

Various Philosophical Considerations

Part 1 of 2

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I have received a very interesting and thoughtful letter which deserves serious consideration. As this is a rather lengthy letter, I shall not read it initially as a whole, but by parts, introducing such commentary as may be indicated as I go along. Taking that portion of the letter which is relevant to our present purposes, it is as follows:

As there are some things I should like to discuss with you, I thought I would take this opportunity to bring them up. First, concerning your recent series of tapes dealing with the aesthetic versus the theoretic approaches to yoga and yogic apologetics, I must question the subsumption of F. C. S. Northrop and yourself of the Hindu Vedanta, or of Hindu metaphysics and religion in general, under the aesthetic orientation. It is doubtless true that the preponderance of extant Buddhist scripture leans heavily in this direction, but is it not interesting to note that it is as Buddhism travels east from India that it grows increasingly more non-rational culminating in the extreme statement of the aesthetic component in the Zen of Japan. I even think that perhaps it was the increasing anti-rationalism in the Buddhism of the time of Nagarjuna that had a hand in driving it from the native land.

First, we have one word introduced here which I think needs a somewhat extended consideration. It is the word 'apologetics'. In the light of what the word really means, I would only in part accept it as a valid designation of my own philosophic contribution. I would however accept it as in part valid. But let us look at the real meaning of the word as given in the *Baldwin's Dictionary*. It there says:

It [the word] is used in two senses—a wider and a narrower. (1) In the wider signification it includes any consideration that may be adduced in support of the particular system for which apology is being made. (2) In the narrower and usual acceptation it includes all pleas for the divine origin and authority of Christianity.¹

Obviously, the term is not used in the second sense in the present usage, but in the first sense. Let us consider what it really is in the logical sense. I think this is reasonably clear, that it is a case of building a body of logical reasons or a collection of various forms of evidence in support for a position or theory or standpoint that has been already

¹ James Mark Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1911), 60.

accepted and which was not attained by the process of reasoning which is used currently in its support. It thus is a process that is present often in the supporting of an intuitively attained point of view after fact. The real basis of the point of view is the intuition, but one may have had the experience of intuitive persons who afterwards try to develop reasons in support of this position. If they are not also competent logicians, they are very apt to be ineffective because the reasons are not adequate. I've often suggested that the intuitive who is not also a logician would be better advised to present his thesis on the intuitive ground alone and let it rest at that because otherwise his reasons may prove to be inadequate, and that inadequacy may be evident to those who are logically competent.

The essence of this situation is that the reasoning process is employed to support a conclusion which has already been reached by other than rational means, like the belief in the authority of some scripture or like an intuitive insight as I have just illustrated. This contrasts with authentic rational development which would be in the following form, namely, one has collected a certain body of fact and a certain collection of principles and puts together these facts and principles and draws conclusions from them which leads to results that most likely in the first place were not foreseen. In such a case, the true rational thinker follows the consequences whether they are in accord with his earlier expectations or preferences, and accepts them as at least tentatively true whether he likes them or not. That is the authentic, the really genuine, rational process. It is a process of discovery. Apologetics, on the other hand, is an invention of reasons to support a conclusion which has been otherwise derived, and if the reasons are shown by a critic to be unsound, that does not affect the attitude of the apologist. He still retains his original basis of conception.

Now, it is true that in the case of Realization we have a process that is neither empiric nor logical by which a point of view is revealed or a certain content enters into one's consciousness by other means. Because it is evident to me that this other means is neither empiric nor logical, I have used a new term for it and called in "introception." Now, when a transcription from introceptual content is made, we have a conception which is not derived either from experience or from logical deduction, but derived immediately in another way of cognition or "imperience." Now, in the effort to present such a transcription as reasonable and acceptable in general by him who is not also awakened on the level of introception, one may adduce evidence and reasons in support of it. That would be a case of apologetic thinking or apologetics.

Now, I admit that I have and use such methods at times, but there is another methodology employed in my own work which does not fall under this classification. It is that method which is known as postulational thinking, and that would have this form: take the transcription from a Realization and postulate it, postulate as perhaps a series of concepts and then proceed from those postulates derive the conclusions which would come from them. This is not a process of justifying the original Realization, but a search for consequences that may come from the conceptual transcriptions out of those Realizations. In postulated thinking one does not question the truth of the original postulates. Even in mathematics these may be treated as simply fundamental assumptions the truth of which is not being there investigated, but simply the consequences which would flow from them in a system of careful reasoning; and much of my work, perhaps the greater part, is more in this postulational form than in the apologetic form.

