Philosophy and the New Left

Part 3 of 5

Franklin Merrell-Wolff December 20, 1970

We are now in a position to make our correlations. Note how the students, on the campus and elsewhere, have accentuated action and involvement. They have demonstrated; they have wrecked buildings, broken windows, stormed into buildings including offices, restrained their teachers, and otherwise acted violently. Now, they claim this to be a revolution, but they have formulated no program. They have made no analysis of that which they have called the "establishment." And they have not built a philosophy interpreting what this establishment means and why it should be transformed or overthrown. Nor have they defined what they intend to put in its place. They rather have indicated that destruction alone is enough and that the new, presumptively better order, would of itself take the place of the old. Here we see the evidence supporting the thesis that the New Left is oriented to Life and the subconscient. Everything clicks into place. We now have understanding. This is not a movement above mind to the superconscient. It's a movement toward the subconscient, that which lies below mind and reason.

There is, to be sure, a certain degree of orientation to yoga among these students. But what kind of yoga is it? It is a yoga connected with the use of drugs and *Tantric* practices—not the high and royal yoga. This brings us to the thought, which I'll put in the form of a question. Is there such a thing as an inverse yoga? I have not seen this conception developed in the literature, but logic would suggest the necessity for its existence—the left-handed parallel of the right-handed royal yoga; a movement towards union with the All in that formation of the All that lies in the subconscient. And there's reason to believe that union with the All could be so achieved; but, in what form? It would be in the form of unconscious union with the All; whereas, the royal yoga would carry the aspirant to *conscious* union with the All. So the inverse yoga could be regarded as the mark of absolute failure, as the movement towards darkness and real death; as contrasting to the royal yoga, which is a movement towards the Light, towards an undying consciousness which had become a realized Self-consciousness, a state of Consciousness becoming conscious of itself. Let us not be confused here, there is the dark and the light way. And as things now stand, the students are orienting themselves to the dark way. Otherwise, why the orientation to nasty, four-letter words; why the orientation to the culture of ugliness—ugliness in behavior, ugliness in art forms, ugliness in personal appearance—the inversion of the true path of movement toward supernal beauty. At last we have understanding. Movement towards the subconscient is a movement towards that in which action is the preeminent mode-not thought, not reflection.

Now the question arises, does this inevitably mean a movement towards darkness, failure, and death? The answer is, that if continued to the end, it would be such; but, there is a possibility that in the case of some representatives of the New Left there is another meaning. And for this, I will direct your attention to certain statements made by Dr. Carl G. Jung.

Where the individual has risen to a certain height of consciousness, and then glimpses a greater height beyond, Dr. Jung makes the point that it is impossible for man to ascend to that greater height by the "rainbow bridge," which only the gods can cross; but that man must descend from the height he has attained, which in this case is rational consciousness, and in descending, reach the bottom of the slope, cross the water in the valley below, and then start the ascent to the greater height. Passing through the water represents an immersion in the unconscious, and possibly in the sense of the subconscient, as now appears to be the case. There, it is possible that the aspirant may be captured by the stream of the subconscient and flow down into the valley of death; but it is also possible that he may successfully make the passage and then proceed to ascend the heights beyond. I think there is something of truth in these two possibilities, and we should pause before condemning all who have gone this irrational way. Remember, irrationality lies below, super-rationality lies above.

Let us turn to a quotation from Arthur Koestler's "Anatomy of a Myth" published in his *Yogi and the Commissar*:

Newton wrote not only the *Principia* but also a treatise on the topography of Hell. Up to this day we all hold beliefs which are not only incompatible with observable facts, but with facts actually observed by us. The hot steam of belief and the ice block of reasoning are packed together inside our skulls, but as a rule they do not interact; the steam does not condense and the ice does not melt. The human mind is basically schizophrenic, split into at least two mutually exclusive planes. The main difference between "pathological" and "normal" schizophrenia lies in the isolated character of the irrational component in the former, as opposed to the collectively accepted irrationality of the later. Typical examples of socially approved split-mind patterns are the Astronomer who believes both in his instruments and in Christian dogma; the Army padre; the Communist who accepts "proletarian millionaires"; the psychoanalyst who gets married; the determinist who abuses his opponents. The Primitive knows that his idol is a piece of carved wood, and yet he believes in its power to make rain; and though our beliefs underwent a gradual refinement, the dualistic pattern of our minds remained basically unchanged.

