In what I have written heretofore, and in what I have spoken, there are certain assumptions that should be kept in mind. I have referred to them in *Pathways* and also in *The Philosophy of Consciousness Without an Object*, but here I'll try to speak more fully concerning these points. For instance, I generally avoid the use of the word ‘mind’, and also the words ‘spirit’ or ‘spiritual’, and to some extent the words ‘psychical’ and ‘psyche’, for the reason that these words have quite different meanings in the different usages we find in the literature, and unless one clarifies his position it can lead to a misconception when the terms are so used. To present the problem in connection with the word ‘mind’, I’ll read a few pages out of the commentary of Dr. Carl G. Jung in a commentary connected with *The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation*—material that is associated with the Tibetan known as Padma Sambhava. In this psychological statement we have the following:

Dr. Evans-Wentz has entrusted me with the task of commenting on a text which contains an important exposition of Eastern ‘psychology’. The very fact that I have to use inverted commas shows the dubious applicability of this term. It is perhaps not superfluous to mention that the East has produced nothing equivalent to what we call psychology, but rather philosophy or metaphysics. Critical philosophy, the mother of modern psychology, is as foreign to the East as to medieval Europe. Thus the word ‘mind’, as used in the East, has the connotation of something metaphysical. Our Western conception of mind has lost this connotation since the Middle Ages, and the word has now come to signify a ‘psychic function’. Despite the fact that we neither know nor pretend to know what ‘psyche’ is, we can deal with the phenomenon of ‘mind’. We do not assume that the mind is a metaphysical entity or that there is any connection between an individual mind and a hypothetical Universal Mind. Our psychology is, therefore, a science of mere phenomena without any metaphysical implications. The development of Western philosophy during the last two centuries has succeeded in isolating the mind in its own sphere and in severing it from its primordial oneness with the universe. Man himself has ceased to be the microcosm and eidolon of the cosmos, and his ‘anima’ is no longer the consubstantial *scintilla*, or spark of the *Anima Mundi*, the World Soul.

Psychology accordingly treats all metaphysical claims and assertions as mental phenomena, and regards them as statements about the mind and its structure that derive ultimately from certain unconscious dispositions. It does not consider them to be absolutely valid or even capable of
establishing a metaphysical truth. We have no intellectual means of ascertaining whether this attitude is right or wrong. We only know that there is no evidence for, and no possibility of proving, the validity of a metaphysical postulate such as ‘Universal Mind’. If the mind asserts the existence of a Universal Mind, we hold that it is merely making an assertion. We do not assume that by such an assertion the existence of a Universal Mind has been established. There is no argument against this reasoning, but no evidence, either, that our conclusion is ultimately right. In other words, it is just as possible that our mind is nothing but a perceptible manifestation of a Universal Mind. Yet we do not know, and we cannot even see, how it would be possible to recognize whether this is so or not. Psychology therefore holds that the mind cannot establish or assert anything beyond itself.

If, then, we accept the restrictions imposed upon the capacity of our mind, we demonstrate our common sense. I admit it is something of a sacrifice, inasmuch as we bid farewell to that miraculous world in which mind-created things and beings move and live. This is the world of the primitive, where even inanimate objects are endowed with a living, healing, magic power, through which they participate in us and we in them. Sooner or later we had to understand that their potency was really ours, and that their significance was our projection. The theory of knowledge is only the last step out of humanity’s childhood, out of a world where mind-created figures populated a metaphysical heaven and hell.

Despite this inevitable epistemological criticism, however, we have held fast to the religious belief that the organ of faith enables man to know God. The West thus developed a new disease: the conflict between science and religion. The critical philosophy of science became as it were negatively metaphysical—in other words, materialistic—on the basis of an error in judgment; matter was assumed to be a tangible and recognizable reality. Yet this is a thoroughly metaphysical concept hypostatized by uncritical minds. Matter is an hypothesis. When you say ‘matter’, you are really creating a symbol for something unknown, which may just as well be ‘spirit’ or anything else; it may even be God. Religious faith, on the other hand, refuses to give up its pre-critical Weltanschauung. In contradiction to the saying of Christ, the faithful try to remain children instead of becoming as children. They cling to the world of childhood. A famous modern theologian confesses in his autobiography that Jesus has been his good friend ‘from childhood on’. Jesus is the perfect example of a man who preached something different from the religion of his forefathers. But the imitatio Christi does not appear to include the mental and spiritual sacrifice which he had to undergo at the beginning of his career and without which he would never have become a saviour.