Here we have something that bears directly upon the thesis of Northrop in *The Meeting of East and West*. He showed in that volume at considerable length how the characteristic of Western scientific man in his thought was postulational, as it is understood today. This is something very different from the categorical spirit which was more or less characteristic in our early scientific development and was even assumed as valid with respect with the categories of the understanding by Immanuel Kant. But in point of fact, we find that the conceptions which reasonably integrate our scientific experience at one time may prove to be inadequate in the light of later scientific discoveries with the result that there has to be an invention of other postulates taking the place of an earlier point of view which takes care of all experience including that which was handled by the earlier postulates, plus later scientific experience. These postulates may be simply inventions of the intellect, but they could be also the discoveries by intuitive insight, and there is reason to believe that in the case of the very greatest of the scientists that this latter factor works very largely. Now the point of view is different from that which has been so characteristic not only of all religions in the past, but of even our earlier scientific points of view, particularly the standpoint we held in mathematics in the days when we viewed the foundations as axioms or self-evident truths that were known with certainty. We know today that many of these supposed axioms are not essential, and so today we view the foundations as fundamental assumptions. This means that instead of having a categorical conception as the base of a science and of a religion, we have postulates as such a base, and postulates which may be replaced by other profounder postulates in the future.

Can this be a valid approach to the problem of religion? That is a question in which I am presently much concerned. It has certain positive values that may avoid some of the great evils that have grown out of religions in the past, for when a religion is viewed as categorically true, the believers in such a religion tend to feel that they, and they alone, have the truth and all of those who disagree with them are in a position of false prophets; and in as much as it is a fact that there are different categorical religions in the world involving serious incompatibilities, the result has frequently been war or violence as in the case of the Spanish Inquisition. I see this as largely due to the habit of categoricism, of asserting truth as absolutely certain when in point of fact it may well prove to be much less than absolutely certain. If we can free ourselves from this categoricism we may render possible a more harmonious development with variable religiosity in the world. Just this thought for the moment.

With respect to this clause which says, "I must question the subsumption by F.C.S. Northrop and yourself of the Hindu Vedanta, or of Hindu metaphysics and religion in general, under the aesthetic orientation," I would like to refer the writer of the letter to the tapes in question.² As I remember my statement at that time, I was indicating some question as to this. I there referred to the fact that in my reading of *The System of the Vedanta* of Paul Deussen, it certainly appeared that Shankara was dealing with logical universals in his use of concepts, rather than with mere *nomen* or nominalistic pointers, and that by so viewing it, it was a real aid to me. But the question arose, Is this the impression one would have if he read Shankara in the original Sanskrit? If Northrop is right, then it could be that Paul Deussen in his interpretation introduced the appearance of

² See the audio recordings "General Discourse on the Subject of My Philosophy," parts 3 and 6.

logical universals in Shankara's concepts. I raised this matter at that time and was by no means convinced that Hindu metaphysics was purely nominalistic. I tentatively accepted Northrop's position, but with a question mark, if you please. My own point of view is rather confirmed by the standpoint of the writer of this letter. As a personal confession, I too feel the same way.

Now, this leads to a thought that the thesis of Dr. Northrop, which he has presented as the point of view of the East as contrasted to the point of view of the West, may be valid in a different sense from that which he had in mind. The East, in the sense of the Far East, involves the point of view of a particular race or group of races which we may call the Mongoloids, which in a sense contrasts with the dominant culture of India, which is a culture of another race known as the Indo-European race. There is a tradition that this race was born in Central Asia, that one branch of it went south and another branch went west, and the branch which went west make up our progenitors; the branch that went south was known as the Aryan race that invaded India, and that there was at that time certain peoples in India that are now known as Dravidians, and that these are to be distinguished from the Aryan Indians in the same way as we distinguish between the Europeans that came into America and the so-called Indians that were found already here. Now, the thought that the difference may be associated with genetic elements of radically separated races may well be more fundamental than that the difference should be associated with merely geographic elements. In other words, that what Northrop discovered was not so much a characteristic of the East *qua* East versus the West *qua* West, as a difference between the Mongoloid races and the group of Indo-European races. In that case it may well be that the use of the concept in the sense of the logical universal is to be a characteristic introduction by the Indo-European racial group as contrasted to the radical nominalistic use of the concept which appears to be characteristic of the Mongoloid races. This, then, would explain why as Buddhism goes East, as suggested in the letter, it becomes more and more aesthetic until it becomes radically aesthetic in the form of Zen Buddhism.

