies in the apparent implication of an altruistic attitude toward other human beings. To some of the more evolved natures the idea of self-sacrifice is highly attractive ethically. But it is a fundamental
mistake to identify collectivism with altruism and individualism with selfishness, for a man who has attained a high level of individuation may dedicate himself to an altruistic motivation. Gautama Buddha affords the classical instance of this kind, for no man was ever more integrated, and yet, no man was ever more devoted to the good of other creatures. On the other hand, a real collectivist may be actuated by the most selfish motives. He may be motivated by the wish to avoid the responsibilities of being a complete individual end a desire to enjoy advantages which he never could acquire through his private merit and ability. No, the difference between collectivism and individualism has no primary connection with ethical motivation.

The real difference is psychological. As will become clearer later, the genuine collectivist is more oriented to objective relations and is, therefore, an extravert, while the true individualist is polarized principally to the subject and is, accordingly, an introvert. I shall not justify this statement at this time as I wish merely to point out a contrast that is fundamentally based upon psychological attitude and to illustrate certain consequences that follow.

Once it is realized that the conflict between the ideals of individualism and collectivism is primarily grounded in psychological differences in the constitution or attitudes of men, then this conflict ceases to have an absolute ethical or social significance. No moral or objective superiority attaches to either ideal as such.
We must grant to every man a right to the peculiarities growing out of his natural psychical organization. No one organization possesses an \textit{a priori} right to consideration at the cost of the other. The validity of one psychological base, as contrasted to another, cannot be established by reference to logic or to objective fact. For the psychological base supplies the predetermining framework by which we are enabled to define or isolate the facts of experience, and a logical development always presupposes primary assumptions that are not themselves logically derived. It is just precisely these assumptions and frameworks that are determined by the psychological attitudes of various individuals. It is a common defect of all, or nearly all, theories of social organization that they fail to provide an examination into primary assumptions and frameworks. Accordingly, a systematically developed and well-documented social program may prove fatally defective because it assumes a base that is far too narrow.

If a fractional ideal, such as that of collectivism, were to be established and then coercively enforced, the result would be the violent repression of the types whose normal mode of manifestation is individualistic. In this case, the repression would fall most heavily upon the more introverted types. Now, a psychological force which is repressed does not cease to exist nor does it lose all its energy. The repression simply leads to a "bottling-up" of energy and this energy, in time, will become sufficiently powerful to force an overthrow which will tend to be all
the more violent, the more complete the initial repression. The result, then, is an unstable society continually subject to violent upheavals, the repressed aspect of one phase becoming the dominant of the next, and so on. Such a society hardly seems highly desirable.

Is it possible to build a society freed from this cause of instability? This is the question I propose to examine. Many important values could be conserved if a positive answer should be found. Certainly it would be a society in which the total mass of suffering would be reduced. It would eliminate most of the injustice done to the repressed types and the whole life of the social group would be more balanced, since it would receive more completely the values contributed through the social functions of the various types. Finally, there would be much less tendency to violent upheaval and it is very likely that most violence would vanish.

It is not easy to construct a social pattern which would achieve equal justice for all psychological types. There are important reasons why such a pattern can never be the contribution of a single mind. For the functioning of any given mind is preconditioned by the peculiar psychical structure of the individual, and this fact alone disqualifies any single individual for reflecting a completely synthetic view. We never do succeed in wholly freeing ourselves from the limitations of our individual psychological patterns, but to realize this fact constitutes an enormous step toward the recognition that there are innumerable other human beings who are not organized as we are, and yet possess as valid a right to consideration as we claim
for ourselves. Inevitably the effective pattern must be the product of several minds and, in this case, every one of these must view loyalty to the psychological type it represents as a primary duty.

It is far easier to see wherein existent social patterns fall short of equal justice to all types than it is to design an organization which will provide approximately equal opportunity for all. As an instance, we may consider the organization which provides a so-called, classless society. Actually, such a society is a one-class society and this implies an organization designed to accommodate the needs of but one psychological type or type group. Inevitably, such a society is organized along lines defined by a group of particular assumptions. Necessarily, there would be a predetermined set of duties, rights, privileges and restrictions that were equally applicable to all individuals. A particular psychological type, or a restricted group of psychological types, could adjust themselves to such a complex readily or, at least, reasonably well, and function with corresponding effectiveness. But the counter type, or group of counter types, would be forceably restricted in function and in the unfoldment of self-expression. For them would be the torture of the Procrustean bed. So the program of the one-class society necessarily implies cruelty. One portion of the human group would find itself living under conditions more or less favorable for the attainment of happiness or self-realization, while another unfavored group would face the lot of constant
repression. And, as a whole, society would lose since it would not receive the benefit of the potential contribution of the repressed group. A one-class society implies a one-sided society.

I have developed the preceding illustration at some length in order to suggest something of the importance of the relationship of psychological types to social organization. Tentatively, the reader was asked to entertain the idea of the actuality of difference in psychological types and, in particular, of the correlation between introversion and extraversion, on the one hand, with the ideals of individualism and collectivism, on the other. So far I have not proven the fact of inherent type-differences nor the correctness of the above correlation. I have sought merely to illustrate how important a knowledge of type-psychology is for the planners of social organization, it being granted that vitally important differences in individual psychology exist.

That not all individuals have the same psychical organization has been known from a very early day. However, the most systematic approach to this subject has been made in our own day. In this field we are especially indebted to Dr. Carl G. Jung for his contributions. But some decades

* For a serious study of this subject the volume, "Psychological Types", by C. G. Jung, is recommended to the reader. As the evidence justifying type-classification is well developed in this work I shall not attempt to restate the
before Dr. Jung made his contribution the philosopher and psychologist, William James, had become aware of the fact of type differences. As he has shown in his "Pragmatism: a new name for some old ways of thinking", philosophers fall into two types which always stand in a relation of philosophical conflict. The representatives of these types use the same logic and have access to the same facts, yet they build logically incompatible world-views. And all of this is not due to difference of skill but to an incongruency in the extra-logical presuppositions of each. James calls this a difference in temperament, which is but another name for divergence in psychological organization or attitude.

But long before the time of James, Friedrich Schiller, the German poet-philosopher, attained through the insight of his genius a shrewd understanding of the conflict of the psychological functions, both in the individual and in society. There is evidence that even the Greeks were aware of these type-differences and, if we turn to the Orient, we find that this knowledge is still more ancient. The more one studies the Indian Yoga the more he becomes convinced of the depth of the psychological insight of the Indian Sages. The Yogic literature consists of a vast collection of systems of psychological adjustment. There is no one system of Yoga that is exclusively valid for all individuals. For some there is Bhakta, for others, Krama Yoga, for still others, Jnana Yoga and, finally, a very technical group of systems classed under the general head of Kundala Yoga,
designed for those who are qualified. The principle of
the right method for the right man is fundamental throughout
the whole theory of Yoga. What is this but a recognition of
differences in individual psychology? In fact, it is
probable that no people has ever been more conscious of
the fact that different men have different psychical
organizations than have been the Indian Sages. The original
caste organization of society seems to have been designed
to meet the problems growing out of the differences in the
inherent psychical organization of different men.*

* It is important to avoid the mistake of judging the
original caste organization by what it has become in its
present corrupted state. Apparently, in the original
pattern there were but three or four castes, with the
possibility of the transference of the individual from one
caste to another. Thus the individual was not born irrev-
ocably into any given caste, but could be transferred when
he revealed the appropriate psychical adaptation. Now, each
caste had its duties, rights, privileges and restrictions,
which varied in each case. In this way, there came into
existence a complex society wherein the divergent needs
and possibilities of different human beings were recognized.
It is a system that implies psychological tolerance and,
apparently, even to this day there is a far greater
psychological tolerance manifested in Indian society than
has ever been known in the West. In fact the typical
Westerner has learned little of the art of maintaining a
vital religious attitude combined with tolerance for radically
different religious attitudes.
It should be evident that in the field of type psychology we are not dealing with anything like an absolutely new discovery. It is a new discovery only in the sense that now, for the first time, western psychology is giving the fact of divergence in psychical organization a scientific recognition. And, so far, it is apparently a quite unknown fact for western sociology, although it is a factor of sociological importance second to none.

In our western culture the primary sources of our knowledge of type structure lie mainly in two fields: (a) the domain of psychopathology, both in the form of full psychosis and of the less developed para-psychosis, and, (b), the field of the psychology of genius. This is the case for a reason which readily becomes clear. In both the instances of psychopathology and of genius we have an exaggeration of psychical states or capacities that is not to be found in the "normal" individual. Through the exaggeration of the various components in the psychical organization of men we are enabled to isolate, at least relatively, those components and submit them to analysis. This is but an adaptation of the methodology typical for all occidental science, since this science proceeds by a method of analysis preceding subsequent synthesis and application. Thus, in the psychological field we arrive at a better understanding of the so-called normal man through the study of the abnormal or unusual as manifested in pathology and genius.

There is no doubt but that the becoming familiar with
one's self as a psychical organization is an appalling business. It is not to be recommended for one who prefers his illusions to a realistic view of himself and of his fellow-men. But no one has a right to attempt social planning who lacks the courage to face the ordeal of psychical purification which comes to him who earnestly endeavors to understand himself and mankind in general in the psychological sense. The student soon comes to wonder just how many truly sane men there may be in this world. For the most part, he finds that the so-called "normal" man is just about sane enough to be allowed to remain outside an asylum, and that is all. And, if he is a really honest student, he will be dumbfounded by the discoveries he will make concerning himself. Perhaps he will decide that he is just lucky in that he has not yet been found out by the authorities. At any rate, he will approach his social planning with a greatly increased humility and a wholesome uncertainty with respect to his own presuppositions. Probably he will do much less planning, but will bring much more wisdom to bear upon such effort as he continues to put forth in this direction. Undoubtedly, he will find the causes of human suffering to be far less of an economic character than he had formerly supposed.

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The completed picture of the psychological types is very complex. Popular knowledge on the subject seems to be largely confined to the two types which Dr. Jung has called the "Attitude Types". These are the familiar introverts and extraverts to which we have already referred in the preliminary statement. But in addition to the primary attitude of introversion or extraversion the more evolved or differentiated individual manifests a predominance of one or more of the functions of consciousness, while other functions are repressed. Dr. Jung has isolated four such functions, but a study of mysticism together with Buddhist and Vedantist psychology at least suggests that this list is incomplete. However, the four functions seem to be easily identified and are probably the only ones that are active, save in the case of rare types. Now, the various combinations of the different possible functional types with the two attitude types supply a distinctly elaborate complex, with the result that the complete analysis of a given individual is by no means a simple matter. However, I shall simplify the approach to the subject by first considering the general characteristics of the two attitude types, taken in isolation from the modifications due to various functional patterns.