The conflict between science and religion is in reality a misunderstanding of both. Scientific materialism has merely introduced a new hypostasis,
and that is an intellectual sin. It has given another name to the supreme principle of reality and has assumed that this created a new thing and destroyed an old thing. Whether you call the principle of existence ‘God’, ‘matter’, ‘energy’, or anything else you like, you have created nothing; you have simply changed a symbol. The materialist is a metaphysician malgré lui. Faith, on the other hand, tries to retain a primitive mental condition on merely sentimental grounds. It is unwilling to give up the primitive, childlike relationship to mind-created and hypostatized figures; it wants to go on enjoying the security and confidence of a world still presided over by powerful, responsible, and kindly parents. Faith may include a sacrificium intellectus (provided there is an intellect to sacrifice), but certainly not a sacrifice of feeling. In this way the faithful remain children instead of becoming as children, and they do not gain their life because they have not lost it. Furthermore, faith collides with science and thus gets its deserts, for it refuses to share in the spiritual adventure of our age.

Any honest thinker has to admit the insecurity of all metaphysical positions, and in particular of all creeds. He has also to admit the unwarrantable nature of all metaphysical assertions and face the fact that there is no evidence whatever for the ability of the human mind to pull itself up by its own bootstrings, that is, to establish anything transcendent.

Materialism is a metaphysical reaction against the sudden realization that cognition is a mental faculty and, if carried beyond the human plane, a projection. The reaction was ‘metaphysical’ in so far as the man of average philosophical education failed to see through the implied hypostasis, not realizing that ‘matter’ was just another name for the supreme principle. As against this, the attitude of faith shows how reluctant people were to accept philosophical criticism. It also demonstrates how great is the fear of letting go one’s hold on the securities of childhood and of dropping into a strange, unknown world ruled by forces unconcerned with man. Nothing really changes in either case; man and his surroundings remain the same. He has only to realize that he is shut up inside his mind and cannot step beyond it, even in insanity; and that the appearance of his world or of his gods very much depends upon his own mental condition.

In the first place, the structure of the mind is responsible for anything we may assert about metaphysical matters, as I have already pointed out. We have also begun to understand that the intellect is not an ens per se, or an independent mental faculty, but a psychic function dependent upon the conditions of the psyche as a whole. A philosophical statement is the product of a certain personality living at a certain time in a certain place, and not the outcome of a purely logical and impersonal procedure. To that extent it is chiefly subjective; whether it has an objective validity or not depends upon whether there are few or many persons who argue in the same way. The isolation of man within his mind as a result of
epistemological criticism has naturally led to psychological criticism. This kind of criticism is not popular with the philosophers, since they like to consider the philosophic intellect as the perfect and unconditioned instrument of philosophy. Yet this intellect of theirs is a function dependent upon an individual psyche and determined on all sides by subjective conditions, quite apart from environmental influences. Indeed, we have already become so accustomed to this point of view that ‘mind’ has lost its universal character altogether. It has become a more or less individualized affair, with no trace of its former cosmic aspect as the *anima rationalis*. Mind is understood nowadays as a subjective, even an arbitrary, thing. Now that the formerly hypostatized ‘universal ideas’ have turned out to be mental principles, it is dawning upon us to what an extent our whole experience of so-called reality is psychic; as a matter of fact, everything thought, felt, or perceived is a psychic image, and the world itself exists only so far as we are able to produce an image of it. We are so deeply impressed with the truth of our imprisonment in, and limitation by, the psyche that we are ready to admit the existence in it even of things we do not know: we call them ‘the unconscious’.

The seemingly universal and metaphysical scope of the mind has thus been narrowed down to the small circle of individual consciousness, profoundly aware of its almost limitless subjectivity and of its infantile-archaic tendency to heedless projection and illusion. Many scientifically-minded persons have even sacrificed their religious and philosophical leanings for fear of uncontrolled subjectivism. By way of compensation for the loss of a world that pulsed with our blood and breathed with our breath, we have developed an enthusiasm for facts—mountains of facts, far beyond any single individual’s power to survey. We have the pious hope that this incidental accumulation of facts will form a meaningful whole, but nobody is quite sure, because no human brain can possibly comprehend the gigantic sum-total of this mass-produced knowledge. The facts bury us, but whoever dares to speculate must pay for it with a bad conscience—and rightly so, for he will instantly be tripped up by the facts.

