I do not expect anybody to accept my philosophic position willy-nilly, but I do hope that they will understand it and not misinterpret it. On that point I want to be as sure as possible. I do not want, after I leave this plane, to face the responsibility of a misinterpretation of the position I present. There’s no obligation that anybody, however, should accept it.

Now, this morning I wish to make clear my position with respect to Materialism in the broadest possible sense of the term. First of all, I am a radical anti-materialist all the way down the line. I will present this morning four senses in which Materialism may be understood, and I stand in opposition to all four phases; and you may be surprised by the amount of ground which will be covered by these four phases.

At the time of the imperiences that constitute the foundation of this philosophy I was a convinced conceptualistic Idealist. The fifth Realization converted me from that position to Introceptualism. There was no conversion from a materialistic or vitalistic position, and that will have a definite bearing upon the yoga and why a certain method worked. One who starts from either a materialistic or vitalistic basis would require a different yoga.

Now, the view of Materialism which I’ll present here is much more than the purely technical use of the term in philosophy where it is viewed as a rather primitive metaphysical orientation asserting the reality and primacy of a self-existent thing totally apart from all consciousness. That is merely the crudest form of Materialism. It is not the whole of Materialism in the sense in which I am here using the term.

The four forms which I shall consider may be called as follows: practical Materialism, metaphysical Materialism, psychological Materialism, and epistemological Materialism. I’m straining the term in using it in this broad sense. I’m fully conscious of that fact. And bear in mind my attitude here is not a purely detached academic one. It is a position that involves conviction and feeling—feeling on the order of a religious intensity. That makes a difference. I could give an example of a, for instance, a theoretical physicist who held a theory that was materialistic, but whose personal life was austere, who was not sensualistic in that life, who was deeply involved and committed in

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1 The following discourse was delivered extemporaneously before an audience. Participant: Would you mind turning the light off Doroethy?

2 For the definition of ‘imperience’, see audio recordings “General Discourse on the Subject of My Philosophy,” part 10, and “On My Philosophy: Extemporaneous Statement.” In speaking of introceptual knowledge, Wolff says, “The third function therefore gives you imperience, not experience. It is akin to sense perception in the sense of being immediate, but is not sensuous.”
his working with his differential equations. With such a one I could feel personal rapport though I would argue against his philosophic position. That would not be practical Materialism. That would not be Materialism in the most invidious sense as I conceive it. It would be only a theoretical doctrine. Now, very largely the Materialism of the scientist is of that sort, and I, therefore, do not regard the Materialism of the Western scientist as the most obnoxious form of Materialism. I want to make that point clear. I disagree with it, but I do not find it obnoxious when it is only a theoretical position.

Now, to consider the four forms: first practical. This is the kind of Materialism with which the American is charged by the Oriental—a great interest in possessions and in that which commands possessions, namely, money. To be able to get things and command the ownership of them, to own land, to own all the various gadgets, and so forth, involves a great interest in the object and the possession of it. But it is largely an unconscious kind of Materialism. It is a barrier. It tends to close the door to spiritual values, to be sure, but it is not Materialism in the most invidious sense. It is a kind of childhood Materialism, if you please.

The diametric opposite of that is the sannyasin whose only possession is a loin cloth, a walking staff, and a begging bowl, and follows the rule of never sleeping twice in the same place. This I regard as the infantile or baby stage of yoga. For some individuals it may be quite necessary. If he has a strong attachment to things, to external possessions, to comforts, and so on, it may be necessary for him to live this way and even to sit on nails or thorns, or lie on them, as has been done in order to break away from such attachments. But this would be necessary only if one started from a very inferior and low form of attachment. It may very well be necessary, but it’s not advanced yoga; it’s infantile yoga, the infantile stage of yoga. And there is a story told of one such sannyasin who became the guest of a Sage, a man of Realization, who also had fine possessions—a fine house and all that went with it—and the two were bathing in a pool. And the sannyasin, imagining that he was in a position of superiority, rebuked his host for retaining all of these possessions. Then the host, with his magical power, caused all of those possessions to start to burn, and then the sannyasin, with a yell, ran to possess his loin cloth. The sannyasin was more attached than the true yogin who could handle wealth. The sannyasin was in an earlier, younger stage of yoga than the one who could deal with property without attachment. So much for practical Materialism.