It is a basic assumption, though one which it seems impossible to prove, that all living men, who are awake and not in a state of trance or of unconsciousness, realize a
state of consciousness concerned with objects or contents in some sense. These contents, given in their raw immediacy in the stream of time, are called experience. But while all men have experience in this sense, not all men relate themselves to experience in the same way. For some, the experienced content is something objective to which reality-value is given. But for another group this experienced content has the significance of an essentially unreal, though useful, catalytic agent, serving the purpose of arousing to wakefulness of a latent capacity for the recognition of a timeless, objectless Reality, which is a somewhat that can be known, but not experienced in the sense of the above definition. These attitudes correspond to the fundamental philosophic difference represented by the systems of Naturalism and Idealism or Spiritualism, the latter term being understood in the strict rather than in the current popular sense. Between these extremes there is a number of more or less intermediate positions which, however, lean more in the one or the other direction. The divergence between these two tendencies is not due to difference in the content of experience nor of logical capacity but to a basic and, apparently, innate attitude or temperament which appears to be born with the individual. Thus the same "raw immediacy" starts psychical processes in different men that lead in opposite directions. The one process is oriented to the subjective component of consciousness, thus being introverted, while the other is directed toward the objective component and is extraverted.
The evidence strongly indicates that these two attitudes, in a fundamental sense, are not a product of conscious culture, but are rather factors which predetermine the course of conscious culture. Unquestionably, the individual can consciously will himself into a more or less extraverted or introverted attitude temporarily, but while he is thus assuming the attitude which is not native to himself it tends to have the effect of an unreal pose, or to be like the playing of the part of a character who is foreign to himself. It is also possible by education, or by some other form of social constraint, to force an individual to function in an attitude which is alien to his real temperament. But this, it has been found, is a fruitful cause of psychosis and even of physiological mal-functioning, thus proving that such constraint results in essential injury. Further considerations which support the conclusion that the attitudes are original elements in the constitution of the individual are to be derived from biology and from the study of physiological types.

It is known from biological studies that there are two fundamentally divergent methods by which species attain survival. One is by the extensive power of spreading seed or of propagation, combined with a relative vulnerability of the individual to destroying agencies. The other method combines a high protection of the individual, so that he becomes relatively invulnerable, with a relatively weak capacity for reproduction. It is easy to see how these
two biological patterns correspond to the extraverted and the introverted attitudes respectively. For the extravert wins by spreading himself over many relations, while the introvert can achieve only by indrawing to a monopoly of relations in some sense.*

* Here is a psychological fact which has very important sociological implications. The systematic opposition to monopoly is a social projection of the extraverted attitude. Since the extravert succeeds best where relationships are most free or most socially extended, he finds himself crippled by all monopolies. But this spreading processess is correspondingly crippling for the introvert, for thereby he is dissipated into ineffectiveness through multiplicity of objective relationships. The introvert broods his values into consciousness, but on the objective side requires the protection of a shell. If his function should happen to fall in the field of business he can succeed only if by some means he can secure the insulation of monopoly. Behind the lea of this insulation he may bring into manifestation values of the very greatest importance. His method of working is unsocial, though the product of his work may be highly social.

All of this simply illustrates the difficulty involved in finding any working principle of universal social validity. The adequate society must consider the necessities of both attitude types if it is to receive the advantages of the functions of both or to attain anything
In his book, "The Psychology of Genius", Ernst Kretschmer has shown the presence of distinguishable physiological types, of which the pyknic and leptosomatic types are the most important and the most contrasted. He reports that an extended psychological study has revealed a very decided correlation between these types and the two most basic psychological temperaments. These two temperaments are approximating even-balanced justice. Thus, in the present instance, there must be a place for monopoly as well as a field which is free from monopoly. It would seem that we must distinguish between types of monopolies. I would suggest that group monopolies are essentially destructive, while individual monopolies may be highly beneficent, provided the latter shelters an introverted creativeness. Government, labor-union and widely owned corporation monopolies would seem to fall in the first class, while monopolies centering around an individual during the creation of new industrial possibilities apparently fall into the latter. This suggestion is quite counter to the present trend which rather strongly favors government monopolies, monopolies of labor unions and of certain established large corporations regulated by the government. This is simply one of the many instances in western society where the advantage is given to the extraverted attitude while the introvert becomes the truly "forgotten man".
the cyclothymic and the schizothymic, respectively. The pyknic type, as the name suggests, is broad and thick-set while the face has soft and full contour. An examination of a series of selected photographs of this type gives the impression that the representatives are generally well-nourished. In contrast, the leptosomatic type has lean features and tends to have spare and even under-developed bodies. These men appear as under-nourished or even starved. Among the corresponding temperaments, the cyclothymic is characterized by an oscillation of mood. There is more or less marked tendency to swing between happiness and sadness but, we may say, the whole man goes with the mood, so there is not a splitting process. The mental attitude tends toward objective realism. On the other hand, the schizothymic temperament tends toward withdrawal or to being occupied within themselves and to seriousness without much humor. They type tends to be highly strung rather than gay or melancholy. The mental process inclines to be romantic, logical and idealistic, rather than realistic, humorous and empirical.

While this classification of temperament is given from the angle which is of peculiar importance to the psychiatrist, yet it is not difficult to see the correlation with extraversion and introversion. Though the two systems of classification may not be completely identical, yet the extravert attitude is readily correlated with the pyknic type and the cyclothymic temperament, while the introvert tends to be the leptosomatic with the schizothymic temperament.*

* Back of the actual determination of these relationships...
Whether or not the relationship between the psychological attitudes and the corresponding biological and physiological types is that of cause or effect or, perhaps, some other relationship, such as that of interaction, is not a question to be solved by snap judgment. The prejudice favoring an objective etiology of psychical effects, which is so characteristic of our physical science, would support the conclusion that the biological differentiation is primary. But this implies the arbitrary assumption of the primary validity of the extravert attitude. The introvert, who has not sold himself out to the opposite type, will dispute this assumption most emphatically. For his search into the subjective roots of consciousness will find no biological causes. He will see the whole notion of a biological system or order as a construction projected by thinking consciousness. The raw "facts" of sensation, by themselves, supply no such system. Hence, he will

there is an enormous amount of research. The record of this work exists and may be studied by those interested. My present task is not the reproduction of the statement of evidence but the development of certain consequences which grow out of the psychological facts. For that purpose I am concerned simply with a presentation of the psychological picture, from the base of which further conclusions will be drawn. The reader, who desires to delve more deeply into the subject, is recommended to the psychological literature concerned.
naturally regard the biological system as a reflected effect, to which the conscious psychological attitudes stand in causal relationship. The student of oriental Yoga will realize that such an attitude was well developed long ago and thus is by no means a purely imaginative possibility. It is merely occidental prejudice and habit that have closed our consciousness to the ready recognition of this other possibility.

However, in any case, this fact should now be clear, i.e., that the difference between the attitudes is not merely a product of culture, but is grounded deeply in the very nature of life and consciousness itself. Thus we are in no position to pass an "off-hand" judgment as to the essential validity or soundness of the one attitude with respect to the other. The facts end the arguments, or the principles and the arguments, that are decisive with the members of the one type, lose all force with the other, since there is not agreement in primary perspective or valuation. If the social organization is for all men, and not to be oriented to the interests of one special group alone, it follows that the organization must be designed in such a way as either to be neutral with respect to the various types, or else have such a complex form as to provide zones or compartments favorable for the functioning of the respective types. And, in this connection, no point becomes more important than the fact that no one type can design the adequate organization.

One of the popular views of the difference between
introversion and extraversion paints a picture of undue simplicity. According to this view the difference is merely that of placing the emphasis upon the facts of experience as given through the senses, in the case of the extravert, or upon the ideas derived from those facts, in the case of the introvert. But this is an obviously extravert view of the difference, for it gives, by implication, priority to the object of the senses and sees introversion as a secondary or derived process. The self-conscious and intellectually developed introvert will give the ideas the priority and view experience as simply an occasion which arouses the ideas into recognition. To the true thinking introvert the ideas are original and substantial and the object for the senses only an insubstantial shadow. Such an introvert has no fundamental trouble in understanding the philosophy of Plato. But the defect in this popular view goes deeper than this. For the idea, itself, is still an object, though of a more subtle nature than the object for the senses. In the absolute sense, he who is oriented to ideas is still on the extraverted side, though less extraverted than those who give primary reality-value to the sense-object. The boundary line between introversion and extraversion, in the absolute sense, is passed only when consciousness is completely disengaged from contents, whether sensuous, affectional or ideational. Ordinarily, this degree of introversion is attained only in dreamless sleep, which cannot be called a conscious state in the familiar sense. One who is not familiar with the deeper
states of mystical consciousness is disposed, quite understandably, to question whether introversion in this deep sense can ever be a conscious value. However, when introversion does proceed far enough to enter the zone of mystical consciousness, occasionally a state of full consciousness is attained wherein there is no content, save in the sense that consciousness becomes its own content. This corresponds to dreamless sleep, but differs from the latter in that it is fully self-conscious. From this level of consciousness the state of awareness of ideas stands very definitely on the extravert side.*

Every time a man falls asleep he participates in a process of introversion. By acquiring the art of observing this process he can learn much about what introversion means. When a man dies introversion is carried still further. When the dying process has been arrested and the life

* I do not attempt to prove here what has been affirmed in the latter part of the above paragraph. The subject is a very large one and proof, in the strictly objective sense, does not and cannot exist. Objectively, only a presumption for the consciousness can be built. The only proof is by personal verification, but this involves an act of introspective penetration that is very difficult for most natures. The interested reader is recommended to read the immense literature on mysticism, especially the Vedantic and Buddhist manuals on Yoga. I have offered a contribution in the volume, "From Point-I to Space -I".
of the body re-established, it occasionally happens that the individual is able to report the stages of consciousness through which he passed. I have known instances of this kind, and in each case the states passed through parallel certain stages of deep mystical consciousness. From the standpoint of a well-developed power of introversion the process of falling asleep and of dying are not the simple drawing of a curtain over consciousness, as so generally supposed by the extravert. Consciousness simply functions in another phase which also can be traced consciously by developing the appropriate capacity. Consciousness merely enters another phase which affords material for the scientific spirit, but which is not an object for scientific observation in the extravert sense. There is, beyond all sensation, all feeling and all adaptation, another domain of consciousness which operates according to its laws, and is a part of the total nature of man. Therefore, it has its right to a co-determinant part in the forming of the social organization of life. Typically, western sociology disregards all this.