The final thought suggested in this paragraph, which I will bring out by re-quotation is, "I even think that perhaps it was the increasing anti-rationalism in the Buddhism of the time of Nagarjuna that had a hand in driving it from its native land." This thought I find quite suggestive, and that it might well be true. One of the things that has impressed me in the study of Buddhism is that the different philosophic statements have seemed to have been originated by *Brahmins*, namely, East Indian peoples, and that they were later often continued by the Mongoloid peoples of China and Japan, of Mongolia and Tibet, and of perhaps Southeast Asia to a degree, and modified into conformity with the psychological orientation of this race. It brings up the question of what is the relationship of modern Buddhism to the original teaching of Gautama Buddha himself. It certainly seems to become more philosophically sophisticated in the hands of these Brahmanical thinkers; and then that implies that Buddhism is not a fixed dogma, but something that grows, and that the final word was not uttered by the Blessed One himself, but that he brought into manifestation a living and growing entity that grew in different ways from the earlier formulations. It is, thus, a living discipline or religion, not a fixed categorical structure. And this brings up the thought, what new growth may come into the Buddhistic current? What may the West add to it which is indigenous to the Western spirit? What may be a formulation in the future that does not now exist?

Certainly in the past it was modified in the hands of the series of patriarchs following Bodhidharma, and we must remember that as pointed out in the *Buddhist Logic* of Stcherbatsky, there are there presented three phases of Buddhism, and that in those three different phases we have shifts from points of view as follows: in the beginning, a pluralistic realism; in the second phase, a monism which was anti-rational in a radical way, and it was in this period that Nagarjuna is to be found with his radical anti-rationalism; and finally, in the third period, which is listed as idealistic rather than realistic, in which logic comes into the picture as an important factor.

Continuing with the letter:

I'm at a loss to see how you can justify grouping one such as Shankara with the Aestheticists. Can you produce examples of this thesis? My own present position is that Indian metaphysics, taken as a whole, is directly related neither to perception nor to theoretic conception, but to put it in your own terminology, to introception as the source of both of these. This is something I believe a scholar, even a great one like Northrop, is liable to miss. The sages of the *Upanishads* are not theoretic speculators, but neither are they essentially linked in theory or method with the world of sense. To expand on my view, I would like to utilize such a schema as that of Sri Aurobindo, in which we have an ascending scale of Supramental levels of possible cognitive experience. It seems to me that as we ascend into the planes above ordinary mind, perception and conception merge. The split in us between these two aspects of cognition is due to the fact that we are ourselves, in a sense, split beings. We are mental beings in a physical world. If we were mental beings in a mental world, I believe that we would still have an objectivity before us, though perceiving and conceiving would be unified in an intelligible intuition, which need not be knowledge by identity in the most exalted sense. By descending into the physical we forfeit the objectivity of the mental plane, but by our essential nature as mental beings, we retain the characteristic forms and categories of mind. We impose them on the physical world. In this way, I believe the schism arises. Our sense organs are limited to physical experiences while our cognitive faculty of mind is descended from another and higher realm. My point is that a division between the theoretic and the aesthetic need not be an essential one and that Indian philosophy may well have disregarded the distinction by way of transcending it. I would be interested in your reaction to this if perhaps you would include something about this on a future tape.

The material of this paragraph, I regard as a very thoughtful and suggestive contribution. On the whole I would not be disposed to criticize it adversely. However, with respect to my being associated with a aesthetic interpretation of Shankara, I refer the listener to my comments previously. All of this may be very true, as pointed out by the writer of the letter.