There are indications that this dualism is correlated to specific neural processes. Recent progress in neurology established the thalamus (the philogenetically older central organ of the mid-brain) as the seat of feeling and emotion, and the pallial cortex (the rind of the relatively new brain-hemispheres) as the seat of discriminative or ("logical") thought. Animal experiments and the study of certain types of brain injuries during the last war (e.g., Head's thalamic syndrome) disclosed two mutually inhibitive tendencies of reaction to a given situation: the "thalamic" and the "cortical" type of behavior. Thalamic behavior is dominated by emotion, cortical behavior by formal reasoning. Irrational beliefs are rooted in emotion; they are *felt* to be true. Believing may be defined as "knowing

with one's viscera." Behaviour under thalamic domination is accompanied by affective, that is, wishful or fearful thinking; the type of thinking we find in monkeys, savages and infants; and in twenty-three out of twentyfour hours in ourselves. Cortical, i.e., detached rational thought, is a new and fragile acquisition which breaks down at the slightest irritation of the viscera, reported by the autonomous system to the thalamus, which, once aroused, dominates the scene.

Both anthropology and psychology have during the last fifty years led to convergent results. Levy-Bruehl proved that the mentality of the primitives is pre-logical; the Kantian categories of (homogenous) space, time and causality do not exist in the primitive mind; it is controlled not by formal reasoning but by ready-made beliefs (*pre-liaisons collectives*). Freud demonstrated the affective roots of thought and followed them down to Totem and Tabu; Jung showed that certain archaic or archetypal images and beliefs are the collective property of our race. Even modern philology came more or less independently to the same results; Ogden and Richards proved the emotional fetish-character of words and tautological statements. Science has at last reached a stage sufficiently rational to be able to see the irrationality of the mind's normal functioning.

The science which has so far been least affected by these developments is politics. The ultimate reason for the failure of the Second, Third and Fourth Internationals and of international socialism in general is their disregard of the irrational factor in the human mind. Socialist doctrine and Leftist propaganda remain based on the assumption that man is an entirely rational being who only needs convincing by logical arguments, evening classes, pamphlets, Penguins, etc., to recognize his own interests and to act accordingly. The subconscious, the older half of the brain, the archetypes, the world of the dream, the ductless glands, the autonomous nervous system, the id—that is, 90 percent of what constitutes the real *homo sapiens*—was left out of the picture. Hence the total failure of the Left to analyze, explain and counter-act the phenomenon of Fascism. Hence its self-deceiving, shallow optimism even on the present verge of the abyss.¹

And in a footnote, this much:

Fascism, on the other hand, despite its emphasis on the irrational and the myth, is no nearer to scientific truth. It errs on the other side; the rational element is underplayed, its sociology is based on an untenable race-theory, its political economy is rudimentary and eclectic, its society static.²

Now that is the end of the quotation.

At this point, I would like to introject as a footnote a consideration which I believe will keep my own position clarified. Not for one moment do I entertain the

¹ Arthur Koestler, *The Yogi and the Commissar* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946), 117-119.

² Ibid., 119.

crassly materialistic point of view that thought is secreted by the cortex or that feeling is secreted by the thalamus in much the way that bile is secreted by the liver. These qualities, namely of thought and of feeling, are not functions of these respective organs in the brain; but, on the contrary, the following view I believe to be much closer to the truth: that these are organs whereby that which is *involved* in matter can *evolve* outward into manifestation, in which case, these qualities are not functions of the material organs, but the organs, rather, are channels whereby these qualities—self-existent on their own level—can become communicated to this plane of experience. Therefore, the experiments that show a correlation between the organs and the qualities of consciousness would be satisfied by this interpretation. If the organ of communication is damaged, then the quality cannot be manifested. It does not follow that the quality is not there, does not exist, but only that it could not be manifested. This would satisfy, I believe, the logical needs of the situation and also the further needs of an idealistic interpretation.

