On the Limits of Psychology

Franklin Merrell-Wolff December 9, 1951

Tonight we propose, during the initial part of the talk, to deal briefly with a subject matter which may be more than a little painful for many of you here; and yet it is a subject matter that introduces certain points of very profound importance. The subject matter in question belongs to the fifth chapter of the second part of *The Psychology of the Unconscious* by Dr. Carl G. Jung.¹ The subject of this chapter is the "Symbolism of the Mother and of Rebirth."

Now, a word of introduction so that we may have an understanding of the point at which we start here. It was with this work that Dr. Jung broke from the status of a disciple following Sigmund Freud and introduced for the first time the notion of the "collective unconscious." But one notes still in this work a good deal of the Freudian influence, particularly in the emphasis of the reductive interpretation of subject matter which ordinarily is regarded as perhaps the very heart of religion. In Jung's later works, particularly in *The Integration of* [the] *Personality* and the "Introduction" to *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, the constructive interpretation takes predominance over the reductive, and the effect is very different. The reductive interpretation giving the effect of cheapening or belittling values which one has been brought up to consider sacred; whereas, the constructive interpretation considers not so much the reduction of forces in the individual psyche to what may be biologic roots, but rather their meaning as pointing towards ends somehow intended by what Jung would call the "unconscious" but what we would call the "superconscious."

The thing that would strike many readers with a shock in this chapter is the presence, or the indicated presence, of a motive underlying not only a large number of pagan religions, but even Christianity—a motive which is sublimated consciously and with a considerable success in the early or primitive Christianity, but nonetheless a motive that is surprising to many of us to discover that it exists. This motive is known as the "incest wish," which Jung goes on to explain is to be understood in this sense: of the wish of the adult to return to the infantile state. In some cases, it's viewed as the wish to return to the womb—part of the reason being that the burden of being adult is too much, or seems to be too much, and there is a longing for the state of infantile irresponsibility. A connected motive is the desire for rebirth, evidently a phase of a deep yearning for immortality—rebirth being understood sometimes in an almost physically literal sense, something which is indicated rather clearly in the story of Nicodemus in the *New Testament*. And you may remember how the Master had to tell him that the rebirth was not of the flesh but of the spirit, but apparently Nicodemus could not understand.

The sublimation in Christianity took a symbolic form, according to Jung. It was by introducing the veiled symbolic form, the conception of a divine or celestial mother

¹ Carl G. Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious* (New York: Moffat, Yard and Co., 1916), 202.

which is to replace the carnal mother in the effort of the return to rebirth, but the mother appears symbolically. The symbols of the mother, symbols that occur in mythology, in alchemy, and spontaneously out of the collective unconscious, are various. Among them and most important are the sea, the earth, sometimes a horse, sometimes a tree; but in the Christian symbolism, it is particularly in the form of a city. The city is a mother in the sense that it supports and sustains inhabitants. In the *New Testament* two cities stand out: one is Babylon, and since it is portrayed in some connections as on seven hills it may be a blind for Rome, the other city is the New Jerusalem in the heavens—Babylon representing the carnal mother, the New Jerusalem representing the celestial mother. The effort is to sublimate this incest motive so that it is oriented to something transcendental. Jung gives the effort credit for having achieved something like a virtual salvation of that particular age, that it was an enormous force for culture. But his interpretation of it is in psychological terms which imply a discrediting, or even a denial, of any transcendental value corresponding to these conceptions, but only a psychological value or reality. Thus they are conceptions which are either to be cast aside or to be reinterpreted when we come into a different cultural period. The total information that is drawn together here is very impressive. One cannot help but feel that at least some facet of truth has here been uncovered, but there is a large question introduced as to whether such interpretations, interpretations which are essentially reductive, are adequate.

Jung suggests that for the adult man, the solution lies in the abandonment of belief, positive belief in the religious object, the holding to it as an aesthetic object, but otherwise substituting something like a brotherhood of man, a moral autonomy. The trouble is that the moral revolution is not enough, that there is something in man that is left out when we substitute a social conception, a brotherhood of man, for the great religious motive that has played such an enormous part in the history of the race.

In studying Jung's conception to see its possible limitations and validities, there's a light thrown upon the whole matter in one of his footnotes, and I propose to read that to you and discuss it. It's not too easily followed, and therefore [we will] wait upon what I shall say about it.