Western psychology knows the mind as the mental functioning of a psyche. It is the ‘mentality’ of an individual. An impersonal Universal Mind is still to be met in the sphere of philosophy, where it seems to be a relic of the original human ‘soul’. This picture of our Western outlook may seem a little drastic, but I do not think it is far from the truth. At all events, something of the kind presents itself as soon as we are confronted with the Eastern mentality. In the East, mind is a cosmic factor, the very essence of existence; while in the West we have just begun to understand that it is the essential condition of cognition, and hence of the cognitive existence of the world. There is no conflict between religion and science in the East, because no science is there based upon the passion for facts, and no religion upon mere faith; there is religious cognition and cognitive religion. With us, man is incommensurably small and the grace of God is everything; but in the East, man is God and he redeems himself. The gods
of Tibetan Buddhism belong to the sphere of illusory separateness and mind-created projections, and yet they exist; but so far as we are concerned an illusion remains an illusion, and thus is nothing at all. It is a paradox, yet nevertheless true, that with us a thought has no proper reality; we treat it as if it were a nothingness. Even though the thought be true in itself, we hold that it exists only by virtue of certain facts which it is said to formulate. We can produce a most devastating fact like the atom bomb with the help of this ever-changing phantasmagoria of virtually non-existent thoughts, but it seems wholly absurd to us that one could ever establish the reality of thought itself.¹

That, I think, represents a very fair statement of the most sophisticated Western understanding. It is not popularly understood; the having had a college education is no guarantee that one has this understanding of the nature of mind as understood by the West. Only those who are grounded in the story of philosophy, thoroughly, and in depth psychology, and have actually seen what has happened in the history of thought, really appreciate these facts that have been brought out by Dr. Jung. Now, in my writing and thinking and speaking, I always have in mind this ultimate Western point of view. I am speaking to Western man in his most sophisticated understanding.

In my way, I became aware of this problem way back as a student in the colleges, and it seemed to me then that the resolution of the problem might lie in the determination that there existed other ways of cognition than those of sense perception and conceptual cognition. Ultimately the results of that search were positive. But let us look at our problem.

One who is familiar with critical philosophy, and that means the philosophy of Immanuel Kant as pre-eminently developed in his Critique of Pure Reason, can see the influence of that philosophy upon the thinking of Dr. Jung. In fact, he read the book when he was only seventeen years old, and in the strict sense of the word, became a Kantian and remained so. Immanuel Kant emerges as actually the critical figure in all Western thought. To appreciate his position in this Western thought, one must return to the story of philosophy.

I think it is rather significant that the man who stands as the dividing point between the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, which brought to us the treasure of ancient Greek thought, the man who stands as the critical point between that and modern philosophy, science, and psychology was René Descartes. And it may be significant that he stands as the first in the field of modern mathematics as well as the first in the field of modern philosophy. His philosophy was colored very deeply by his mathematical labors. Philosophy became conditioned fundamentally by mathematical thought with him and the whole school of philosophy founded by him, of which there are four members, three beside himself, who stand out as great. There is the great German mathematician and philosopher Leibniz, who is second in the line; the last man who is said to know everything that was to be known; Spinoza, who wrote his greatest work in a form

analogous to that of geometry; and finally, Christian Wolff, whose philosophic writings had dominated the thinking of the younger Immanuel Kant. But there was no criticism in this thinking. It seemed to imply that the system of conceptions was essentially identical with real existences.

There then developed in the British Isles a contrasting philosophical stream which is known as skepticism or radical empiricism. The earliest figure was that of Francis Bacon, but the one who developed more sophisticatedly this point of view was John Locke. He pointed out that the older faculty psychology led to certain rather ridiculous consequences. The old faculty psychologists would say that when one sings it is the faculty of music that sings—a statement which really doesn’t have too much meaning. It’s not I who sings, it’s the faculty of music that sings. He pointed out that our ideas must have a reference to an existence which is experienced, to be valid. So it seemed. He predicated that the mind of the new-born child was an empty tablet or *tabula rasa*, in which there were no determinates whatsoever, but that experience wrote upon that tablet all that became knowledge later in the adult. He assumed, however, that there was a substance behind things and that there was a substance behind mind.