Returning now to the main body of this discourse, let us consider a certain statement made by the pragmatists, namely, that the rational powers were evolved by life to serve the needs of the living organism in its adaptation to its environment. Now, was it in fact really necessary to evolve the rational principle in order to achieve this adaptation? In other words, was it necessary to evolve the cortex for the purposes of life alone? The evidence from paleontology points in the opposite direction. Thus, the scorpion, as we see it today, can be traced back far in geologic time virtually unaltered, and therefore proves that it had achieved an extraordinary degree of adaptation of a living organism to its environment. And again, it would appear that not even that much of brain development is necessary; for, if we consider the redwood, it has been traced as far back as the day of the dinosaurs-a time estimated as 130 million years ago. Here, the purpose of life is satisfied even without any development of brain; and in the case of the animal organism, only a very primitive kind of brain. If life were the end-all that is, it would be these organisms that would constitute the crown-not man. The conclusion, I think, is quite ridiculous, but the assumptions back of the thinking, I believe to be quite false; that it is not the intent of the All simply that a living organism should attain effective adaptation to its environment, but that there is in the evolutionary process a purpose, an end which is envisaged; and that to accomplish this end, when a living organism was sufficiently developed to serve the purpose—and that proved to be what we call today homo sapiens-then a purpose over and above the living organism, a something that viewed the living organism as only a means to an end, took place. Then the mental principle, that which was correlated with the cortex, came forth; not simply to handle the problems of adaptation, but to fulfill its purpose for its own sake and also for something more ultimate that would come forth later. The rational mind, therefore, is not to be viewed as simply a device that serves living organisms, but something that has a higher order of terminal value in itself than that possessed by life; and, in addition, an instrumental value with something that lies above mind in what has been called the superconscient. The real office of mind is to serve the end of man's transcendence of himself, of leading the way to the transhuman.

Let us now turn our attention to the subject of time. Time is a very important subject in the field in which we have just been discussing. For those philosophies called vitalistic, pragmatic, or voluntaristic, time has virtually an ontological importance; it is irreducible. The best discussions of this subject are to be found in Spengler's *Decline of*

the West. There he points out that there are two notions of time, one which may be called "reversible time," which is the 't' in theoretical dynamics. A past state of any system in theoretical dynamics can be calculated as well as a future state. In other words, we have here the principle of reversibility. However, time in the sense that is important for both Vitalism or Voluntarism is to be regarded as irreversible or, to use Spengler's term, as "chronological time." The moment that has gone into the past is lost and cannot be recovered, so that time becomes an absolute determinant. Spengler, in his development, recognizes two orders which he calls the "systematic" and the "physiognomic." The physiognomic is oriented to the physiognomy of events, to chronological time, the systematic to reversible time. I made a classification of the qualities or interests of man under these two headings. Thus under physiognomic we have life and under systematic, mathematics. The series will run in a group of pairs: under physiognomic, *Tantra* versus *Mayavada*; psychology versus logic; art versus philosophy and science; aesthetic versus theoretic; will versus reason; feminine versus masculine; time versus space; history versus nature; eros versus logos; becoming versus being or the "become"; in the field of yoga, Karma yoga versus Jnana yoga.