It should be clear that a distinction must be made between the contrast of introversion and extraversion in the absolute sense, and the more familiar differentiation in which the distinction is one of degree. We may say, that, outside of mystical states, all waking consciousness is

* I coined the word "introception" to represent the requisite activity and focus of consciousness necessary for this kind of research.
extraverted in the absolute sense, because such consciousness is engaged with objects in some way. We may speak of one race or one individual \textit{as relatively introverted}, or the reverse, with respect to another race or individual, and in this case our reference would be to the contrasting attitudes of the waking consciousness. This is the usual sense in which the two types are differentiated. But in this case there is no absolute line between introversion and extraversion. It is rather an arbitrary line, so drawn that half of the population of a given race or culture would fall on one side and half on the other. Thus, when we consider different cultures and races the relative positions of this arbitrary line vary in their respective distances from the absolute line separating all consciousness concerned with objects in any sense, and that state where consciousness is its own content. When this arbitrary line occupies a position far out on the side of extraversion then, we would say, the corresponding race or culture is extraverted as compared to another race or culture where the arbitrary line is nearer the absolute center. It is in this sense that we may speak of occidental culture as being extraverted, when contrasted with the culture of India.

Since all waking consciousness, other than that of mystical states, is to be regarded as extraverted in the absolute sense, it follows that all cultures which are most highly extraverted are more unbalanced than the cultures which are relatively introverted. The more in-
troverted races and cultures are nearer the center. This fact leads to the consequence that the more extraverted cultures are, of the two, the less stable.*

Naturally the strongest relative manifestation of introversion and extraversion is to be found in individuals rather than in races. If we seek out the most powerful examples of the two types we will perceive the contrasts

* I once saw a chart representing all the great cultures known to history, giving the point of origin, the time and decree of greatest world-dominance and the time of disappearance. It was interesting to note that only two of the cultures now existing were also present at the earliest dawn of known history, and these two were the cultures of China and India. In the interim, other cultures have arisen and vanished, and such as now dominate in the West were born relatively recently. All of these shorter-lived cultures are obviously more extraverted and more militant than those of China and, especially, India. On the whole, they expanded for a relatively brief period to greater world-dominion than the latter, and then vanished completely in a cycle that is rather surprisingly short. All of this points to the conclusion that the greater vitality and stability is found in the Chinese and Indian cultures. And what conclusion are we to draw from this? The answer is very clear. The more introverted cultures are closer to the roots of consciousness and life and, therefore, less disposed to become dissipated as rootless psychical fractions.
in strong relief. Of all historic examples of supreme genius, which was combined with a strong development of the introverted attitude, the best known are Buddha and Christ. The spiritual stature and influence of these Men is without question and is well known. That They manifested a strongly introverted attitude is quite obvious, for both preached a Message of other-worldliness, a characteristic of the introverted orientation which has gone deeper than the four functions. Now, if we examine into Their significance for the world we find it summed up in the idea of universal salivation. The implementation of Their function lay in example and precept without violent constraint.

If, on the other hand, we seek for the greatest development of supreme extraverted genius we must look for a power which operates directly and forcefully upon the objective world and, especially, upon the human object, since it is the human object that requires the greatest capacity for feeling into the object on the part of one who seeks to be effectively influential.* The most commanding powers of this kind are to be found in the politico-military genius. Hence, the greatest of all extraverts have been the men who have determined the course of history through political and military power. The

* The mineral object being, of all sensible objects, the most responsive to the control of the logically developed idea, it requires much less of the capacity for feeling into the object in order to secure control, than is the case with organic objects, particularly man.
primary power-instrument employed is of irrational psycho-political character, supplemented by a compelling objective force. However, naked physical force is the more obvious, if the less fundamental, power-principle. Men who fit this description come to mind very readily. Thus we think of Genghis Khan, Caesar and Napoleon. All of these men are very important historical determinants. They set a tempo to which other men within their orbits, perforce, had to march, if they wished to continue to live.

Now, if we contrast the objectives of these supreme examples of the two types we quickly find the keynote of each. The ideal of the superlative extravert is world-conquest; that of the superlative introvert is world-salvation.

Though the two attitudes are complementary, yet in their differentiated development they introduce conflict, which becomes particularly marked in the most strongly contrasting instances. Among the examples of opposed types given above no two came into direct contact, though Jesus and Julius Caesar lived at approximately the same time. However, the Rome of Jesus' time had fallen heir to the mantle of the great Caesar and this has afforded us an opportunity for an historic study of the interaction of the two spirits. Whether or not the story of the crucifixion is historically correct, it is symbolically true, and thus reflects the effect of the impact of the two attitudes. Actually, as it appears in the account, Jesus was crucified through the permission of the Roman governor in
Palistine, and the physical act was performed by the Roman soldiers. In later centuries, as the Christian movement permeated the Roman world, the political genius of Rome awoke to what was happening and recognized in Christianity a challenge. The spirit of Caesar answered by the great persecution so well known throughout Christendom. From the political standpoint the effort to stamp out the Christian spirit was inevitable, for the latter carried a threat to the very basis of Caesar-power. In the end, the Christian movement won, in the sense that Rome had to capitulate formally, though in the victory the Christian spirit lost something in that there was a dissipation of much of the early purity. If, on the other hand, we view this issue as met by the Christ in his own words, we find a recognition of the conflict but, also, a very different technique for meeting it. Jesus enunciated the formula: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, but render unto God the things that are God's."* Stated in psychological terms this means: "Render unto objective relationships that which belongs to the object, but render unto subjective relationships that which belongs to the Subject." Comment as to the difference manifested by these two spirits is scarcely necessary.

* In the larger number and more ordinary situations produced by life it is possible to work out an adjustment of this two-fold obligation, symbolized by that which is due Caesar and God respectively. But when there is a conflict between the Divine and the political commands the individual is
But the spirit of Ceaser still is strong, particularly so at the present time. Since the first phase of the world-war the political spirit has gained an enormous accession of power. The fundamental principle of the totalitarian state is the monopoly of power by the political spirit. It may be expressed by the formula: "Nothing outside the state; nothing above the state; all within the state." The implication for a spiritually oriented religion is obvious. In this situation the subjective or introverted valuation is as completely repressed as is possible. The course of action with respect to the free exercise of religion taken by the present Russian, German and Italian governments is inevitable. Religion is permitted only in so far as it serves as a support of political objectives. Totalitarianism forced to make a choice as to his primary allegiance. In symbolic terms the question then is: "Is God or the political entity the truly sovereign power?" Those who give primacy to political power or the state, in effect, dethrown God. This is equivalent to the denial of the authority of conscience and of the "Voice". Today the world-tendency is very strongly oriented to the unconditional ascendency of the state or the political entity. This means that behind the military and economic conflicts there is a much more important religious battle. It appears that those who stand for the primacy of the authority of conscience must be prepared to face a new cycle of persecution.
in the current sense, is a manifestation of extreme extraversion. Now, when an attitude becomes too exclusively dominant it tends to become pathological and we begin to have symptoms of a psychosis. In the case of extraversion, that is overly developed, it is found that the psychosis tends to take the form of hysteria. This may help to explain much of the recent phenomena connected with the totalitarian states. It is also a factor which serves to make those states peculiarly dangerous, but not necessarily in the sense that they will become more powerful than others. The danger is rather like that of a contagious disease which constitutes a threat to all who come into contact with it.

In the preceding examples of extraversion and introversion the conflict between the attitudes is brought forth in strong relief. It is only fair that the picture should be extended to include an instance in which the complementary operation of the attitudes is manifested. We are afforded an excellent example of this in the field of physical research. Physicists fall into two classes, the empiric physicists and the mathematical physicists. Now it is clear that the former have the more extraverted attitude as they are principally concerned with fact-determination, and that implies primary orientation to the object given directly or indirectly through the senses. In contrast, the mathematical physicist is occupied with an abstracting ideational process, obviously implying an introverted attitude. The stupendous advance of physics has been accomplished by the co-operative interaction of these two attitudes, while the conflicting temperaments of the two types has been relatively submerged. A beautiful
instance of the co-operation of these two attitudes is afforded by Michelson and Einstein. Michelson was a very able experimental physicist who specialized in precise measurement. He, with the help of Morley, devised the experiment which demonstrated that we could not conceive of the earth as either passing through an unaffected ether or as dragging that ether along with it. This provided part of the data which led to the special theory of relativity, of which Albert Einstein was the principle creator. Experiment produced a seemingly contradictory situation which was finally reconciled by pure speculative reflection.

In the transition from the special to the general theory of relativity we have an example of a highly introverted function which is of deep significance. The generalized theory of relativity required the abandonment of Euclidian geometry, but another geometrical concept was found already existing which satisfied the requirements of the relativity theory. This alternative form of geometry is known as the Riemannian or Elliptic geometry. It was in the middle of the nineteenth century that Riemann tackled the problem of the twelfth Euclidian axiom, which concerned parallel lines. He proceeded by arbitrarily assuming a statement which radically violated the Euclidian assumption, and then investigated the possibility of building a logically consistent system upon the new basis. In this he was entirely successful. This new system deviated from the Euclidian geometry in the case of every theorem dependent
dependent upon the parallel axiom, but otherwise the theorems were the same. Now some of the consequences are quite startling for one who has been trained in Euclidian geometry and conceived it as the one valid system. Thus, if two parallel lines are drawn perpendicular to a third line these lines are parallel in Euclidian geometry and meet only at infinity, but in Riemannian geometry they meet in a finite distance. It must be remembered that these lines are straight and not curved. Hence the new geometry defined a peculiar kind of space and one which is not infinite in extent. Now, it so happens, that this geometrical concept has served, in the hands of Einstein, as the conceptual basis of the development of a systematic cosmic-conception which most effectively integrates the facts of physical and astronomical observation.

In the case of Riemann's investigation there was no thought of a practical application to the "facts" of experience. His was a purely logical study, based peculiarly upon an arbitrarily introduced assumption. But he produced, thereby, a logical scheme which made possible the organization of observed fact several years later. Now, the arbitrary assumption is essentially an act of free creation.* In this we have the process which analytic psychology calls the phantasy function; phantasy meaning a creative projection out of the Subject, as distinguished from impressions derived from the object through

*Pure mathematics is now regarded as a systematic application of logic to a group of fundamental assumptions that are themselves a product of free creation.
the senses. The activity of phantasy is thus an introvert
function. Accordingly, the development of the Elliptic
geometry was a highly introvert activity.