The metaphysical Materialism is not metaphysical in our usual sense of the word. It consists in the projection of the object of consciousness as the self-existent thing outside of consciousness as such. Careful analysis shows that we never have experience of any such thing. We have experience of images, but not of things. Images are existences in consciousness. The thing, as predicated, is a supposed existence outside consciousness in every sense. Since this involves a projection, we may call it a sort of metaphysical judgment, a judgment of existence beyond epistemological justification. There is a good deal of crude thought of this form. The outstanding example of it today is the dialectic materialism of Karl Marx. It’s crude and a primitive kind of thinking—a perversion and inversion of the triadic dialectic of Hegel, which was spirit oriented. This was matter oriented. It is equivalent, speaking now in symbolic language, to a shift from an orientation to God to an orientation to the devil. That is why the development of Marxist governments has been so vicious in its manifestation. They are not only anti-capitalistic;
they are anti-Christ, anti-Buddha, anti-Lao-Tze, anti-Krishna, anti-Aurobindo, anti-Shankara. And there’s another form of this represented by Moleschott who was so crude as to say man is what he eats.

We come next to the consideration of psychological Materialism. Psychological Materialism is more subtle than this form that I called metaphysical Materialism, for it does not fall into the obvious error of projecting the image to the status of a thing beyond all consciousness. But it is an orientation primarily to the sensible object, to that which comes in through our various senses: seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and all of those senses which come under the general head of touch, which includes kinesthetic sense, the sense of heat, sense of pressure, organic senses. I understand that something like thirteen senses all together have been differentiated. The point of view that that which is sensuously apparently is real, I class for my purposes here as another form of Materialism, though technically I’m well aware that it should have another classification; but I’m presenting an individual point of view and attitude towards all Materialism. Here you would have persons who are oriented to the sensuous order as contrasted to the conceptual order or the introceptual order. Among them you would list the glutton, the gourmet, the person who attaches a lot of importance to what he eats, who is not forced to it because of ill health, who makes a big point of organic gardening and of health store products. They are all materialists in the sense in which I use the term. They hope to accomplish important values for consciousness by an external agency—the object. It is more subtle than metaphysical Materialism, but it still is in an essential sense materialistic.

Now, I might say in this connection, to bring out the distinction between the image and the concept, here we have a certain hierarchy in the orientations. Dr. Sommers, who is a specialist on the philosophy of Shelling, told me once that in correspondence between Shelling and Hegel, Shelling insisted upon the difference between the image and the concept, whereas Hegel seemed to view it as possible to dispense with the image completely and reduce it completely to concepts. In this objection of Shelling, I must agree with him. My own analysis confirms the view of Shelling that the image, which is sensuous, is not reducible to the concept; but on another point, I am in agreement with Hegel in the sense of the hierarchical transcendence of the concept with respect to the image. In that respect I am in sympathetic rapport with the Hegelian position and with the Platonic position in which the sensuous order of knowledge was viewed as inferior and even colored with evil, whereas the universals, which are essentially conceptual, constituted a superior form of knowledge. Here we’re getting into an hierarchy of values. But if you’re going to understand my philosophy, you’ve got to understand this distinction and my relative valuation of these different elements. We have then, in what I have said right now on the concept and the image, what might be called the epistemological form of Materialism. It is that which gives primacy to the image. It’s a subtle, very much more subtle form of Materialism; nonetheless, it contrasts radically with the position I present.

Now, here I stand in opposition to positions that are rather surprising. In Buddhism, for instance, you have sutras that in effect treat the object as transcending the subject, and I stand radically opposed to that position. You have in logical Buddhism developed by Dignaga and Dharmakirti the position, primarily formulated by Dignaga,
that there are two and only two organs of cognition, namely, sense perception and conceptual cognition, but maintaining that Ultimate Reality, or Paramartha-sat, is the pure point-instant sensation, and that conceptuality is only a creative construct which produces a maya essentially, and that therefore the movement towards Liberation is a movement toward the purely point-instant sensation away from the conceptual order. Now, you will find, and you should already know, that in my philosophy I also assert that the conceptual order is transcended, but it is transcended by the introceptual order, but it in turn transcends the sensual order; so, therefore, I deviate from the position of the so-called logical Buddhists. There are other forms of Buddhism. I find my greatest agreement with the sutra formulated by Padma Sambhava. Now, what this all means is that we have an hierarchy of values at the foot of which, in my system of thought, stands sensation, and in an intermediate position the conceptual power, and transcending both, the introceptual order.