With most individuals who have become self-conscious in their thinking and general orientation, there is a tendency towards a primary orientation to either the systematic or the physiognomic, and there are cultures in the past which are oriented in one or the other direction. Those that are oriented to the physiognomic have been called by Spengler as *historic* in their attitude; the others that are oriented to the systematic are *a-historical*—history being a record in the movement of time. Races that have been historic in their orientation are such as the culture of Egypt and our own present Western culture. Examples of a-historic cultures are those of India and of Greece, or the classical times. Here's a little quotation from Spengler that may give something of the picture:

The drama of the West is ordinarily designated Character-Drama. That of the Greeks, on the other hand, is best described as *Situation-Drama*, and in the antithesis we can perceive what it is that Western, and what it is that Classical, man respectively feel as the basic life-form that is imperiled by the onsets of tragedy and fate. If in lieu of "direction" we say "irreversibility," if we let ourselves sink into the terrible meaning of those words "too late" wherewith we resign a fleeting bit of the present to the eternal past, we find the deep foundation of every tragic crisis. It is Time that is the tragic, and it is by the meaning that it intuitively attaches to Time that one Culture is differentiated from another; and consequently "tragedy" of the grand order has only developed in the Culture which has most passionately affirmed, and in that which has most passionately denied, Time. The sentiment of the ahistoric soul gives us a Classical tragedy of the moment, and that of the ultrahistorical soul puts before us Western tragedy that deals with the *development of a whole life*. Our tragedy arises from the feeling of an *inexorable* Logic of becoming, while the Greek feels the illogical, blind Casual of the moment-the life of Lear matures inwardly towards a catastrophe, and that of Oedipus stumbles without warning upon a situation. And now one may perceive how it is that synchronously with Western drama there rose and fell a mighty

portrait-art (culminating in Rembrandt), a kind of historical and biographical art which (because it was so) was sternly discountenanced in Classical Greek at the apogee of Attic drama. Consider the veto on likeness-statuary in votive offerings and note how-from Demetrius of Alopeke (about 400)—a timid art of "ideal" portraiture began to venture forth when, and only when, grand tragedy had been thrown into the background by the light society-pieces of the "Middle Comedy." Fundamentally all Greek statues were standard masks, like the actors in the theatre of Dionysus; all bring to expression, in significantly strict form, somatic attitudes and positions. Physiognomically they are dumb, corporeal and of necessity nude-character-heads of definite individuals came only with the Hellenistic age. Once more we are reminded of the contrast between the Greek number-world, with its computations of tangible results, and the other, our own, in which the relations between groups of functions or equations or, generally, formula-elements of the same order are investigated morphologically, and the character of these relations fixed as such in express laws.³

This of course is not easy to follow, but you begin to get a certain feeling here. Time is admittedly tragic and yet Spengler is oriented to the primacy of life, time, or will. He acknowledges his debt to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, but he says that Schopenhauer did not develop an ethic which was the logical expression of his metaphysic. Schopenhauer's ethic was essentially taken from Buddhism. And he found the resolution of the tragic problem where the Will is made predominant in the denial of the will-to-live, which was the Buddhist's formula for the emergence into the *nirvanic* state of consciousness. I think Spengler is quite correct in viewing Schopenhauer's ethics as not naturally following from his metaphysics, though I agree with Schopenhauer in his dissatisfaction with the tragic results of his thought. Spengler on the other hand goes forth toward an heroic acceptance of those tragic results. The tragedy lies in those words "too late." The opportunity not grabbed at this moment seems lost forever; the possibility not opened up can no longer be awakened and manifested. This is a tragic result.

Now another point; ordinarily philosophy has contrasted "becoming" with "being"—being, being considered as pre-existent to the process of becoming. Spengler reverses this and in so doing is quite consistent with his thesis. We have becoming as the primary ontological fact and the static end-term is the "become," which he identifies with a state of death. Process is the all-important; process is the ontological fact in his view. And thus, in a broad way, Spengler's position is in alignment with that of the pragmatists and their Vitalism. Don't forget that out of Spengler developed the Nazi movement, oriented to the thalamus, and its great appeal is to be found in that fact of that basic orientation. There was obviously a schizophrenic division in the German mind—on one side the thalamic appeal of German National Socialism, on the other side the capacity to perform as efficient engineers and as efficient generals of the army, which is quite cortical in its nature. This is a schizophrenic condition, but as Koestler has pointed out, this is a schizophrenia present in all of us. We tend to be blindly patriots; we tend to be

³ Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), 129-131.

blind in our religiosity; we tend to be blind in our basic vitalistic orientations, and only part of the time are we rational beings. But this does not mean that rationality may not become more and more dominant. If it true that 90 percent of the time we are thalamic, as Koestler has said, and only 10 percent of the time cortical, yet, in a latter day of evolution the figures may be reversed.