How is it that a system, born out of a combination of
logic and creative phantasy, should be such that it com-
bines the facts of observation so that they form an
intelligible whole? The investigation of this question
leads us into some of the profoundest mysteries of con-
sciousness. From the standpoint of the naturalistic
assumption, that the experienced world is self-existent
and independent of conscious being and life, this question
becomes very difficult, if not impossible, to answer. But
if one approaches the problem by predicating the priority
of consciousness, with respect to all objects, then it is
relatively easy to outline an answer that is intelligible
and, at the same time, satisfies the facts. In this case
we find it easy to conceive of the Subject as laying down
the form of possible experience, and thus there is nothing
surprising in the fact that actual experience of the object
is such that it falls into the framework provided by the
subject. Thus a given conscious being produces a framework
of possible experience by a conscious or unconscious
phantasy function of the subject. This framework serves
a two-fold purpose: In the first place, it serves to focus
consciousness so that it operates positively in a pre-
determined direction and, second, it acts as a screen or
blinder which inhibits the action of consciousness in
other directions. Thus it is inevitable that a man who
has strong doctrinal convictions will perceive only those facts which confirm his convictions. Accordingly, experience inevitably substantiates prior conviction. This affords a simple and rather obvious explanation of why man are bound by their religious, scientific and social dogmas. Within the framework of the dogmas they may be rational and objective enough, but they simply do not see facts or principles which lie outside the range delimited by the dogmas. No man can be convinced by any argument in the face of his convictions. His position can be changed only by a process of conversion, which implies the transformation of consciousness out of one framework into another.

From the foregoing considerations a consequence follows which is of the utmost importance in its bearing upon the social problem. Often religious groups, social reformers or revolutionaries arise who look forth upon the social whole from the standpoint of a particular framework. From the given special perspective the social problem may assume a clear-cut definition, which seems to be confirmed by all the facts. Hence, all too easily, the conclusion is drawn that the particular definition with its implied program is exclusively correct. Others, who think differently, are consequently regarded as either actuated by evil motive or as lacking in information or intelligence. From this position it is but a short step to a program of liquidation of the former and of education of the latter by propaganda. Here is the setting, out of which fanaticism and violence grows very readily. Current history is so full of instances
which fall into this pattern that it is scarcely necessary to cite illustrative examples. Now the framework, which is typically accepted uncritically and without a conscious recognition of its presence, predetermines the facts that can be perceived. This is the reason why basic theories that have the character of innate conviction - particularly so if they are unconscious - can never be disproven by reference to the facts. They can be challenged successfully only through the action of other frameworks springing out of the depths of the subject. If, now, it is desired to build a sound and balanced society, recognition must be given not only to objective factors but, as well, to the differences between men growing out of the varieties of frameworks from which men look forth upon the world. We cannot formulate an objective common denominator which is equally valid for all men simply for the reason that the very formulation presupposes some particular framework of consciousness. There is no one system of valuation equally valid for all. There never will be a society in which peace and justice prevail until this fact is appreciated and given recognition in practical government and social relationship.

It is only with great difficulty that we attain the realization that not all men are psychologically like ourselves. Our own outlooks, valuations, systems of ideals and interests naturally seem to us to be obvious and proper. All too easily we conclude that if others do not agree with us then there is something wrong with them; they are either wicked or stupid. Naturally such a view concerning human
beings, who are not like as , has its effect upon courses of action. When this view is held by men in power the consequences can become very painful. We enter into mortal battles with others when the possession of some psychological understanding would change the whole issue. Actually, those who are unlike us may have as lofty valuations and ideals as we have, but they see the world from a different perspective.

There are genuine moral differences among men. In this sense there are superior and inferior men. But the classifying of men in this respect, if it is to be just, must be done with a due regard for the individual system of valuation. It is not a question of the form of the moral code but rather of how well the individual lives by the code he accepts. So far as moral judgment is concerned, every man has a right to his code.

When the introceptive process of introversion is developed to an advanced degree is deep level is reached wherein consciousness is concerned no longer with either objects of the senses or ideas. In general, this stage of introversion is not consciously traceable, but in a few cases consciousness persists as a result of training. In such instances consciousness has become dissociated from content. Now it may happen that the psychical values lying within the subject may be projected either in the form of sensible images or as ideas. In this case we are not dealing with external objects nor with ideas derived from external objects. Quite frequently the images are visual in type and may be in the
form of representations of living beings, world-fields, symbols, etc. In at least some cases and, perhaps, generally, these projected images or ideas carry with them a much greater feeling of reality-value than anything derived from external objects. The presentation is spontaneous or autonomous, in that both the images and the ideas just happen rather than being the product of consciously directed effort upon the part of the individual. One who is familiar with these psychical events is bound to be greatly impressed with their importance. They tend to be of the highest order of importance to the individual realizing them and often are the source of extended social influence, particularly in the domain of religion. Now the question arises: What is the significance of these presentations?

In dealing with this question, Dr. Jung, first of all, affirms their genuineness as psychical experience often having superior value. But are they more than merely psychical? Most men who have such introceptive presentments do give a most emphatic answer in the affirmative. From such a source most metaphysical systems are derived as well as the notions of inner worlds, of all the various gods and other non-physical beings. Here is the fountain-head of the different systems of religious eschatology. In India the proliferation from this source is simply enormous, but the same process is well developed in some phases of Christianity. In this connection we may note the extensive seership of Swedenborg. As an example of a
metaphysical system drawn from subjective roots the philosophy of Plotinus affords an excellent instance. In all of these cases substantial reality is predicated of the images and of the projected metaphysical systems. Accordingly we must distinguish two notions: (A) the psychical introceptive penetration which is an indisputable event, and (B), a substantial, metaphysical system of existences corresponding to the psychical experience. Now the question of the validity of the metaphysical system is something quite different from the valuation of the psychical event considered purely as psychical, and the validity of the latter does not, of itself, imply the substantial reality of the former.

Dr. Jung openly challenges the validity of the hypostatized metaphysical systems, while regarding the experiences as psychologically valid and real enough. With respect to the discrediting of the metaphysical systems unquestionably the scientific and cultured world of the West would now stand in agreement with Dr. Jung. Now, thus far, the Buddhist system stands in agreement with Dr. Jung and the viewpoint of western scientific culture. As one reads through the Sutras of the Mahayana Buddhist literature he finds the student warned not to regard introceptive presentments as substantially real but rather as being empty and a product of the mind, though admittedly produced in a way that is generally spontaneous and not consciously traceable by most individuals. Thus, for Buddhism, as well as for western science, the hypostatized metaphysical world is unreal. But there is another aspect
of hypostatized substantiality which is equally discredited by Buddhism on the ground of the same insight and logic applied in the metaphysical instance, whereas in this respect western enlightenment has failed to think its thoughts through.

Our objective experience is composed of a group of sense impressions, called perceptions, and apperceptions connected with them. We unify such a group under the notion of the external object. Now if we analyse the impressions assumed to be derived from an external object we never find at any time anything other than psychical elements, such as sense-impressions and ideas. Yet we habitually say that the object is a thing which exists outside of consciousness as such. We have never proven the reality of this "thing", nor is it possible to do so since proof deals only with an event in consciousness. We can prove a certain persistence in the object that is independent of the determination of the individual subject, but that is by no means equivalent to proving its existence as independent of consciousness as such. It is quite easy to explain the persistence without reference to the idea of the independent existence of the object as "thing". Unquestionably, we can treat it as though it were independent and, in fact, that is what is done by most men all the time, but this is by no means proof of independent reality.

It is the strong tendency of extraverted consciousness to predicate independent objective reality of the object of the senses. Actually, however, this is merely another hypostasis only, in this case, it is the type of hypostasis
favored by the extravert. The same logic that undermines
the metaphysical hypostasis applies with equal force in the
present case, and consistency requires that the attitude
should be the same in both instances. For if the strong
feeling of reality is not to be trusted in the metaphysical
form, it is not to be trusted in relations to the physical
object, especially as the feeling of reality is stronger
in the former instance. If we are to accept hypostatization
as valid in either case we must accept it in both, or
uniformly reject it in both instances. Apparently, Dr.
Jung is not consistent in this respect for he seems to
accept a physical order along with the psychical order,
while rejecting the metaphysical systems. At this point
I am forced to disagree with Dr. Jung.

Buddhism consistently repudiates both hypostases and,
so far as I know, is the one system of thought that is
completely consistent in this respect. Both objective
and subjective phenomena stand on the same footing, both
have a relative or derived reality but both are essentially
insubstantial and empty in the absolute sense. For both
depend upon an inscrutable Reality which is neither physical
nor metaphysical but which is called by the northern Buddhists
"essence of Mind." This would correspond approximately
with the psychical reality of Jung or with my own
formulation: "Consciousness-without-an-object and without-
a-subject".

The foregoing discussion of the attitude types is little
more than an outline of a phase of the psychological structure of man. The statement is in no sense exhaustive nor has any effort been made to establish proof. The full treatment of the subject belongs to the special fields of psychology and philosophy and the reader who is interested in a more complete understanding should refer to the literature on the subject. Our interest here is primarily centered upon the consequences for social organization which grow out of the psychological structure of human consciousness. Thus, stated in logical terms, we may say that we assume the substantial correctness of the thesis of analytic psychology, i.e., that individual human consciousness is organized under a number of diverging psychological patterns. Then our problem becomes that of the investigation of the consequences which follow, in so far as they are related to the social problem.

At this point I shall suggest one of the consequences which grows out of the assumption that the normal attitude of some men is introverted, while that of others is extraverted. For the introvert, the primary reality-determinant inheres in the subject to all consciousness, while for the extravert this determinant is found in the object. Now, if it is assumed that the social problem is primarily one of manipulating the circumstances within which human beings live, then the fundamental reality-determinant is given to the object. Thus those programs which envisage the social objective as equality of economic income, as equality of access to the land, etc., are examples of social theory.
that assume, at least unconsciously, the valuation of the extraverted type. It is unquestionably true that if a human being is to live at all in this world he must have some minimum access to economic values, such as food and some contact with the land as, for instance, the ground which his body actually occupies. These are necessities of embodied existence. But a recognition of these irreducible necessities by no means implies that equality of access to land or other economic value is a precondition of equality of opportunity to attain happiness or self-realization. In fact, if we were to make a search throughout human history for those men who have been most successful in the attainment of durable happiness or of self-realization it would appear that, at least preponderantly, they are men who required extremely little economic resource. Consider, for instance, outstanding spiritual Lights, such as Lao Tsze, Buddha, Christ and the Tibetan Yogi, Milarepa. More often than not, these men have voluntarily lived upon an objective basis of a most extreme material poverty. Equal possession of or access to material wealth would supply such men with a meaningless and burdensome surplus. Yet, in contrast, there are highly cultured extraverts for who very extensive resources are necessary, if they are to live on a level of even faintly comparable happiness and are to realize themselves in fair degree. For one, a beggar's crust for food, a rag abandoned on a grave for clothing, and a cave for shelter, for the other, a connoisseur's selection of food served in a setting of superior artistic taste, fine clothing for the
covering of the body and a place to live in. Yet, with all this material difference, both types of life are, or may be, rich and full. Thus, it becomes evident that, for some, material circumstance is highly important while, for others, it is merely a secondary incident at best.