Here it is not to be forgotten we are moving entirely in the territory of psychology, which in no way is allied to transcendentalism, either in positive or negative relation. It is a question here of a relentless fulfillment of the standpoint of the theory of cognition, established by Kant, not merely for the theory, but, what is more important, for the practice.²

I'll read more later, but right there is a key. The Kantian theory of cognition plays an enormous place in the underlying conception of knowledge which supports the whole of our science. Very briefly, and in very simple terms, it is this: there are two sources of knowledge, one through the senses, one through the understanding—in other words, the conceptual order, the order of judgment. Now, Kant's theory—based upon a philosophic background in a history we won't go into but actually achieved a way out of an impasse that existed at that time—takes this form: our sense perceptions by

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² Ibid., 226.

themselves do not give us objects, do not give us relationships, but there is needed in addition, the action of *a priori* factors known as the categories of the understanding. These come with the cognizing subject. What we live in, then, is the world form, or appearance, that is conditioned by these two factors. They do not give us the *thing-in-itself* or what we might call ultimate reality. We are unable by means of these two cognitive agents to examine into the background or into the source of the categories of the understanding or the forms of pure perception. We are locked, as it were, in a realm of pure phenomena, and that all that we can know beyond that is a *somewhat*, not only unknown, but unknowable. Kant does leave the door open to the bare possibility that some other cognition might exist, but I think that substantially, if we confine our analysis to these two forms, we are, as Kant says, restricted to the purely phenomenal and can never know the truly transcendent or noumenal.

If, then, it is true that there is some other means of cognition in addition to these two which lies latent in most men but is capable of being awakened, the world before us could be known in quite a different way, the form of science could be radically altered, and our knowledge of psychology made vastly more profound. It could very well happen that very much that we consider now knowledge would have to be scraped as simply an essential ignorance, that the reality as it truly appears in the light of this other, as yet generally not awakened power of cognition, would be something even beyond our present power of imagination.

Now, that there is such an organ of cognition is the endless assertion or implication in that whole stream of tradition which descends from at least as far back as the Vedas. It is affirmed throughout by the yogis and the rishis of India. It is even affirmed by the post-Kantians, for Fichte spoke of an "inner sense" and Shelling of an "intellectual intuition," which meant something quite different from sensuous perception and the categories of the understanding. I, myself, in 1912, faced this problem and found that there was no answer to it within the academic circles, and though I had aimed at that time at a philosophic career, I realized that it was impossible to attain any definitive answers to the metaphysical questions unless this issue as to another means of cognition was definitely solved. The testimony from India that there was such a means was sufficiently impressive to lead me to put forth the effort. After twenty-four years I was able to come up with a positive answer. Now, it is definitely affirmed by Sri Aurobindo not only that there is a third instrument of cognition, but a group of means of cognition which are other than sensuous perception and the forms of the understanding. He would list among others: vision; pure intuition, which is not the same as our ordinary intuition; knowledge by direct contact; knowledge by identity.

Now, here is the bearing: it is precisely in the religious field that the effort is made to reach into these other domains of cognitive power. In a word, the essence of religion is the arousal to activity of an organ of perception or cognition. Once the organ is aroused, further possibilities, the resolution of problems that otherwise were insoluble becomes possible. Therefore, when the psychologist deals with this religious subject matter, the point is very well taken that with that equipment, equipment defined by the theory of cognition of Immanuel Kant, he cannot come through with an adequate answer and he may do damage—do damage by a disparaging of something that has a sacred value. This very reductive treatment of these images that you find in *The Psychology of*

the Unconscious does have a disparaging effect. There is no question about that. And what he offers in return seems cheap, seems little, seems crude. The yearning for the transcendental when interpreted as a misplaced sexuality is like throwing sewerage upon sacred monuments. Sexuality may well come into the picture in a certain sense, but not in the sense of nothing-but. The question then, is there such a thing as a transcendent cannot be answered by the intellect alone or by sensuous perception alone. If there is an answer, that answer belongs to the awakening of another means of cognition.