And now I wish to suggest something in the physiological terms that can show a contrast with that which is above the cortex, corresponding to the contrast with that which is below the cortex in the thalamus. And that is, that above the cortex lies the pineal gland, an organ largely non-functional in our day, but may well prove to be the line of communication with the superconscient—that which lies beyond our rational mind, and yet stands in greater harmony with that rational mind than it does with life itself; hence, needing the intervention of the rational mind to communicate downward to life.

The thing that becomes clear is, as I've said before, he who has reached to the level of rational mind and then turns into an orientation toward life, has stepped back, has regressed to an earlier position—to a position that is more in harmony with the animal, and the savage, and the infant. And this explains a great deal of what we see in the movement of the New Left and among these revolutionary students generally; they act like spoiled brats. The infantile element of the thalamus is evident in this. They do not formulate a clear bill of particulars with which they specifically criticize the establishment. They do not formulate a program for correcting this that they find which is inadequate, but merely collect in groups and march, and break windows, and storm buildings taking them over, and burning buildings, and blowing up buildings, including many lives. This is action. This is not reason. This is a reversion to the methods of the primitive, of the savage, and is very unbecoming to anyone who has the dignity of being a college student, for the college is preeminently the citadel of the rational mind.

We have come to the point where it behooves us to consider the influence of the philosophy of Marcuse upon the movement of the New Left. But first, before proceeding to this, let me make clear a certain point concerning the probable influence of Pragmatism, especially in its vitalistic form, upon this movement. I am not suggesting that this line of influence is generally a conscious one on the part of the members of the New Left; they do not reflect either the strength of character or the degree or intelligence necessary for the conscious assimilation of this philosophic point of view. But a philosophy such as Pragmatism, which formulates a conviction embedded in a large proportion of the unconscious of the race, has influence that is indirect and not easily traceable. What I'm suggesting is that the influence of Pragmatism or Vitalism is largely unconscious, though not necessarily always so; that, therefore, it may have a certain causal connection with this movement.

Now, in the case of Marcuse, there is a marked difference. The movement developed before the philosophy of Marcuse was formulated. It was subsequently assimilated, to some measure, by the student movement; perhaps, we might say, in the spirit of an apology for that movement. No doubt, in many of the behavior patterns developed by the New Left there was a sense of guilt. There certainly was a break with traditional morality—a break with that morality which was most predominantly formulated by the Great Buddha and the Christ, a morality of self-restraint and lofty

aspiration. But the philosophy of Marcuse comes into the picture as something that could afford a real apology for a movement in the direction of a degraded and degrading sensuality. This comes, as we shall see later, from a dialectic treatment of the thought of Sigmund Freud. It could very well remove from the representatives of the New Left this background of a sense of guilt; and, apparently, it has been welcomed with open arms by the New Left, although Marcuse himself doubts very much that the students really read him. I do also, for he is, indeed, a master of obscurity. But in connection with Marcuse, we have what purports to be an application of the triadic dialectic formulated by the great philosopher Hegel. This also was applied by Karl Marx as at least one, if not the main, basis of his theoretical development of his particular materialistic socialism. The implication is that in this dialectic there is a pregnant power either for good or for ill, and to understand either the position of Marcuse or of Karl Marx, some understanding of what is meant by the triadic dialectic is necessary, and so I shall proceed to a discussion of that subject.