Which of these two types of lives should be envisaged as the social ideal? There is no answer to this question on which all men would agree. Apparently, the vast majority of human beings aspire to the position of the rich man. Yet, would it not still remain true that it is those who are most like Buddha or the Christ who are most respected and loved? In which, then, lies the greater social ideal, the rich man or the Christ? The answer to this question has a very vital bearing upon social theory. As the answers vary so, also, varies the relative importance of the economic problem.

There are those who, while they recognize the right of men to choose these vastly different ideals, yet maintain that the social problem is, first of all, an economic one, to the extent of providing for all men an economic minimum necessary for comfortable living. But analysis reveals that in this we still have the extraverted presuppositions, for circumstance is given the first place as the social determinant. And not only is circumstance given the first place, but it is the kind of circumstance which favors the course of life oriented to the object. It still remains the ideal of the rich man, i.e., circumstance viewed as positive determinant. Now, from the introverted perspective, circumstance may be valued as a secondary agent, but in a negative
sense. Thus conditions, which from the extraverted point of view would be regarded as unfavorable, such as painful poverty, may be, and often are, the most favorable condition for shocking a sleeping consciousness to wakefulness. "In the moment of greatest extremity we learn". This is a proverb that is certainly often true. Clearly, then, in those cases to which this proverb applies the premature removal of the extremity is no true service. Perhaps, more often than otherwise, it is the negative economic condition which produces the effective extremity.

It should now be clear that, if the reality of differences of natural attitudes is acknowledged, together with their equal right to recognition, the comprehensive social program cannot be built upon an economic base, or upon any other base that lays primary emphasis upon objective circumstances. The neutral or common ground of the two attitudes lies deeper than this. But, even assuming that an intellectual formulation of such a common ground were to be found, serious inadequacies would arise out of the fact that it was only an intellectual formulation. For, psychologically, men are divided, not alone by differences of attitude but, as well, by other characteristics of psychical structure, such that, while an intellectual formulation would adequately serve the needs of certain types, it would hopelessly fail for others. To come to an understanding of these further complications it is necessary to arrive at some appreciation of the differences among men growing out of varying patterns of the psychological functions.
BOOK I

Chapter 3

The Functional Types

It is obvious that the totality of consciousness cannot be comprehended within any system of ideas, for man has feelings as well as ideas. Thus, human beings love and hate as well as think. And however completely any individual may develop his ideas concerning love and hate, yet such a system of ideas forever remains something different from the actual states of consciousness known as love and hate. All of this is so obvious that it is hardly likely that the statement will be seriously challenged. But while it may be readily recognized that love and hate belong to a different dimension of consciousness than thought, it is not so well known that the determinant part which thought and feeling play in the lives of different individuals varies quite widely. Thought may play the dominant role and thus become the prime determinant of the total life while, in other instances, feeling occupies the prior position. As a consequence, the most perfectly thought-out system may well fail of universal acceptance, even with individuals of comparable intelligence.

As men differ in terms of psychological attitudes, so also, do they vary in the relative importance which they attach to the different psychological functions. This fact forces us into a consideration of just what functions there are which may be variously developed among human beings. This is an empirical question with respect to which we now have considerable knowledge.
Just as clearly as human beings have feelings and thoughts, so is it equally evident that there are sense-impressions which constitute the primary means for the acquaintance with the objects of experience. However much thought and feeling may affect the interpretation and valuation of the conscious material given through sense-impressions yet, in the latter there is a consciousness-quality which is not reducible to either thought or feeling or any combination of these two. Again, it is hardly necessary to prove the reality of a function which universally recognized.

But with the group of thought, feeling and sense-perception we have not exhausted the recognizable forms of psychological function. The fourth, and last, of the recognized functions may be introduced by considering the three senses in which the verb, "to feel", is often employed. A man may say: "I feel cold", "I feel happy" or, "I feel that such and such a horse will win in this race."* When he says,

* It is an interesting fact that we commonly clearly distinguish between thinking and feeling, but use the latter word as a blanket term to cover the action of three distinct psychological functions. One is led to suspect that there is some significance revealed by this fact. We oppose sensation, intuition and feeling proper in one group to the function of thinking, as something which stands out in radical contrast. Perhaps the meaning of this tendency becomes clearer when we regard the fact that directed or intellectual thinking
"I feel cold", he is clearly referring to a sensation, but the state of feeling happy is something more than a sensation. Happiness is an emotional state which may persist throughout a very wide range of sensations. But when a man says, "I feel that such and such a horse will is a late development as contrasted to the other functions. That is, the psychical functions of feeling proper, sensation and intuition in the broad sense, had attained a well-established development before man became an intellective thinker. Thinking thus stands in peculiar contrast to the other functions. May this perhaps explain why we use the one word "feeling" to comprehend three functions in contrast to the one function, thinking?

A further consideration grows out of the fact that we can trace from the behaviour of animals evidence of active feeling and sensation and other functioning that is, at least, like intuition. But, apart from man, we never speak of any animal as being intellectual. When we speak of an intelligent animal we do not mean an intellective animal, but rather have in mind a broader and more general meaning of the word.
win in this race", he really refers to a function that is neither sensation nor affection. In common parlance, men often speak of this kind of "feeling" as a "hunch", thus revealing an instinctive recognition of the activity of a distinct function. Obviously, we have in this the function of intuition. Now it is not necessary for us to prove that a given "hunch" or intuition is correct to establish the actuality of this function. To assume that invariable correctness or validity of the product is the necessary condition for the proof of the actuality of a function would lead to the discrediting of all the functions, since all are subject to incorrect or unsound application. Thus, much thinking will not stand logical examination; feeling valuations are often defective; and there are optical and other sensory illusions. It is simply unreasonable to require the intuitive function to justify its existence through operating always infallibly. The important point is, that we often find that men act or assume attitudes for reasons that cannot be reduced to thinking, feeling and sensation, and this is proof enough that these three are not the sole psychical functions.

Although there are excellent reasons for concluding that the four functions are components of all human consciousness, yet an empiric study of individual human minds soon makes it apparent that the relative degree of the development of the functions varies widely. Some men are more decisively oriented to thinking than to any of the other three functions, but with others one of the latter
occupies the predominant place. In fact, it seems to be a rule that approximate equality in the development of the functions is to be found only among relatively unevolved or primitive individuals. Possibly, at the level of a very high culture this state of approximate functional balance may be reattained, but certainly these highest and lowest levels we find extensive specialization. Most of our culture is the fruit of such specialization. We have made extensive conquests in the field of thought, just because there have been men who have developed the power of thought at the price of imposed inferiority upon the other functions. In contrast, we have many great artistic achievements that became possible through the excessive valuation of feeling, sensation or intuition. On the whole, it appears that if we were to isolate two groups of human beings of comparable biological development, but were to impose upon these groups the requirement that, in one of them, the four functions were to be developed equally, while, with the other, the functions would be specialized, the resultant cultural effects would vary greatly. The individuals of the group wherein the functions were not specialized would, unquestionably, develop in a more rounded way than where specialization was the rule. In a word they would remain psychically interrated. But, in contrast, the specialized group would have attained, on the whole, a higher level of culture in a relatively short period of time. This higher level of culture would result through the combination of the fruits of concentrated
specialization. Each individual would tend to be far advanced in terms of his specialty, at the price of remaining relatively barbaric with respect to his inferior functions. This would mean that, as an individual, he was poorly integrated and, therefore, dependent upon the specializations of other individuals in the group. In the one group we would have greater development of individuation; in the other, a greater development of collective culture.

Which of the preceding hypothetic societies would be most desirable is a question, with respect to which, we can hardly hope for agreement in the answers. Systems of valuation vary far too widely. Each society would have its advantages and limitations. The cultural advance of the non-specialized group would be unquestionably slower. But, to offset this, each member would be more complete, individually, and would be largely free from the problems of psycho-pathology, since the latter arise very largely as the effect of the unbalance produced by over-specialization. When such a society did attain a superior cultural level of development we would have an aristocratic group, for the true aristocrat is a product of superiority in individuation and culture.* On the other hand, the specialized society would have advanced further in terms of the product synthesized by the combination of its specialties, but would

* It is easy to see that such a society would naturally become democratic in form. In fact, it is well known that there is more real and practical democracy within genuinely aristocratic circles than anywhere else.
remain distinctly barbaric when valued from the standpoint of the collection of its inferior or underdeveloped functions. Thus this group would have a positive potential which was distinctly superior, but with this offset by a negative potential of relative inferiority. The resultant disproportion would be the cause of serious instability. The superiority would always be threatened by the inferiority. There would always be the possibility that a motivation, grounded in the inferior side, would be implemented by the capacities of the superior side. Nothing could have a greater destructive potentiality than just this. That such a possibility is not of merely academic interest is well illustrated by the present state of Europe.

Even though wisdom might lead us to prefer the form of psychological development illustrated by the first group, yet, as realistic observers, we must recognize that, in point of fact, we are living in a highly specialized society. For many centuries, at any rate, there has been a radical disjunction of the psychological functions. Men are valued because of their most developed functions, rather than as integrated individualities. There is a wide variation in functional capacity, with superiority in terms of one or two preferred functions purchased at the price of a corresponding inferiority of the remaining functions. Since this is the rule, sociological systems which fail to take this fact into account are bound to fall short of attaining the objective of sound social adjustment. Our sociology must orient itself to the psychological
peculiarities as they actually exist in our western culture.

Specialization of function leads to the segregation of distinct functional types, in addition to the types defined by the preponderance of one or the other of the two attitudes. Our next task will take the form of sketching the possible type-patterns which grow out of the accentuation of the various functions.

In as much as psychological research has determined that each function may manifest predominantly one or the other of the attitudes of introversion and extraversion, the combination of the functions and attitudes supplies us with eight possible primary type-patterns having distinctive character. Accordingly, each function will have to be examined in its introverted and extraverted forms.

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BOOK I
Chapter 4
The Thinking Types

Whenever an individual's primary reality-value is centered in the concept or idea we have a thinking type. Since all schematic analysis is oriented more to thought than to any other function, it follows that more justice can be done to the thinking type by the analytic method than in the case with the other types. In this instance, it is a case of a criticism of thought by means of an instruments or process which is true to the law of thought. As a result, that which can be thought concerning the thinking type will be more acceptable to representatives of this class than anything that can be thought concerning the other types, also when judged by representatives of the latter. Inevitably, we are approaching the whole type problem from the standpoint of thought and thus are guilty of an unavoidable violennc to the functions other than those of thought. I readily acknowledge this ineluctible defect in the present treatment.