Now, I wish to take you to something I spoke of last Sunday because it is quite important here. Let us submit the material of our consciousness to somewhat acute analysis. We have a field of perception filling our consciousness in which there is a process of thought, there is a feeling tone, and other elements that may not be reduced to this. On the surface, we have a material which we commonly interpret as referring to an external, existent world. We say that these perceptions we hold in the mind are copies or indicators of an existence out beyond—crude materialist say exact copies; one who is a sophisticated Kantian would say you can't define them as exact copies but is in some sense pointing to an existent out beyond. The point that often comes to one, how do we know that there is an existent out beyond which we call the physical world, the physical universe? We cannot take this psychical complex—which is the one thing we are really experiencing and really witnessing—step outside consciousness and compare it to the supposed existent out beyond. In order to make a comparison, the whole event has to be done within consciousness, and then we have failed to prove a correspondence, a correspondence to an existent outside consciousness. We've been really unable to escape from the conditioning of the psychical complex which makes up our perceptive consciousness. Well, of course, it's long ago been suggested that we might abandon the whole notion of an external existent. All we'd have to demand is something that would effect a uniformity in its behavior—the behavior of these psychical complexes. If we could provide for that uniformity, then we could abandon completely the notion of an existent outside our consciousness. Very important philosophies have been built upon it. However, the generality of human beings including scientists and psychologists, at least in the West here, do assume that there is an existent out beyond corresponding to our mental complexes.

Now, there are certain other experiences: experiences we have in dreams. Here there are complexes that appear before us that carry affects with them, can be rather strongly emotive, can have affects that reach over into the waking state. There's certainly something acting there. We can have visions the psychologist calls the hypnogogic visions, a seeing while awake, though partially in trance, of formations, appearances of persons, and so forth, that are not external in the sense that other people around can see them; they appear before the consciousness. And then there's a third form: in certain states of *samadhi*, which is not sleep, the consciousness may be severed completely from this plane and yet be aware of a formed content in other terms. Now, the question arises: do these formations, these three types of formation, have only a psychical significance or do they correspond to existents beyond them? Or do perhaps some of them correspond to existents beyond them? We might call that view metaphysical which maintains that there is an existent, an objective existent, corresponding to at least some of these experiences which are not held in common with the mass of human beings, for most people, particularly those who have a materialistic orientation, would deny any transcendental

existents or metaphysical existents corresponding to this type of experience, while affirming a physical existent corresponding to the ordinary psychical states. Now, I ask you, is that logically consistent? Why should we attribute reality value, in the sense of an external reality, to one type of these psychical existences and not to the other type? Wouldn't it be more consistent either to affirm equally in both cases or to deny equally in both cases? It appears to me so. I attach a lot of importance to logical consistency. Isn't it after all a matter of prejudice that one likes to believe that there is an external world corresponding to our ordinary psychical states but deny that there are worlds and existences corresponding to these extraordinary psychical states? Isn't it prejudice since logic cannot resolve the question?

Of course one might bring up this point: there is a certain uniformity, a certain social agreement, in the psychical states that are common. That's why we call them common. I say that I see over there a chimney; others confirm that psychical impression by describing the impressions which they have and I find that they agree with the impressions which I have. Therefore, there is a certain building up of testimony supporting the idea. But after all, isn't that deciding the question of reality by vote? What logical value does a majority vote have? Very often, the genius who has stood alone among the multitude and affirmed contrary to their belief, as Galileo did when he dropped the different weights from the Leaning Tower of Pisa, was right and the multitude with the majority vote was wrong. I don't see that there's an adequate answer there. The problem isn't handled quite so simply as that.

Sri Aurobindo suggests this as an answer, and a ground for the answer: that at a certain stage of Realization, there is a power of cognition which can reach directly into the object by a fusing with the object, which thereby enables one to affirm its real existence. And on the basis of that experience, he has formulated a philosophy of universal realism, affirms the real existence of the world, affirms the real existence of a complex metaphysical order consisting of its formation, also recognizing that some psychical states are only subjective and are to be interpreted accordingly, but others are the reports of real experiences. The difficulty, of course, in this answer is that one cannot verify without having aroused into activity the appropriate instrument of cognition.

There is another possibility then; this is the line taken by the Buddhists: a complete denial of an existence beyond both in the physical and in the metaphysical senses. Now, this is a position that falls more closely within the range of analysis by means of our ordinary powers. If we take only that which we know unequivocally, we find that it is this: a mass of states of consciousness, a presentment of certain contents as they exist before any judgment is passed upon them. As I look out in this room, dissociate from my mind all judging process as far as that is possible, I have, then, but a set of impressions which do not mean our commonly named objects like lamp, chimney, books, table, davenport, and so on, but just a mass of these impressions, not even human beings, but just these immediate impacts on my consciousness. That I can't possibly doubt, that is an immediate fact. Just so soon as I take these impressions and submit them to an interpretation and say, they mean that so and so objectively, such as a book, chimney, person, so on, I come into the position where I may fall into error and not know that I am guilty of error. As a matter of fact, there's no possibility of illusion so long as one has not introduced judgment. There's only an appearance—no illusion. The moment I introduce