The man who followed him was an Irishman, Bishop Berkeley, who saw that the conception of a substance behind things really had no necessary place. This substance is not something that is experienced. It thus was a predication by John Locke that it existed without any basis in experience to justify the assumption that it existed. Berkeley suggested that in place of things, of a substance behind things, that all things could be but the ideas planted in man by God; and thus was founded what is known since as subjective idealism.

But the third or fourth great figure among the empiricists was David Hume, the Scotsman. And he pointed out that there’s no real ground of assuming a substance behind ideas, such as God. And we arrive at, and this is a strictly logical development on Hume’s part, we arrive at the condition that all which exists is simply phenomena, a mass of sense impressions and ideas which give us no assurance of anything whatsoever. And he points out that even though we see the sun rise a million times, that gives us no assurance whatever that the sun would rise tomorrow.

It was the impact of David Hume upon Immanuel Kant which, he said, awoke him from his dogmatic slumbers of philosophical thinking. Here they were, with one stream of philosophy that led to a rather arbitrary dogmatism and another stream of philosophy that led to an absolute skepticism—both of them proving to be blind alleys. The way out of these blind alleys was afforded by the thought of Immanuel Kant, and that’s the reason why he is such an important figure in the whole history of philosophy—a man that must be understood if we are to understand science, if we are to understand the Western mind.

Now, there was one thing overlooked by the empiricists. When we arrive at the final conclusion of radical empiricism, as in David Hume, we arrive at a position where mathematics would be impossible. Northrop, in his *The Meeting of East and West*, notes the point that an effort has been made to derive mathematics from an assumed basis of knowledge such as that with which we are left by David Hume, and it cannot be done. And that bears upon the significance of the question that Immanuel Kant asks toward the close of his “Introduction” to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, how is pure mathematics
possible? That it exists is unquestionable. Without pure mathematics there could not be an applied mathematics, and without applied mathematics there could not be modern technology—there could not be the machines, there could not be modern transportation, there could not be a trip to the moon without applied mathematics. But the machine and its achievements in multiple forms, transportation and otherwise, is a fact of experience today. Therefore we know that applied mathematics exists, since without this applied mathematics these modern achievements of the machine would be impossible; and since applied mathematics is a resultant of the delvings by the pure mathematician in his ivory tower, therefore pure mathematics exists. We have a fact, therefore, established even from the empiric base that is not explainable by empiricism. That, then, shows how important was this question of Immanuel Kant; a question which I find Jung has not recognized in its bearings. For Jung, too, is a radical empiricist operating in a different field, but he finds the solutions of the problems that beggar man, primarily in irrational factors, whereas mathematics is supremely rational.

Is there, then, a rational base as well as an irrational? All experience as experience, or qua experience, is irrational in the sense that it is not in the province of reason, not necessarily in the sense of being against reason. What we mean here may be illustrated in the following way. A man born blind, if sufficiently intelligent and trained, could grasp the physicist’s conception of light as a complex of wave systems and of particles which can be mathematically formulated. He could, for instance, conceive, make the statement and understand logically its meaning, that a given monochromatic beam of light, say of the color red, involved a certain wave system of certain amplitude and certain velocity, and that it was in some sense an actual particle entity. But one thing he would not have is the immediate experience of the monochromatic red corresponding to that. He would have to have sight in order to have this immediate experience of red.

This brings out a point, that perceptual perception and rational cognition are two different orders of consciousness, that one does not lead into the other, but that there is an incommensurable relationship between the two. Our assumed man born blind who grasped the conceptual image of light could not from that make the crossing over into the direct experience of light, or of the monochromatic red we referred to. There is, thus, between the conceptual cognition and perceptual cognition, or sense perception, a hiatus, an incommensurability, or a point of discontinuity. We are familiar with this fact, and applied mathematics, as distinct from pure mathematics, manages to make the crossing from pure conceptuality to effecting consequences in the perceptual zone, namely machines and so forth that produce perceptually existent forms.