All thinking involves a complex of three primary factors. Clearly there is something which is the object of thought, i.e., its content. But, equally clearly, there is someone who thinks the thought; we do not find thoughts hanging loose out in space. It requires but a small amount of analysis to discover that the thought is the third factor and is to be distinguished from the thinker and the content. Now thought, as such, together with the formal laws by which
it is governed, constitute the common denominator whereby all thinkers can unite upon a platform of common discussion. But such meeting upon a common platform by no means leads to general agreement among all thinkers, even when the individuals possess equal degrees of logical acuity. Very frequently, differences remain even after the most complete and competent discussion. Quite clearly these differences grow out of factors other than those of the laws of thought itself. Here is where typical differences within the thinking type can be differentiated.

Except when functioning as the pure logician or as the pure mathematician, the thinker is a center carrying conscious or psychologically unconscious elements, which are not reducible to the thought function. In one case, he may attach more importance to the object or the content of thought while, in another, the subjective element carries the greater reality-value. With William James, we may call this a difference of temperament, and this temperament constitutes the decisive factor which remains to divide men, however similar their logical capacities or knowledge of empiric fact. Apart from logic, where does the greater reality lie for the thinker? With respect to this question thinkers are hopelessly divided. The introverted thinker places the greater reality-value in the subject, while the extraverted thinker is sure he faces reality in the object.

To arrive at a clearer understanding of our problem we are faced with the necessity of analysing concrete thought into its component factors or elements. Apart from its
purely formal or logical aspect, ordinary thought is always thought about something. Typically this something is viewed as derived from an external world of experience, in other words, the world as given through sensation or, possibly, intuition. But there is a third factor that is, all too often, disregarded. The thinking subject brings with him a conditioning framework which predetermines, in a general way, the form under which his world is experienced or thought. Predominantly, men are so completely bound by this form that they are quite unaware of its existence. Yet it operates none the less.

We may suggest the function of this subjective and predetermining form by drawing an illustration from mathematics. For the purpose of analysing spacial relationships, mathematicians set up what are known as bases of reference or systems of co-ordinates. By reference to such bases various geometric relationships can be studied expeditiously by analytic means. Let the system of analytic equations symbolize the field of consciousness of the thinker. The geometric configurations would then represent the object-in-itself which, however, was represented in the consciousness of the thinker as a complex of algebraic or other analytic symbols. The base of reference, or system of co-ordinates, would correspond to the predetermining or subjective factors. Now, when we shift the base of reference from a position of rest, with respect to the geometrical object, to one of relative motion, or change its type, as from the Cartesian system to the polar system, the form of
the analytic system of equations is more or less radically altered. In this illustration, the alternative analytic systems correspond to thinkable world-views, all equally correct when judged from its appropriate base. One world-view might be simpler or more workable than another, but there is no a priori reason why one view should be regarded as truer than another. The ultimate objective reality, or thing-in-itself, would not be the realization of any of these alternative world-views. The thing-in-itself, or the non-relative noumenal essence would remain an unknown X, of such a nature that it forms the objective* substratum of all the various world-views. The way in which the object would be experienced, in its turn, is preconditioned by the form or state of the system of reference, that is, the transcendental form which the apperceiving subject imposes upon the material of the thinking consciousness.

Neither the transcendental subjective form nor the objective thing-in-itself is ever the direct content of thought. Direct apprehension of either of these would require a transcendence of the framework of relative

* The word "objective" as used in this case is not to be understood as referring to an object of relative consciousness. It is objective in the sense of the invariant element of all states and kinds of consciousness. In this sense, the invariant element in the subject-as-such would be objective, as contrasted to the peculiarities of different empiric or personal selves. This double meaning of the word "objective" is admittedly confusing.
consciousness. But by means of the object of relative consciousness it is possible to have a process of reflection stimulated which, by piercing toward the subjective pole, draws forth a symbolic knowledge of the transcendental predeterminant of concrete consciousness. Such knowledge, when expressed, would have to be given in symbolic terms, since the expression as formulated would be in the form of an objective content, but conveying a meaning related to the subjective preconditoning factors. Thus it is that introversion leads to a knowledge of principles which are not mere abstractions from experience. The introverted thinker is closer to these principles than he is to the objective world, however much his introverting process was dependent upon an experience of the object for its initiation. In this case, the object had significance only as a sort of "trigger" cause. But for the extraverted thinker, there are no principles save in the sense of schema which are abstracted from the concrete reality of the object. Thus, for the extraverted thinker, such schema are only pragmatic or instrumental devices, to be valued solely in the degree that they lead, subsequently, to a fuller consciousness of the object.

* It is not my intention to imply that the "transcendental subjective form" and the "objective thing-in-itself" are distinguishable in any absolute sense. They simply appear as different from the perspective of relative consciousness. As a matter of fact, profound introversion leads ultimately to a state of consciousness wherein these two coalesce.
For the extravert, facts of experience are more real than principles, while the reality-value is revered for the introvert. Clearly, here are differences which can never be resolved by argumentative discussion alone. The initial reality-value from which each takes his premise is so different that there never can be agreement in the final consequence. There is no fact of greater importance than this for the sociological theorist. An analysis which, from the extraverted standpoint, may seem thoroughly documented and entirely competent, may still be viewed by the introvert as unconvincing, because he sees it as possessing only a relative validity. Typically, the extravert is unconscious of the fact that he is viewing the situation from a perspective, which is only one from among a number of different possible perspectives. But of this fact, the introvert thinker is thoroughly conscious, and while he might agree with the extravert thinker to the extent of saying, "if we assume the perspective of the latter the conclusions follow", yet he might fail to agree that the perspective taken was the best or the most comprehensive possible.

Directed relative thinking is always in the form of judgments involving concepts. This implies a relating process which, in this case, is subject to the laws of logic. The conscious content, as concept, may or may not have a felt value. In any case, if a concept arouses a feeling attitude, such as that of liking or disliking, this is a matter of irrelevance from the standpoint of the
thinker. Thought pursues its course through the preferred and distasteful ideas and through those which are neutral, in the affective sense, with an attitude of indifference. For this reason thought appears to be cold. But thought does not dare to be anything else, if it is not to violate its own law. Otherwise, thought degenerates into mere wishful thinking, or becomes no more than an appendage of some other function or functions. Sound thinking is necessarily aloof and indifferent. Manifestly such thinking is far from common. It is achieved only as the result of protracted self-discipline and always requires consciously willed effort.

Because, when operating in accordance with its own law, the nature of thought is such that it must exclude the active participation of feeling in the process, except for feelings such as that of faithfulness to the thought procedure, pure thought has often seemed to be inhuman from the viewpoint of representatives of other psychological types. This attitude is hardly defensible on theoretical grounds, though it is psychologically understandable. The fact is that thought is a human function no less than is the case with the other three functions. Indeed, there is ground for affirming that the capacity for pure thought is the most peculiar distinguishing mark of the human being as such. For, on the other hand, warmth of feeling, capacity for sensation and for at least something which is like intuition is shared by other than human creatures. But while the accusation of being non-human, as applied to pure
thought, is not theoretically defensible, yet the existence of the accusation has psychological significance. For when this accusation is made we have strong evidence that the person responsible for it belongs to other than the thinking type and, very likely, gives to feeling the preferred position. It is, indeed, often true that the law of thought does violence to the law of feeling, particularly as a result of its embedment in the colorless feeling tone of aloofness.

There are reasons for believing that the pure and consciously directed thinking function is the most recently developed major psychological capacity of man. Thus, from the standpoint of the older and more firmly established functions, it is quite natural to view thought, in the pure form, as something more or less alien to human nature. As a whole, humanity seems to find it difficult to adapt itself to the environment produced by the present culture, which in an especial sense the product of directed thought. The growth of psychoses and the tendencies toward physical deterioration constitute strong supporting evidence for this conclusion. Thus it is quite easy to understand how the intellect has been made to stand in the equivocal position of an enemy to life and, therefore, anti-human. But a dispassionate examination of the facts does not confirm the view that the intellect is essentially inimical to life. Recent progress in the conquest of disease, with a resultant notable increase in life-expectancy, is primarily due to the achievements of directed thinking. The
truth would seem to be that we are facing the problems of adjustment to the effects produced by a relatively recently liberated function. Thus the conflict and difficulties of the present situation are not to be interpreted as an issue between the truly human and something anti-human, but rather as the effect of the effort in adjustment to the widening of the meaning of the word "human".

* At this point, a word concerning the meaning of humanism would seem to be pertinent. Humanism is defined as, "any system of thought, belief or action which centers about human or mundane things to the exclusion of the divine". (Baldwin's "Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology".) As thus conceived, humanism does not imply a preferential valuation of certain human functions at the expense of others. The essence of humanism lies in the focusing of interest in mundane things to the exclusion of the divine. When we analyse this psychologically we find that the preferential valuation is given to one of the psychological attitudes, i.e., the extraverted, at the expense of the introverted attitude. The expression, "mundane things", is equivalent to the "object of consciousness". Thus, exclusive valuation of the mundane implies a systematic over-valuation of the extraverted attitude. When psychologically considered, "the Divine" means, in terms of feeling, the "supreme value" and, in noetic terms, the transcendental or subjective predetermining component of consciousness. Humanism is thus very similar to philosophic Naturalism.
A comprehensive examination of the various fields of human activity and interest reveals the fact that, in some of these, certain of the psychologic functions play the leading role, while other fields are developed principally through the use of other functions. It is easy to isolate the zone of interest in which thinking plays the dominant part. At once we can list philosophy, mathematics, science - both pure and applied - and modern business. In contrast, the part played by thinking is distinctly subordinate in politics, art and religion. In the latter, feeling and the perceptive functions have primary value while thought, in so far as it enters into the picture at all, serves only as a supporting or instrumental function. In the four field of philosophy, mathematics, science and modern business, conceptual judgment is primary while the other functions are only contributory, though the degree in which this is the case is variable. If we examine these manifestations of thinking activity, similarities and differences in the different forms of thinking become apparent.