judgment, the judgment may give me truth or illusion. My judgment, then, of an existence lying beyond, of a character beyond this immediate experience, is something that is questionable. Let us therefore drop it off as something uncertain. May be truth there; we won't positively deny that there may be an existent beyond. We simply will build upon the basis of what we unequivocally know. We do that that these impressions are here; but in that case, all impressions stand on an equal basis, equally authenticated. The dream impression, as impression, is just as much a fact as a waking impression. Dream impression, if interpreted as meaning the literal presence of Mr. So and So, may be an absolute illusion, but as impression before interpretation it is as much a fact as this table or this impression I get from striking the book. The same thing applies to the hypnogogic vision; it stands upon an equal footing as impression. Error arises only when interpretation is imposed. The interpretation could be correct, it could be an illusion. The same thing applies to the formed *samadhi* state, savikalpa *samadhi*, the impressions that come there are factually there just as much as the impressions here now. All right, we'll take that as an indubitable fact of consciousness—something which we cannot question.

Now, there's something else that happens. If we withdraw our judging power, as far as possible, try to remove the unconscious judging, which is a habit—one cannot be very successful in that without a lot of practice because our eyes will interpret impressions as objects automatically because we have learned to do that; we're trying to get the view that the newborn infant would have, if you please, before there's any interpretation come in—if we just look forth upon that—one can help a little bit by halfclosing the eyes so that the images are not too clear; withdraw the focus from the central part of the vision, as it were, and let the attention spread over the whole field with a halfclosed eye—and then note what he finds. He'll find a certain pulsation, an appearance and disappearance . . . The objects are not there all the time. The turning of the focus, for instance, may cause a disappearance. What we call leaving the room causes a disappearance. Death causes a disappearance. Birth causes an appearance. There is a sort of a movement of a play in and out of that field of these cinematographic forms, uninterpreted appearances. Now, we're trying to get a purely aesthetic consciousness. The impression that grows upon one is that here is a sort of a chaotic play, a play without meaning, a play that may make one weary, a sense of the endlessness of a kind of a becoming and a becoming not—just going on, going on, ceaselessly. Seek then to step further out of this mass into something permanent.

Now, here is a step that's subtle. It's something to be done with consciousness which I can illustrate by something that is more easily possible with vision. If you're looking straight ahead at something, instead of focusing upon what is in the center of vision as we ordinarily do but let the attention go to the periphery of that vision, there is a determinateness indeterminateness, from to a movement from particularization and differentiation to something which we might call a neutral gray and indeterminate. If one can do that to the whole field, the whole of consciousness, and with more or less success after practice, just withdraw from these formations, this is something he can sense more or less clearly when he's successful: that there is a field of consciousness there supporting the totality of all objective impressions, all subjective states of consciousness available to introspection, supporting his own identity, the self and the not-self, in one endless continuum, indeterminate, indefinable, pure, unaffected by the appearance or the disappearance of the objects. This can be done without the complete disappearance of the impressions of objects, but with the appropriate effort the impressions of objects can be cut off and there is exclusive awareness of this field component. In that continuum, there is no birth, nor death.

Now, this continuum may be called Pure Consciousness. I do so myself. It may be otherwise viewed, I know. Von Hartmann would speak of it as the "unconscious" and so undoubtedly would Jung, but it is more positive to view it as Pure Consciousness—not a consciousness that is a relationship between a knower and a known, that's our ordinary conception of consciousness, but that which is the support of the knower and the known. There's no "I" there and there's no world there, but it's just Pure Consciousness.

Jung has shown a profound insight when in the "Commentary" on *The Secret of the Golden Flower*; he speaks of this detachment of consciousness from its content as the supreme achievement. Actually, this is—when known in its purity, is a pure *nirvanic* state. It can be known with the cognition of objects at the same time, provided the consciousness—the individual consciousness never loses track of a sense of a field of consciousness which is supporting this whole manifold, so that while engaged in the manifold the consciousness in the field sense isn't lost. You can symbolize it as being like a space which supports objects, planetary bodies, stars, and so forth, but a space that is not dependent upon the presence of objects for its existence, and it's a very good figure—a consciousness which is not dependent upon knowers and known for its existence, but a support of the knower and the known.