On the occasion of the fifth Realization at its culminating point before there was a descent into Darkness, I had the imperience of the object of consciousness and the subject to consciousness falling away and only Consciousness remaining. That meant that the subject to consciousness is not permanent, though it transcends the object of consciousness and has a higher order of durability with respect to the object of consciousness. It occupies, thus, a position analogous to that in algebra between the constant and the variable, which is called a parameter. In analytic geometry an equation of the first degree in the form of \( ax + by + 1 = 0 \) represents the sum total of the two-fold infinity of straight lines that can be drawn in a plane. In any one of these straight lines the variables, known as \( x \) and \( y \), can take an infinity of different values, but if a given value is attributed to \( x \), a corresponding value is determined with respect to \( y \) if you have an actual concrete equation involving numbers; but otherwise the range of values here is infinite. As you give the \( a \) and \( b \), the constants in this equation, specific numerical values you define a specific straight line, but you can give \( a \) one value, then you can give the \( b \) any of an infinity of values, that are actually numerical, and you define an infinity of straight lines; and then you can give to the \( a \) also an infinity of values with respect to every one of which the \( b \) would have an infinity of values and you thus get a two-fold infinity of straight lines. Your \( a \) and \( b \), therefore, have an intermediate position between that of an absolute variable and an absolute constant—the numbers being absolute constants—and they’re called, therefore, parameters. Now, the position of the subject in my philosophy is like the parameter. It has, shall we say, a kind of relative durability with respect to the object, but not an absolute durability. The ultimate truth is, thus, Anatman. Instead of being the primary first truth, it is the ultimate. Buddhism seemed to give in the beginning a durability to the object that it did not give to the subject since it was always anatmic. With that position I disagree, but that position is not implied in all the sutras. Therefore, in this system any effort that focuses upon the primacy of the object as well as the thing, either in theoretical form or in yogic practice, is viewed by me as essentially materialistic.

Now, if you’ve been thinking ahead, this carries implications with respect to Zen and Tantra. Zen imposes an asceticism upon the conceptual side of man to free and give primacy to the sensual order, or aesthetic order. Tantra treats the organism as the primary agent in yoga; and, thus, in this broad sense, is classed by me as a form of Materialism. Please note this fact, that sensuality is that which we hold in common with the animal. Conceptuality is that which differentiates us from the animal. We are men, human beings,
because we are conceptual beings. We do occupy an animal nature or body, that we have in common with the raccoons and all the other creatures around us; but as conceptual entities we have something the raccoon does not have. And beyond this there is the introceptual order which may be called the divine order. And in my yoga the methods employed use only that which man as man possesses and the animal does not possess. In other words, the methodology is conceptualistic; the goal is not conceptualistic. That distinction should be made. In my yoga, the organism, diet practices, breath culture, taking of postures—standing on the head and all of that stuff—have no place whatsoever. I’ll grant that some persons who are so deeply engrained in a kind of unconscious Materialism may have to use this, but it is not a part of my yoga. In the most radical sense possible, my yoga is non-Tantric. It makes no use of asana, mudra, pranayama, or even of mantra, but does use, emphatically, conceptual resources. The resources that man only has, the animal has not.

Now, if one is in the position he has to loosen himself from a strong grip of his animal or sensuous nature, I grant that these methods may very well be necessary; but, I view them as belonging to the more primitive or early stages of a yoga discipline, not an advanced yoga discipline. On these points, I’m taking a strong position. This position was fundamental in the whole experience that I went through, and you won’t understand the yogic process that I have reported unless you understand this background—one which may be called a radical anti-materialism implying anti-sensationalism and a subordination of the image to the concept.

Now, I think that’s enough. We may open the way now for discussion and all of the disagreements. But please bear in mind that this is as much what you might call a psychological confession as anything else. It’s not at present a philosophic argument.