In bringing in a reference to Sri Aurobindo, we have another factor brought into the total picture. Sri Aurobindo is a modern figure—a man of Realization trained not only

in Eastern thought, but very largely also in the Western form of thinking. It must be remembered that his father sent him to England for his education at the tender age of six or seven, and that that education was continued up into the university level at Cambridge. It is indicated in some of the letters that the intention of the father was to disorient his son from the Indian point of view, but fortunately that intent failed of attaining consummation. Aurobindo, thus, is a man who includes within himself much of the West along with his natural orientation to Oriental thinking. The only thing that I find lacking in an important respect in the thought of Sri Aurobindo is an adequate understanding of the significance of mathematics. Because mathematics does not seem to have been really effectively grasped by him, I would say that he fell short of a full understanding of the Western genius, for as it would appear, it is in the development of pure mathematics that the Western genius has most greatly manifested its own particular capacity, its own particular contribution. And right here I might introduce as a sort of footnote, certain thoughts that go beyond the immediate content of the letter.

I would direct your attention to one of the greatest, if not the greatest, of the Greek figures in the story of philosophy and of mathematics, and that is Pythagoras. It appears that Pythagoras did in his earlier years travel into the East and apparently studied at the feet of Eastern Masters so that he has attained a recognition as being the Foreign Master by Eastern scholars. Now, in his contribution to thought it will be remembered that he oriented himself to number as the most fundamental of his conceptions. Whether number was to be viewed as the *substance* of all things or as the *measure* of all things may be not wholly clear, but certainly the view that number is the measure of all things has a very substantial justification. In fact in our present day in the most advanced features of our research, the determination is often simply the reading of a number on a dial or a number on some other basis of classification. Number becomes for us fundamental certainty as the measure or the basis of our knowledge. It is by working with number that our computers are able to function as instruments of research.

Now, Pythagoras was not only a philosopher and a mystic, he was also a mathematician, and a very great mathematician at that. He introduced certain features into mathematics that are of the very highest importance, such as the importance of proof as the prime factor in mathematical determination of truth. Secondly, he introduced what is known as the Pythagorean theorem stated in the form that the squares on the legs of a right-angle triangle summed is equal to the square on the hypotenuse of the right-angle triangle—a theorem that is of important application in our own present day. And related to the latter was his discovery of the irrational number, found in this way: that if one takes the diagonal of a square, which is the hypotenuse of an isosceles right-angle triangle, namely, one in which the two legs are of equal length and which therefore may be regarded as of unit length, the sum of the squares on the two legs is equal to two, so that the length of the hypotenuse, or the diagonal of the square, equals the $\sqrt{2}$. And this introduced a most important extension of the conception of number which seems to have been beyond the rational grasp of the Greeks. Thus, if I were to pick one figure in the whole history of Western thought that sounds most peculiarly and fundamentally the keynote of the West as contrasted to the East, it would be this figure—Pythagoras.

Now, the West has developed mathematical thought which we may call pure thought—thought that is most rigorous and least contaminated by extraneous elements. This thought is the cognitive form in which the West excels and has made its

characteristic contribution in highest degree. I have found that the mathematical aid, both in approaching the mystery underlying Realization and in the formulation of its content has been the greatest aid of all and this is something which I did not derive from the Orient, but from the West. I think, therefore, for a full understanding of the very heart of Western culture, Aurobindo has not succeeded in getting at it in a thoroughgoing way because of his evident inadequacy in understanding the mathematical component. He does refer to it as a word, but he does not refer to it in a profound and intimate sense. Therefore, I would say that while I regard it as true that Sri Aurobindo has made a very important contribution to the crossing of the difference between the East and the West, that he has nonetheless not completely finished the picture—that there is something that is indigenous to the West that requires some of us to reach out from that Western base in the meeting of the East. He has made a contribution from the East; we need a contribution from the West.

For further discussion of this paragraph it would appear to be well to read into the tape the next two paragraphs as they continue with essentially the same subject matter.

A question arose in my mind as I wrote the above, a question which is no doubt a very difficult one as it involves the correlation of two quite disparate systems of thought, or of yogic apologetics as I like to think of these philosophies. You do not appear to deal with Aurobindo's overhead planes, and yet at times seem to equate introception with the Aurobindian intuitive mind. Now, it seems to me that introception is a process of Realization and one need not necessarily enter into the supramental planes for it. For instance, A tells us that he had a *nirvanic* experience, which I would assume was introceptual, long before he became aware of the ascending series of mind, and on the other hand, one can ascend into the supramental planes, at least the lower of them, without necessarily encountering the supreme knowledge of identity, yet there is a relationship between introception and the overhead planes.