Now, that's a way, if you wish to take it, that will enable you to dispense with the whole field of metaphysical formation. It's the Buddhist way, best formulated by the Buddhists. But I submit that if you are going to take an external existence seriously corresponding to our sense impressions then consistency forces you to take a metaphysical system of worlds seriously corresponding to extraordinary subtle impressions.

At any rate, what this is leading to in a practical way is that our whole Western psychological approach in terms of a prejudice in favor of the physical renders it inadequate in dealing with religious subject matter and thus renders it incapable of meeting the most profound and the most sacred values of the human soul; and that therefore the Western psychologist must add this deeper kind of understanding to meet these profounder problems. And the same thing goes for the Western physicist. His kind of knowledge is conditioned just as truly as is the psychologist's knowledge. He's not dealing with an organization conditioned exclusively by external facts. Some of them imagine it; the more thoughtful know that that is not the case. When man looks out upon the world his cognition is not only conditioned by the forms of understanding that are held in general, it's conditioned also by the forms peculiar to him as an individual. He has a world view not quite like that of any other beings. Fact, as it brings its impact upon his consciousness, has an effect which is different from that which it would have on another consciousness. If he then were to develop a theoretical view, it would be a complex of conditioning by fact and conditioning by his own subjective forms. Newton produced a very beautiful world view, fact didn't force that view exclusively, as we know today, for Einstein produced a very different world view which just as well takes care of fact. Theoretically, there are many possible world views. This subjective conditionality which applies to physics applies even more emphatically when we deal with the problems of the psyche.

Now, after we have the offering we'll throw the meeting open to questions and answers.

Participant: ...is the raw immediacy, is there a psychic stage when interviewing the so called . . . ?

Wolff: You mean a psychic counterpart of the external thing?

Participant: Yes.

Wolff: Well you're assuming there that there is an external thing. How do you know that external thing?

Participant: No. I agree with you that there is an external thing is merely an assumption.

Wolff: Is an assumption.

Participant: What you actually see is possibly a psychic . . . ?

Wolff: Yes. Now the psychic—now here is a thought as to how we might organize that uniformity: that there is in the unconscious, or superconscious depending upon which way you view it, a projection upon individual consciousness of uniform forms so that you have an explanation of commonality of experience. That could be developed as a theoretical interpretation. You see the idea of an external world is a theory. If we can suggest alternative theories that would work just as well then that theory is not necessary.

Any other questions?

Participant: [Difficult to hear.]

Wolff: To see without the use of reason and judgment? Yes, perception without reason and judgment is possible. As a matter of fact, how about animal perception?

Participant: [Difficult to hear.]

Wolff: It's pretty hard to determine whether animals use reason and judgment. There is a presumption that they do not in this sense: that if they had a conceptual power they would almost certainly have developed a language. The absence of a language leads to a presumption that they are not conceptually reasoning beings. There is such a thing of course it is said is a perceptual thinking, but are we justified in calling that reason and judgment?

Participant: [Difficult to hear.]

Wolff: [Difficult to hear.]

Participant: [Difficult to hear.]

Wolff: He can certainly perceive on the conscious..., but a perception strictly would mean a presentment, not a program, not a program of action, not a deduction of a consequence, but just a pure thatness.

Participant: Do you think it's possible for a person to have any understanding...?

Wolff: Understanding without reason and judgment? If you mean by reason and judgment exclusively a time process, then it probably is possible, but I would say that if there was understanding there was reason there even though it was not reason as process. That would be my guess in the matter. You might be coming to a question of definition here. I can see this, that it's probably not correct to confine reason to a process of reasoning; that wherever there is an order, even though it is instantaneously apprehended, there is a reason; that there is absence of reason only when you have complete disorder or chaos.

Participant: [Difficult to hear.]

Wolff: Well, isn't that a theory that reason itself is only an attribute of the individual; there is the other theory that there is a universal reason—Hegelian philosophy for instance—and that the individual reason is simply a more or less perfect, more or less imperfect, reflection of the universal reason, that the universal reason is the order behind all being, it is the affirmation that it is not fundamentally a chaos. Now, that reason would not be a process, as I conceive it, but only when spread out in space and time becoming a process. The term is used in different senses there and I lean rather to the Hegelian conception of reason as an ontological principle not involving essentially a process but only as reflected in man involving a process, that it could be apprehended even intuitively, but if there is an order then it's a reason. That's a question of determining how one uses terms though. One using terms quite differently, yeah, I don't think that Aurobindo uses reason in that sense; he uses it in a more restricted, narrower, humanistic sense, and therefore is often pejorative with reference to it. But I'm inclined to use it as equivalent to the principle of order. I think that would agree with the Hegelian view.