Pure thought attains its highest degree of perfection in pure mathematics, although even here the other functions do serve a subordinate part in the consciousness of the. It is a significant feature of this cycle that nearly all sociological thinking is either humanistic or materialistic. This is simply a sign of the general over valuation of the extraverted attitude that is so typical of our culture.
creative mathematician. The part of the secondary functions is very largely submerged in the finished product so that the final structure seems to be nothing but thought. But if we examine into the consciousness of the mathematician while at work, we find that the other functions serve to supply the impetus to mathematical effort and often guide the course of the developing thought. If we were to ask the question, What is it that drives or guides the mathematician to mathematical effort? we find it necessary to draw upon other elements than that of pure thought to find the answer. No effort known to man is more exacting than that involved in mathematical thinking. Often a great deal of ascetic self-discipline, combined with intense concentration, is required before the mind can make any creative advance. The rate of fatigue is very high and the thinker may find in himself a considerable opposition to the production of the tension requisite for productive work. No human activity is less spontaneous or autonomous than mathematical productivity. As a rule, nothing happens save when the mental faculties are at a very high level of tension or after a protracted period of work at high tension. The psychical organism takes a good deal of punishment in this kind of thinking. Now, such being the case, the motive leading to the effort must be correspondingly strong. In the case of pure mathematics, this is not a practical motivation, such as a command of material nature.* The real motive is sheer love of truth and of

* The practical motivation may generally be determinant in the case of the applied mathematician, but here we are considering the pure mathematician.
beauty for their own sakes. But love and the sense of beauty most decidedly belong to the feeling function and, in order to activate severe effort, must be strongly developed. But these feeling qualities are entirely absent as explicit elements in the finished mathematical product, so that there is no detour in the strict course of reasoning due to considerations of love and beauty. Thus, we may say, the hidden soul of mathematics is strong in feeling, while the surface appears as perfectly feelingless.

But feeling is not the only function, other than thinking, that enters into the creative process of mathematical thought. The final form of a mathematical demonstration or treatise hides almost completely the path whereby the finished product was attained. When the mathematician writes he already knows the solution of his problem, and he merely casts what he knows into a logical order of presentation. In his rarely revealed secret processes of the mind, we find something that is far less orderly and systematic than the finished result. There is a number of fragmentary bits of thinking, often of a nature little more than a sort of cutting and trying of a variety of thought sequences. This process, which may be likened to a plowing of the field of the mind, may continue over long intervals of time without leading to any decisive results. But sooner or later, most likely when the mind is relaxed, the critical correlating idea for the problem tends to break forth spontaneously. The final step is simply one of writing up the material in logical form. Now, in this
we see the action of something other than conscious thought. Since the projection into consciousness of the key to the solution is typically spontaneous and surrounded by a feeling of assurance, we at once realize that herein the psychologic unconscious has participated. Since intuition is the function through which the unconscious connects with the conscious side of the mind, we see that mathematical creativeness is vitally dependent upon the intuitive function. Yet all of this disappears from the face of the finished product.

We now have before us a very striking paradox. On its face there is nothing more aloof and nothing more exclusively of the nature of pure thought than just precisely pure mathematics, yet hidden behind the veil is a rich compound of feeling-intuition without which mathematical creation would be quite impossible. This paradox is an instance of a principle of the very highest psychological importance. No man, in his total nature, is or can be exclusively identical with one or two preferred functions. The psychical organization is a totality of all the functions and both the attitudes, but certain of the functions together with one of the attitudes may hold the dominant and, possibly, even the exclusive position in consciousness. But the other functions and the complementary attitude remain either latent or as active forces behind the scenes. The result is, that the psychical pattern has two aspects which stand in supplementary relationship. Thus, that which a man is, as an objective personality, is reversed in an inner and more or less hidden sense. As a consequence, the man, who as an
objective personality is a strongly developed thinker, has an inner psychical attitude which is just as strongly marked by feeling. This inner aspect of the psyche is, accordingly, the counterpart of the personality. Intuitively mankind seems to have been aware of this inner aspect from the beginning, but it has become a recognized fact for western psychology only recently. We may follow tradition and call this inner aspect the "soul," or we may use the terminology of modern psychology and call it the "anima." In either case, the reference is to the same reality.

For our present purposes, the most important characteristic of the anima is its complemental character, when contrasted with the personality. The anima is what the persona is not. This gives to the anima of man a feminine character and visa versa in the case of woman. If, now, a psychical inversion were to be effected so that the anima became the persona, and the former personality became the future anima, the character of the individual would undergo a radical reversal. There is, in fact, a well recognized tendency for this to occur during the later years of the individual life, particularly so in the cases of those individuals who have made the most dynamic use of the developed functions of their personalities. Thus old men tend to become psychologically feminine while old women manifest notably masculine characteristics.

In the case of the pure mathematician an inversion of the anima and the persona produces some very striking results. The cold and highly disciplined thinker may
become a poet, a mystic or a master of phantasy creation. The mystical development in later life is well illustrated in the cases of Pascal and Sir Issac Newton, while there are not many instances of pure phantasy superior to "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland".*

* Basic psychological facts, such as that of the actuality of the anima and of its inter-relationship with the persona, are factors that cannot be safely neglected in sociological and economic theory. For social and economic theory always involve assumptions as to the nature of human desire. Thus, for example, economic theory assumes as a basic element of its structure an abstract economic man whose desires follow a typical pattern. But if there is a tendency for such patterns to undergo inversion, the structure of such an economic theory may well be undermined at its roots. As an instance, we cannot assume that the desire to acquire is an economic constant, since we are presented with notable examples of men who spent the early portion of their lives in strong and successful devotion to acquisition, only to reverse this tendency in old age. Carnegie and the elder Rockefeller are outstanding examples of this shift. Accordingly, theorists who see capitalistic motivation as moving in the direction of acquisition without limit reveal a very profound ignorance of fundamental psychology. Any strong tendency carries within itself its own corrective which will manifest sooner or later. Thus there is no a priori objection to the con-
There are certain further important facts to be noted in the psychology of the mathematician. First of all, mathematics, as such, is not exclusively the product of an introverted or of an extraverted attitude. Historically, much of mathematics was born out of practical objective situations. In order to build structures that will stand, to navigate the seas out of sight of land and to calculate time-relations that are necessary for social intercourse, a certain knowledge of mathematics is necessary. When mathematical properties are abstracted from the concrete relationships of experience and the mathematical thinking is motivated by a desire to bring about concrete effects in the field of objective relations, the attitude of the mathematical thinker is primarily extraverted. But, in this case, we have the applied rather than the pure mathematician. In contrast, if the mathematical material is a free creation, in other words, a phantasy projection, and if the objective is a pure construction which is all the more valued because it has no practical application, then the attitude is clearly introverted. It may be a surprise to the reader, but there is strong reason for believing that the larger part of mathematical production falls under the latter motivation. Often, to be sure, the product of pure centration of power in the hands of a few men. But it is highly important that the men who have great power should be men of superior character.
mathematical interest is found, subsequently, to possess most important applications, but this result is entirely alien to the motivation of the pure mathematical creator.

However, taken as a whole, mathematical thinking, whether pure or applied, is more introverted than other thinking with the exception of the idealistic philosophies. This is true for the reason that mathematical objects are very subtle and ideal. Thought can become more introverted than its manifestation in mathematics only by becoming entirely symbolic, in which case the apparent objects in the thought-system have an exclusively subjective content. When thought becomes still more introverted, so that it no longer employs even symbolic objects, then it ceases to be a manifested expression.*

Mathematics is peculiarly significant in connection with the discussion of the thinking function as it constitutes the most perfect manifestation of pure thought. All other thinking is, in larger degree, dependent upon the co-operation of other functions, and thus the product is less pure. Partly for this reason I have given so much space to the discussion of mathematics.

Outside of mathematics the most notable manifestations of highly pure thinking are to be found in philosophy and mathematical physics. In mathematical physics the object still remains highly rarified and ideal but, in as much as we have here an application to a material which, however indirectly, is derived from experience through the senses

* No extravert, who is bound to his type, could possibly believe in this kind of thought, but there are some individuals who have realized its actuality.
and there is at least an underlying motive of control of the object, the thinking has progressed a step toward extraversion. Yet, as compared with the experimental or observational scientist in any scientific discipline, the mathematical physicist is relatively introverted.

In philosophy, taken as a whole, the introverted attitude is more developed than in science, also taken as a whole. But the range of attitude in philosophy extends from an extraversion reaching further toward the object than the average of science, to an introversion transcending even that of pure mathematics. However, it seems evident that introverted philosophic thinking becomes inarticulate in its progress towards the subject more quickly than does pure mathematics. This is true for the reason that in mathematics language has attained the highest perfection of development known to man, either in the historic past or during the present day. So far as thinking is concerned, the highest possibility of articulate introversion can only be reached by a combination of mathematical language with philosophic insight.*

* The fact that the tendency of current mathematics is away from the object and toward the subject is revealed when we contrast Greek mathematics with the mathematical developments in Western culture. Greek mathematics was definitely oriented to bodied - so much so that the incommensurable number was far from acceptable. This reveals that the Greek attitude was relatively extraverted. In contrast, our notion of number has what might be called
In no field more than in the case of philosophy can we trace the conflict of the attitudes so clearly or so far into the past. The classical instance of the issue is an orientation to space. Thus a number such as $\sqrt{2}$ has no meaning when regarded as a reference to bodies. It expresses, however, a sort of functional play in space though, to be sure, it is a kind of mathematical space rather than the ordinary perceptual space. Now the notions of the sky or of space, when psychologically considered, represent the polar opposite of the object, in other words, the subject. When one studies the mystical literature of the East Indians this fact becomes clearly evident. Introversion is often interpreted as movement toward the sky, i.e., levitation. This is the opposite of gravitation which, in its turn, represents consciousness in bondage to objects.

Not only has mathematical thought gone far in breaking the bondage to the object, but the same tendency is to be noted in field-physics. The shift from the mechanical interpretation of physics to field-physics is a very impressive shift from an extraverted attitude toward introversion. It has even been suggested that the whole theory of physics may be rewritten in terms of the field without having to introduce the notion of bodies in a field. To one who has a sufficiently deep psychological insight this development has profound prophetic significance. Both mathematics and theoretical physics are far out in the vanguard in the movement of the Western psyche. The general consciousness of the West is at
is found in the conflict between Platonism and Aristotelianism. But it recurs in the Middle Ages in the controversies between Nominalism and Realism. With the opening of the modern period the division is presented with exceptional clarity in the contrast between Rationalism and Empiricism. Since the time of Kant the old conflict reappears with introversion represented by Idealism and extraversion by Naturalism, Neo-Realism and Pragmatism. At the extreme of philosophic extraversion we have Naturalism or Materialism, of which Marxism is the chief sociological manifestation. At the other extrem lies the non-dualistic "Atmavidya" of the Brahmin philosopher Shankara. Between these extremes the other philosophic schools stand in variously gradated positions. Whenever the philosophic emphasis is placed upon the material object, scientific fact, external relations, experience or desire directed toward objective effects, the resultant philosophy reveals an extraverted attitude. In contrast, when philosophies posit a super-sensuous Substance, develop the idea of a primary Metaphysical Reality or lay the central focus upon the apperceptive function of the Self, the attitude is introverted. Dialectical conflicts between these two groups of schools are perennial, which simply means that there is no agreement as to a common criterion of Value.

present highly extraverted, but the most advanced sciences are leading the way in the turnover that is, of necessity, bound to come. The present psychical distortion will ultimately be corrected by an equally profound introversion, i.e., a movement of valuation away from the object and toward space, in other words, the Subject.
or Reality. Yet all schools develop their thought through the use of a common denominator of logic, and this is true for the reason that the common ground is the thinking function.