Now, where does the pure mathematics come from? I submit that man brings it with him when he’s born here. It is not derived from perceptual experience. It comes out of this conceptual capacity and, therefore, gives us a tie-in to something that is beyond experience. I have suggested the thought that pure mathematics is the “other” of pure metaphysics, just as most conceptions which are experience oriented may be regarded as the other of sense experience. Now, we pointed out that there was an hiatus or disjunction between sense perception and conceptual cognition. Let us suggest that there is similar disjunction between pure mathematics and pure metaphysics, but that they are capable of a parallelism and in fact that there is a parallelism between them.
With our conceptual powers we can develop far in the range of pure mathematical conceptions. We may start with simple conceptions where numbers—that would be natural numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 —can be correlated with perceptual entities such as one’s fingers and toes, or stones that one picks up, and that correlation was made long ago at a primitive level. From that, however, we develop number conceptions that become ultimately extremely sophisticated: the conception of the fraction, the conception of the negative number, of the imaginary number, of the transcendental number of which \( \pi \) and \( e \) are the most familiar examples, and of transfinite numbers, which are extremely subtle. There are those who view such developments as empty and purely formal and without meaning, but what I am suggesting is that they are parallels, in the mind, of a pure metaphysical reality which is ultimately what these conceptions mean.

Now, I do not know whether what I’m leading to is as yet grasped, but it is this—that it is not strictly true to base everything upon pure experience, either in the sense of Hume or in the sense of Dr. Jung, but that we have another capacity that produces, first of all, effects within the world of experience, although it is not derived from experience, and this is pure mathematics. And, therefore, by it we have a rational ladder that can lead into that realm that generally is hidden from us, in the sense that we call it the “collective unconscious,” and that here we do have in our mental resources a way that has never been lost which leads to the beyond.

Now let us return to our original problem: why do I, for instance, not use the word ‘mind’? It’s because of the ambiguity of its connotation. If you read the word in Oriental literature it assumes a relationship to a universal mind, which is here not the use that would be employed by any really informed Westerner. It would mean something quite different, as Jung has pointed out, when he uses the word ‘mind’. And again, take its use in Theosophical literature; it’s divided into two parts, one part of which is called “kama-manas” and the other “higher manas.” Kama-manas can be translated “desire mind,” a mentation that is led by wishfulness. There is wishful thinking and that obviously is what is meant by kama-manas. There are some who even maintain that wishful thinking is the only kind of thinking there is. But we might tie in higher mind, higher manas, with the conceptions of discernment, discrimination, and judgment—processes that certainly are capable of functioning free from considerations of desire, and they do so function in the field of pure mathematics. That is a definite, proven fact. So, when we translate ‘mind’ as manas or as kama-manas, there is an ambiguity. Furthermore, we come to the usage of Sri Aurobindo; he translates manas as “sense-mind,” as the ruling power or the king of sensuous cognition, and uses the term ‘Buddhi’ to represent the pure reason. Again, a use of terms that is quite different from that of the Theosophical literature where Buddhi is translated as “spiritual soul.”

Now, to avoid getting into a lot of misunderstandings and getting down to some precision in formulation, I thus avoid using the word ‘mind’ without a lot of preliminary statement concerning it, and instead use these conception—sensuous cognition or perception; conceptual cognition; and then, introduce as the third function and naming it “introception” or “introceptual cognition.” Conceptual cognition, thus, occupies an intermediate position between sense perception and introceptual cognition, which would be the organ, faculty, or function by which metaphysical truth may be known. The latter term, the latter conception, is not to be found in general philosophical
literature. General philosophical literature and psychology deals with perceptual functions and conceptual functions—just these two forms of cognition. The thorough analyses to which these two forms have been submitted have not shown any Door to the Transcendent, and that criticism, I think, is valid. It doesn’t enable us to either affirm that the Transcendent is or that it is not. With those two functions alone, we simply do not know. We cannot know that there is any existence beyond our psychical imagoes at all; we’re locked in. What I submit is that introceptual cognition opens the Door that was closed, and that’s its importance.