I would like to understand how it is possible, as it most certainly seems to be, for individuals to attain the essential knowledge via introception before having traversed the various intervening planes. A seems to suggest that until one has traversed those planes, one's knowledge is relatively a pale reflection in an illumined mind. Do you use the term 'introception' for the higher types of clairvoyance which do not, however, involve Divine Realization? If so, this point demands some clarification.

First, concerning my usage of the word 'introception'; it is used as a blanket-term analogous to Dr. Jung's use of the word 'unconscious'. The term is not intended to be an exclusive term. It does not define one specific type of cognition. It implies all possible cognition above the range of sense perception and conceptual cognition, and I have long sensed in it a possibility of subdivision. But much of this subdivision calls for a progress into certain zones into which I have not in this lifetime entered. It therefore is a generic term rather than a specific term. The point about concerning the possibility of overleaping, as it were, intermediate zones is a question that concerned me way back in 1936. I will now have to enter into certain features that are more like a personal

confession than a formal argument, but this is part of the development of the whole process with which I'm concerned in the philosophy.

At the time, I had contact with one whom I have called a Sage. We knew him as Senior. At the time of the breakthrough on August 7, 1936, I was well aware that I had passed over intermediate zones without arousing them into activity within the outer consciousness, and my understanding had been that one travels the way step by step and that no step could be avoided. I took this problem up with Senior, and I said I'm well aware this consciousness is very transcendent and yet there is an intermediate zone which has not become conscious at this time in this incarnation. His answer was, it is true, he said, that we ascend step by step and no step can be left out, but if one has made such an ascension in a given lifetime, a recapitulation in a succeeding lifetime does not require such a re-passage over all the steps, but a leap over intermediate steps may take place. That helped to explain a good deal. I'm well aware of such an intermediate zone not covered by my own imperience, and in many ways that has been a disadvantage, although also an advantage in the sense of freeing me from the consideration of many details that are not now important to my own consciousness.

Introception is not to be identified with any one of the many forms of cognition Aurobindo has outlined above the mind that is located, as it were, within the head, to use some of his terminology. He has what he calls the overhead levels, starting with *higher mind*, through *illuminative mind*, through *intuition* in its purest sense, through *overmind*, into the various planes of the *supermind*, which are generally regarded as the executive aspect of *Sachchidananda*. My orientation was to the *nirvanic* consciousness, and for that these intermediate planes are not necessary. If one's orientation is to the evolution, they become very necessary. And as one goes through the mass of Sri Aurobindo's literature, it becomes quite evident that his orientation is not to a *nirvanic* withdrawal, but to a transformation of what the Buddhists call the *Sangsara* and to a purifying and correcting the development within the evolution. This gives to him a very definite purpose for which these intermediate forms of cognition are, no doubt, highly important.

We are faced here with a problem that involves some very considerable complexities. We have different entities in the world's history who have had the imperience known as Realization or Enlightenment and from out of it have given a formulation involving a greater or less degree of schematic representation. Aurobindo has produced a schematic form that is extraordinarily rich, but there exists, as well, schematic forms in historic Buddhism and especially in *The Secret Doctrine*, and in Sinnett's *Esoteric Buddhism*. There are variations among these forms. And in one of his letters, Aurobindo does refer to this problem. The question arises in one's mind as to whether the insight which comes from a Fundamental Realization in the case of two or more individuals, would it give schematic representations that are essentially duplicates of each other? As one goes through the literature in this field, it does not appear that the representations are reducible one to another. It does not appear that there is only a difference of language, but that there is some more fundamental difference than that. Aurobindo did discuss this in one of his letters, and he there did state that it is not possible to reduce one of these schemas completely to the form of another.³ This, then,

³ Aurobindo Ghose, *Letters on Yoga*, vol. 22 of the *Sri Aurobindo Birth Centennial Library* (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Birth Centenary Library, 1970), 249:

would imply that in some way the perspectives given by Fundamental Realization or Enlightenment are not in any sense simple duplicates of each other. It would seem as though from such heights there are various vistas, and the schematic organization of those vistas can take different forms which are not in any simple way reducible one to another.