The position maintained by Hegel takes this form: that if we cognize anything, such as being, there is an implication of the contradictory of that conception; we are forced to recognize, equally, non-being. But as being and non-being stand in a relationship of contradiction to each other, you cannot assert, ordinarily, in the terms of ordinary logic, the reality of either without denying the other. These two force a synthesizing conception, and that conception, in this case as presented by Hegel, is the conception of becoming, since in becoming, that which was not, becomes. Hence, there is both an is-ness. which is, and an is-not, which becomes, and in a certain sense we can see that becoming is an integration of being and non-being. The process is developed as a rational process which proceeds in a series of steps that ultimately eventuates in what he calls the "Absolute Idea," which has no other, which is universally inclusive. This process of reasoning is viewed as objective, that is, as not simply the reasoning of an individual subject, but a process that moves in history. It is connected with the notion of development.

An illustration may be made why this principle is introduced. If we consider, for instance, a living organism, like a rose plant, if we look at the plant and perhaps the flower that is in bloom upon it at this moment, we do not have the whole reality of the plant. Although some points of view, such as that of Zen Buddhism, would say the transitory existence of every moment is real, the Hegelian philosophy denies that position. The reality of the plant, in this philosophy, is its whole life history from the seed, through the sprouting, the growing of the plant, the putting forth of the bud, the full flowering of the blossom, and finally the development of seed—constitutes the reality, which is not found by any moment in that stage, but only as we consider it in its wholeness. There is indeed something very impressive about this point of view. It virtually gives to time an ontological value analogous to that which we found in the case of the pragmatist.

Now, there is a basis for taking this movement very seriously. In this dualistic world, we cannot grasp any idea except in contrast to its other, that, namely, which is a negation of the idea. It is impossible to conceive of *good* without taking it in contrast to *evil*, and vice verse; we cannot conceive of *up* without its being related to the notion of *down*. This is a characteristic of dualistic field of action. Dualism is not all that is, as one

who has passed through the experience of radical, Fundamental Realization knows. There is a state of consciousness which is non-dualistic, where there is no contrast of *good* and *evil*. Having had experience of this state, I can say, that that which seems *evil* here goes through such a transformation that it no longer is *evil*. But the same is true of our relative *good*; the *good* is so transformed that it is no longer *good*, in the old sense. There is a zone of awareness here such that the duality of *good* and *evil* no longer applies. He, who in his climb up the yogic path has come to this state of Realization, is no longer in danger from the conflict of the pairs of opposites; he meets, no longer, hostile forces on the way. But that is a state far along on the path.

Now, when we say that any thesis, such as the thesis of *being*, implies its opposite or its contradictory, such as *non-being*, that *up* implies *down*, and that *good* implies *evil*, we're not speaking in the sense of implication such as that which is used in Aristotelian or formal logic, or, again, as it is used in the logic of mathematics, which is largely that which is now known as symbolic logic. This triadic dialectic is more in the nature of an *epistemological logic*, rather than in the form of these logics used in the development of our various sciences and all of our formal structures—based upon the principle not that a thesis, such as *good*, contains within it, as an implication of *goodness* itself, *evil*; but rather it is the assertion that *goodness* cannot be known save in contrast to *evil*. In other words, there could not be a Christ without a Satan; the two are mutually implicatory—not in the sense of the formal logic, bear in mind, but that one could not exist in this world of duality without the other. And so there is a sense in which we could say that the total entity which we identify by the Christ, is in reality Christ-Satan.

Now, there is another line of consideration that gives a very substantial support to the dialectic principle, it is the principle which Dr. Carl G. Jung has called "enantiodromia," which is defined as the law whereby every psychical state tends into its opposite. Thus, if one were a strongly developed thinking-intuitive type, he would repress, relatively, feeling-sensation. These repressed functions would not be destroyed, but they lead a life in the unconscious. But where they are not subject to the criticism and the testing of conscious process, they live a sort of barbaric life. The repression of them does not deny them the development of energy, and in time they build an energetic potential which becomes greater than the energetic potential of the conscious thinkingintuition, and then produces a throwing over, or plowing under, of the thinking-intuitive function and an emerging of feeling-sensation. Being barbaric, it manifests in more or less sordid terms unless it is wisely handled and cultured. And this, in fact, is pretty much what has happened in connection with the student revolt, for the thinking principle was the preferred principle with the Puritan development that dominated so largely our country in its early years and up to the present, which involved a more or less heavy repression of the feeling-sensation type. Now, we can see that what is coming forth is the diametric opposite in that there is an immense manifestation of a sensuous or sensual type of feeling and a repression of rational thought in the movement of the New Left.