But this would not be important if this was merely a speculative idea, an idea that I invented; that would be merely a more or less clever exercise. It is grounded, however, upon certain Realizations, and I submit that Realization represents a function, faculty, or organ by which one may open Doors of consciousness which normally remain closed. I’ve had, as I’ve pointed out before, five such Realizations in a mounting series of which the last two were most important and the very last of preeminent importance since it involved, for me, a philosophical revolution, whereas the other four had not been so radical in their impact; and that through these Realizations I have experienced a cognitive form which is neither perceptual cognition nor conceptual cognition; and I invented the term introception to represent this form of cognition; and it was defined as the power whereby the light of consciousness turns upon itself towards its source—the light of consciousness being the cognitive factor in consciousness.

We have, then, three forms, and bear in mind I do not assert that introception is a simple function; it may be a complex of several functions. But its division into complexity is not wholly clear and so I leave it as a rather, as a group term in which there may be possible forms. It certainly would include what Aurobindo means by the Superconsciousness, but it may cover more than he has differentiated, in addition. Let us interpret it as standing above conceptual cognition in the same way that perceptual cognition stands below conceptual cognition. And the connecting link between the two is conceptual cognition.

Now, we can identify different forms of cognition corresponding to these three functions. Perceptual cognition is simple sense perception and may be said to correspond to Sangsara. It gives us phenomena, and Sangsara we will identify with the whole domain of phenomena—appearances before us as objects, whether subtle or gross.

Now, with respect to introceptual cognition, there are two phases identifiable in this state. One is cognition as assurance. Assurance was the outstanding characteristic of that Realization which was described as a rising above space, time, and law, and which tended to identify itself with Nirvana. The assurance had, did not produce a system of ideas. It produced the effect that all is well, that the problems that beggar one in life are here resolved, that my own continuity as a consciousness entity is certain, and that the problems that beggar one in life either disappear or are resolved in forms that essentially transcend ideation. Also, and this is applied to that state of the High Indifference, it was the Realization of a pure, self-existent consciousness which is not derivative; which is not simply a relationship between a subject and an object, but is the source of the self, or

---

2 See parts 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the audio recordings of Wolff reading The Philosophy of Consciousness Without an Object, “Part 1: The Ground of Knowledge, Chapter 2: A Mystical Unfoldment.”
subject, and of all possible objects whatsoever, so that all entities are functions of that
consciousness, instead of the consciousness being viewed as a function of an entity.

There remains conceptual cognition. At first I was inclined to identify it more or
less with the _sangsaric_ as well as identifying perceptual cognition, or sense images, with
the _sangsaric_, but that doesn’t seem to be its true function. It rather corresponds to that
which in Sanskrit is called the _antaskarana_, that which bridges between. Conceptual
cognition gives us everything that makes possible language, possible communication,
possible formations that can be translated into outer forms as perception. Its correlation
with the sensuous world is something that’s quite familiar. But it also serves as a bridging
element to the world of the introceptual order. But this bridging is accomplished by a
different form. Whereas the initiative with respect to the perceptual order primarily arises
in the conceptual order—and we step from a conceptual idea to the production of a
sensibly existent thing, like a machine—the mind in its relationship, or the conceptual
cognition, cognitive function in its relationship to the introceptual, acts as responsive and
it thinks in terms of transcriptive conceptions; that the relationship to the introceptive
order is like that of, toward a impregnating essence, which injected into the conceptual
cognitive function produces ideations or conceptions. This simile follows the parallel of
the relationship in biology of an impregnating force and a body-building power. The
mind in this case performs the feminine function of building not physical bodies, but
conceptual systems. Now, here we have a tie-in with the domain above.

Now if I were to use words like ‘mind’ and ‘spirit’, and so forth, people would
miss, could have a misunderstanding because of the ambiguity involved in these words,
but here we have a certain degree of precision. If we think of perceptual cognition as
giving us phenomena, which corresponds to _Sangsara_; that conceptual cognition gives us
an intermediate zone corresponding to the _antaskarana_—whereas perceptual cognition
gives us particulars, a tree which is uniquely a tree, conceptual cognition can give us
universals, such as the conception of treeness under which there is a potential infinity of
trees—that above that, there is introceptual cognition that gives us the assurance and
security, which is the goal of the religious quest, and corresponds to the _nirvanic_ state of
consciousness, a state of complete assurance and bliss, and above this lies the pure
consciousness from which both all selves and all worlds are derived, and corresponds, we
suggest, to _Paranirvana_.

That covers the subject, the discourse, this morning.