Participant: Can you explore the Pure Consciousness as being a support of the knower and the known?

Wolff: The Pure Consciousness as being a container of the knower and the known.

Participant: Oh.

Wolff: Hence, you have the disappearance of the self, the *Atman*, which is so emphasized in Buddhism, and the disappearance of the object, the disappearance of the deity in the Alaya Vijnana, which is the Pure Consciousness. All of these existences being phenomenal, flowing upon the surface of the Pure Consciousness, as it were. Hence, it's like a cinematographic play; the appearances being without substance in themselves. You get, thus, the effect of what is known as "asat" as being the ultimate reality; in contrast with Aurobindo who makes sat the ultimate—being versus nonbeing. Non-being, not meaning nothing at all, but meaning insubstantial play of appearance. Now, as a matter of fact, so far as the attainment of Realization is concerned, one can follow these different philosophies, so far as he follows his own consistently, and find them effective means for Awakening.

Participant: [Difficult to hear.]

Wolff: No. But you can be so devoted to it and you can surrender yourself so completely to it that it comes. No, you cannot force it for this reason.

Participant: [Difficult to hear.]

Wolff: A Realization. That it would be a case of the lesser trying to command the more comprehensive and larger. Inevitably the spontaneous factor is essential. But here is a law: you may call it the other power, you may call it the Divine, you may call it the universal Buddha, you may call it by any one of the innumerable names that have been used and I don't care which, but there is a *somewhat* there that has these qualities which may be experienced: that it is unutterably benign, that it supports by the most purist divine love all creatures, and the aspirant that knocks at the door of that consciousness with a full devotion and a full surrender, demanding nothing, will, when the times is right, find a response. Now, one can do something about it. One can choose to be devoted or not; that makes a difference. You can't force it. You can force intermediate states, and that's where danger does lie. There are intermediate states of consciousness that can be experienced that carry danger, sometimes quite adverse danger, or the possibility of getting locked into a pleasant state which is a way station that leads no where. Those sorts of things can be forced. But that's not Realization.

Participant: [Difficult to hear.]

Wolff: That's a kind of.... That is the danger. No, the surrender does come. It may take different forms. To the best of my own experience, at a certain moment—I'd been working rather well in studying the subject of Liberation, following the line of Shankara, and one time I was dwelling on material I read, it all of a sudden came very clearly, with an acute logic and vision at the same time, that there was nothing that could be attained. The logic is this: I am the Self, identical with the supreme Self, always have been identical with the supreme Self, and always would be and could not be otherwise; but this is true of all creatures. Therefore, it is impossible to attain identity, and that all of the effort to attain the identity was a misplaced effort. Well, with that Realization at that point, I just dropped all effort. About the next second things began to happen. I haven't put forth any effort towards attainment since that time. But so long as there's a striving, striving to see, striving to get, it wouldn't come. The fellow who is striving to get Realization is like the man who is going all over the house hunting the spectacles he has already on his eyes. He finds his spectacles when he stops hunting. That doesn't mean that the initial effort hasn't done something. It has this value: effort in the sense of purification of the mind, purification of the..., purification of the motivation, the rooting out of egoism—effort in that sense does prepare the way. That doesn't command Realization. The Realization comes spontaneously if it does come, but everyone can be assured that he who has prepared himself will not be forgotten. It will be just a matter of waiting until the appropriate hour has struck. Time has something to do with it. The law of cycles applies in there; you can't force outside those laws of cycles. Therefore, be prepared at all moments for that moment. That is the effort that one most appropriately can put forth; but not to try to force. If you try to force, ego is ruling. It is the "I am" becoming an exaggerated "I am," and what could happen is that one would break into powers that would be of an asuric type; in other words, an enormously inflated egoism a kind of Genghis Khan. That is extremely dangerous—a man that could possibly be a scourge for a whole world, but it would not be spiritual Realization; it would not be fulfillment. It could mean death of soul. Yeah. Hence, therefore, the fundamental attitude of surrender in one form or another must be there. It can be formulated in other terms. The way of Self-Realization would not use so much the term of surrender, but perhaps the connection of a spontaneity of the Self. But it comes to the same thing in the long run—a self-giving, absolutely; a self-giving so complete that one renounces the very attainment itself before the attainment can come.

I think that'll be enough for tonight. We'll use the closing words.