Now, in my own experience there is a schematic representation that is as true to it as I can make it. There are features in which it would parallel certain features of Aurobindo's schemata, but in other respects, it follows schemata that are to be found in *The Secret Doctrine* and more especially that schema that's presented by the *Taraka* yogins. This involves, therefore, an element of complexity which, no doubt, we would like to eliminate, but it is there. Some of my imperiences are well formulated in forms that parallel some features of Aurobindo's thought. Others do not. They parallel forms found elsewhere. And here it might be appropriate to point out that while several of the five Realizations which I have elsewhere discussed, do parallel the *Atmavidya* of Shankara, there are respects in which they overlap the Buddhists' point of view. The *atman* is fundamental in several of them, but in the end, the *atman* disappears as only a relative invariant, not as an absolute invariant. There is, thus, in my own imperience something that is characteristic of the Advaita Vedanta, but also something that is more characteristic of the Buddhistic point of view. Therefore, I cannot completely classify myself in either one of these religious philosophic systems. My first duty is to be true to the Realization. It is not my duty to make that material conform to the schemata of any other thinker.

I think attention should be given to a sentence which occurs almost at the end of the quotation from the letter. It runs as follows:

Do you use the term 'introception' for the higher types of clairvoyance which do not, however, involve Divine Realization?

To the sentence as a whole I'd have to say no. And this leads to a degree of discussion. The Realization of August 7, 1936, followed the lines that are known typically in the Vedanta as self-realization; but at the same time, the Realization of the *atman* implies the identification of the *atman* with the *Brahman*. And so there is a sense in which self-realization as the Realization of the *atman* is equivalent to Divine Realization; and we did, particularly in those days, speak of it as God Realization—'God' being the common Western term which would have a correspondence to the *Brahman*, although philosophically the terms do have quite a different background. Introception, therefore, is not a negation of Divine Realization as is suggested from the quoted sentence. This subject was discussed with the Sage, and he gave to us at that time a sort of formula or affirmation which is very useful. It takes this form: I am Divine. I, the personal self, recognize my Divinity. From that Divine Self, which I am, I say to my personal self, reflect thou Me. This is part and parcel of the Realizations, but it is not the

I do not think exact correlations can always be traced between one system of spiritual and occult knowledge and another. All deal with the same material, but there are differences of standpoint, differences of view-range, a divergence in the mental idea of what is seen and experienced, disparate pragmatic purposes and therefore a difference in the paths surveyed, cut out or followed; the systems vary, each constructs its own schema and technique.

fifth or final Realization where the principle of equilibrium was emphasized—the principle of a universal, unbreakable equilibrium which held a position of transcendency with respect to all entities whatsoever. The impression one would derive from all of this is that through the five Realizations, which I have outlined elsewhere, there is an ascension, and that in the final position I found myself closer to the Buddhistic point of view than to the Vedantic, which had dominated up to that point. I therefore occupy a rather uncomfortable position midway between the Buddhists and the Vedantists. Frankly, it would be more comfortable to take either one position and regard the other as in error than it is to take this intermediate position, which certainly has certain difficulties. I'm unable to identify myself with the position that Aurobindo takes wholly, nor am I able to take the position of the Buddhists wholly, but a certain position in between. It's not easy.

Now, considering further the reference to the higher types of clairvoyance, curiously this question did come up in connection with discussions between the Sage and myself. He said, which is quite correct, that I did not have clairvoyance in the ordinary sense. Clairvoyance in the ordinary sense being a capacity for clear seeing in the sense of something akin to but higher than sense perception—something that has been discussed by Aurobindo in his chapter in *The Life Divine* called “The Methods of the Vedanta” where he discusses the direct sensuous cognition of the sense mind without the intervention of the sense organs.⁴

Now, the Sage did say that I had something which he called a mental clairvoyance, which might be defined as a capacity for a direct cognition of the universals, to refer to the terminology of Plato. In this form of cognition, the universals were immediately apprehended without the intervention of ratiocinative process. Now, that might be called a higher form of clairvoyance, but I do not identify the term ‘introception’ with that exclusively. As I've said before, it should be viewed as a blanket-term comprehending all higher form of cognition above sense perception and conceptual cognition, and capable in principle of subdivision.

⁴ Aurobindo Ghose, *The Life Divine*, vol. 18 of the *Sri Aurobindo Birth Centennial Library* (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Birth Centenary Library, 1970), 60-70. The chapter is actually titled “The Methods of Vedantic Knowledge.”