Now, this enantiodromia could be regarded as an example of the dialectic movement; and the indicated solution of the opposition between these two phases could be a higher synthesis in which a working relationship between thinking-intuition, on one side, and feeling-sensation on the other, could have a working relationship so that there is no repression either way, and instead a mutual cultivation in terms of superior culture.

Again, the dialectic movement suggests the principle of periodicity—phase and counter-phase followed by phase and then by counter-phase again, indefinitely—a process which could well be represented by the familiar sine curve. There is much, thus, that impresses one in the conception of the dialectic movement taken in its formal or abstract sense; although, we must bear in mind that Hegel uses the terms 'abstract' and 'concrete' in a very different way from the normal usage. He's saying, for instance, that only the whole, the Absolute Idea, is completely *concrete* and any partial existence, like a rose, is *abstract* because it is not the fulfilled whole; but that is contrary to our ordinary usage.

Now, can one then by the application of this principle prognosticate the future? What is the ideal structure that is the culminating point of an evolutionary process? Hegel himself, Karl Marx, and Marcuse have all attempted this. Hegel came up with a discussion starting with the Asiatic cultures—which he regarded as very primitive and apparently did not know very much about them—passed through the Greek and the Roman stages, and finally wound up with the ideal perfection conceived as a constitutional monarchy, and that the one perfect example of that was the then existing German government, which, it seems, was actually a quite corrupt Prussian government. Karl Marx takes the same method to suggest the necessary development of social forces leading to the final stage of a synthesis which is what we now call "communism," or might more properly be called "dialectic materialism." This eventuated in the massive cruelties and murders of the Stalinist era. Marcuse, then, applies the same technique to the Freudian thesis concerning sexuality and repression, and arrives, finally, at what he purports to believe is a logical necessity for the removal of repression—which I prefer to call restraint—and let everything flow forth in an uncontrolled, uninhibited salaciousness.

Now the question arises, in as much as we get quite different conclusions from these practical applications of the dialectic process, is it a valid process for prediction or is it more valid as a means of interpreting history after fact? There are reasons why I think the latter is the case, and I will illustrate them in this way. Let us consider as the thesis a movement in the vertical direction, that which we call "up," the contradictory of movement in the vertical direction upward is movement in that which is "non-upward," of which the opposite is the most strongly suggested form, namely, movement downward. But downward is the logical opposite, not the contradictory of upward. The contradictory of upward is all that is not-upward—not, in this case, movement upward. Thus, movement in a horizontal direction is also a negation of movement upward, and all non-moving states would also be a negation of moving upward. Now, anything in the contradictory-which consists of movement downward, movement in a horizontal direction, and non-moving states—any one of these could be regarded as a manifestation of the negation of upward movement. Now, in the actual development in history, it might well be, assuming the correctness of the dialectical process in principle, that the negation of the thesis upward movement is not necessarily in the form of downward movement; it might be in the form of horizontal movement—in which case there are many, an infinity in fact, of directions—and it might be even in non-movement itself.

Out of all of this, then, there is a complexity of possibility that I suggest renders prediction, in any specific sense, impossible; and yet, there could be, nonetheless, the play of the dialectic process. This play would become evident after fact and not be good or valid in predetermining what the future might be. It appears to me that there are an infinity of possibilities in future development that would obey the dialectic process, but which would remain unpredictable if we use the technique of the dialectic process alone for prediction. Thus, Marx has not, by the dialectic process, proven the necessity or inevitability of the socialistic state; nor has Marcuse proven the inevitability of a passage through salacious conduct and general repudiation of all norms as a necessary part of future application of the dialectic principle; nor do I think that Hegel successfully proved that the more or less corrupt Prussian government in Germany at his time, was the ultimate ideal of social organization which was forced by the dialectic movement.