It is a significant fact that in the domain of science the two attitudes have played less the part of conflicting temperaments than of complemental factors. Undoubtedly this is true for the reason that it is precisely in natural science that Western culture has realized most completely its possibilities. The extraverted spirit is very clearly exemplified in observation and experimentation. Descriptive science is preeminently extraverted and, since by far the greatest amount of scientific work is descriptive, it is unquestionably true that the vast majority of scientists are more extraverted and than introverted thinkers. But it is through theoretical co-ordination that the heterogeneous mass of scientifically determined fact becomes organized as system within the framework of general laws. As it is only through the scientific systems that scientifically determined fact becomes an effective power, the theoretical work is of an importance not less than that of fact-determination. Now, theoretical construction requires the introverted attitude which, on the whole, is more immediately aware of the validity of principles than of experimentally determined fact. Often, it is true, empiric or ad hoc hypotheses are developed by minds functioning primarily in the extraverted attitude, but in the case of the great integrating theories, which unite into one whole vast masses of seemingly heterogeneous material, it
is far more likely that the theoretical ideas are produced mainly by subjective brooding rather than by prolonged engagement with facts. In this we have a manifestation of the introverted attitude.*

When we step from the domain of pure to applied science we find that the thinking function still continues to be very strongly predominant. But here we are dealing with thought almost wholly in its extraverted attitude. For, regardless of whether the application is directed toward specific psychological or medical problems, on the one hand, or to an engineered organization of inanimate materials, on the other, yet in every case the purpose intended is some objective effect. In so far as ideas or principles are employed, they are valued only as instrumentalities in effecting modifications of the object. Here science is valued to the extent that it works and because it works in the producing of objective effects. Nothing could be more completely the opposite of the attitude and the valuations of the introverted thinker than just this. For the genuine introverted thinker values principles of their own sakes and values objective facts or transformations of the object, only in so far as they serve as instruments which facilitate the realization of principles.

* It would be an interesting study to determine how far science, as system, is the result of the fact that there were great minds who dared to indulge their fantasy-function.

** Whatever one may think with respect to the general validity of the pragmatic theory of knowledge or system of
Though applied science is itself extraverted, it by no means follows that all men who are engaged in the various departments of applied science are, in their personal attitudes, extraverted. Here is a very important distinction.* For we can focus our attention upon the personal attitudes of individuals or upon the relative introvert-extravert character of their products. Now these two methods of approach do not lead to identical results, since it is entirely possible, for instance, for an introverted individual to produce a product which is socially valuable mainly because of its orientation to objective effects. I know of an economic geologist who, as an individual, is a well developed introverted thinking type. yet he is valued highly by his employers because he is able to supply information which plays an important part in determining the course of their investment. 

* In the present discussion of thinking I have been less concerned with the thinker as an individual than with the character of his product. This is a valid procedure, since the present concern is the general sociological application of analytic psychology. If our interest had been the treatment of specific psychopathic cases the individual attitude would have been all-important. But such is not the case when we are considering psychological attitude and function in their broad sociological bearings.
Thus this man produces an extraverted value although, as a matter of individual psychology, he is introverted. However, instances of this kind would seem to be more the exception than the rule.

Apparently thinking in the extraverted attitude attains its purest development in the applied scientist. In so far as it is a question of applying science to inanimate objects, this kind of thinking has been highly successful. In fact, it is precisely in this domain that Western civilization has realized its most positively successful achievements. But when the object is a living creature the success of the pure extraverted thinking attitude is far less notable. Indeed, one of our most serious mistakes, of which we are beginning to become conscious, has been the unjustified extension of the engineer's or the chemist's way of thinking to the specific problems of living organism. Thus we have many physicians who view their task as the fighting of disease rather than as the healing of human beings. This is an approach which produces much unnecessary failure, which becomes all the more considerable as the psychological ramifications of the disease become more important. The hygienic engineer may, without doing damage to the value of his work, think of himself as fighting disease, but such is by no means the case with the practicing physician. The same considerations apply to education and to applied sociology and economics. For, in these cases, we have practical problems involving living beings in whom the
individual variants from thinkable general rules may be more significant than the agreements. Skill in application to either the living or inanimate object does call for a superior development of the extraverted attitude, but the more developed the object is as a living and conscious being, the more important become the functions which are neglected by the pure thinking type. Especially is it true that the wise handling of men cannot be reduced to the basis of pure formulae, however much such formulae may help in a subsidiary sense. *

When we come to the social zone covered by the term "business", thinking ceases to hold the predominant place that it does in the other fields previously discussed. Thought is only relatively predominant in the business world and may well have been of subordinate importance before the advent of technology. The traditional trader of the past seems, psychologically, to have more of the character which is typical of the politician than of the true thinker. In so far as business is a matter of skill in manipulating human desire, thought must play the subordinate function behind the scenes. Also to the extent that business is a matter of customer and labor relationship, the feeling function is of more importance than thought. But to the degree that business is a question of relationship between finance, technology and management, thought is of predominant value. Now it is just in the

* The striking failure of the Marxian ideologies in the field of application is very largely due to the overvaluation of formula-thinking with respect to sociological and economic problems.
latter complex that business has made its greatest advance during the last century and a half. Thus the leading business men of the day are more largely thinkers than has been true heretofore. The necessities of finance and technology are essentially rational ideological problems. Accordingly, when the integration of finance and technology is the greatest business problem the effective management is necessarily of a type which can co-ordinate financial and technological consciousness. As this can be done only on the level of thought, naturally effective management must have superior thinking capacity.

But while it is true that modern business necessitates a far greater sweep of knowledge than ever before it still remains, in variable degree, dependent for its success upon a valid valuation of many indefinables and unknowables. Thus it is that the very greatest success in business tends to go to those who have an exceptional development of extraverted intuition. The recognition of hidden potentialities is only partly a matter of conscious calculation. It is far more largely dependent upon special insight. Thus, the superior business genius may be predominantly an intuitive with a subordinate, but well developed, capacity of thought which is primarily extraverted in its orientation.* This is the reason why the typical

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* While the business thought must be oriented to the object, and therefore extraverted, the individual temperament of the business man may be even highly introverted. Probably John D. Rockefeller Sr. was our greatest business genius, yet a study of his life reveals the temperament of a well developed thinking introvert. Much of the adverse criticism that was aroused by Rockefeller's work was due to the popular misunderstanding of the introvert temperament.
business mind so often fails to impress the pure intellectual. Rarely, if ever, are the more successful business men great thinkers. But they are superior co-ordinating centers. Thus they tend to be organized as functional complexes whereby correlation may be established with men of wide diversity of capacity. Accordingly, while the business man is specialized in the sense that he has superior orientation to objective fact and objective situations, he must have a relative breadth of functional development. Of course, the most successful psychological pattern would vary with the type of business. Thus, if a business produces highly technical products and deals exclusively with professional buyers, the psychological demand of the managerial problems is very similar to that required of the technologist. But in the reverse case, where the business consists of the sale of goods or services to the consuming public, a superior capacity for feeling into the human object is a pre-condition of success. Consequently, in this latter case, an extensive development of the feeling function may be more important than thought capacity.

At present it appears that the business success of the future will go more to those who have superior capacity in integrating labor and consumer relationships without sacrificing the necessities of technology and finance. This imposes a very severe demand upon management for it necessitates a high development of a wide functional complex. Thus we may expect a substantial reduction in the number of successful business men in the future, thus
leading to a decrease in the number and an increase in the size of the operating concerns. Perhaps only men of the personal stature of real kings can win in the future. And will we have enough of them?*

The great sociological importance of the business mind inheres in the fact that it shares with the political mind the only direct control of objective human events. At least in the West, the power of religion and, in both the East and the West, the power of intellectual and artistic culture operates with delayed effects upon the objective field. From the standpoint of a sufficiently long historical perspective the influence of these three zones of conscious intent may well be far more considerable than that of business and politics, but power-effects upon the immediate field are either in the form of money-power or of political-power. Practically, then, our choice in empire government lies between money-power and political power or some combination of the two. Much sociological thought has failed to take this fact into account in any adequate degree with the result that many proposed programs are pregnant with the threat of merely substituting a new set of abuses in place of the old ones, the recognition of which lead to the development of those programs. An informed individual may validly

* There are grave sociological consequences to be feared as the result of the present tendency to make the managerial problems too difficult for men who fall short of the capacity of genius.
prefer to live under the one or the other of these types of power, but such a choice will be grounded in psychological rather than in ethical reasons.

No psychological type is, as such, more virtuous or more evil than another, nor is the development of selfishness or of altruism a peculiarity of one or another psychological pattern. Each type tends to build its own peculiar ethic and the individuals who fall within any given type form a complex reaching from those who are highly conscientious to others, at the bottom of the scale, in whom the ethical sense is scarcely more than latent. It is a wholly mistaken view that there is something ethically superior in the make-up of the political mind when compared with the business-mind. These two minds, taken as a whole, manifest psychological patterns having certain distinctive features which, in turn, lead to moral codes that diverge in certain important respects. As I have already pointed out, the business-mind tends to give to thinking a relative priority while, as I shall show more fully later, the political mind is more strongly oriented to feeling. Thus all thinking types will find more in common with the ethic of the business-mind than with the quite different ethic of the politician. But other human beings with divergent individual psychologies may, quite properly, reverse the preference. For my own part, I could much prefer to live under the domination of a cold-blooded but intellectually honest business-mind than to be ruled by a warm-hearted Machiavelian. Warm-heartedness
by itself is no guarantee that there will be no ethical outrage, as is well illustrated in the totalitarian states. But different men have different tastes. However, it is distinctly important that the individual should not find himself aligned with the "wrong crowd", simply because he had a mistaken understanding of the real issue.

It may appear that this discussion of the thinking type has been disproportionately extended. There are, however, two reasons which seem to justify such an extension. In the first place, thought has more to say concerning its own nature than it is able to do with respect to any other function, and a discursive treatment is one in which thought necessarily plays the predominant role. In addition, though has, in our culture, developed a far greater skill in self-criticism than has any of the other functions. Secondly, sociology has been treated by us dominantly as a problem for thought and thus it is especially important that we should have a clear understanding of the powers and limitations of thinking. In reality this discussion is far too short to accomplish the latter purpose. The most that I have hoped to achieve is a sort of sketching and suggesting of certain phases of the problem. Any serious student will find a wide literature and, above all things, should not neglect Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason". With this final suggestion I shall proceed to the consideration of other functions.