Contrast Between Philosophy and Psychology

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The material I have in mind will be good for a public tape.

There is a very important orientation or contrasting orientations, namely, that which exists between the attitude of the philosopher and the attitude of the psychologist. From the standpoint of the philosopher, psychology is a department under philosophy, as in the case of the three elements of metaphysics; as traditionally considered they consist of ontology, cosmology, and rational psychology. Here we have the assumption of a perspective in which psychology occupies a subordinate position. On the other hand, if we consider the modern depth psychologists as contrasted to the earlier experimental psychologists where the name of Wundt was of supreme importance, the general attitude of the modern psychologist is such that philosophy is viewed as something that expresses a psychological position and thus occupies a subordinate place. Between these two attitudes there is a contrast that is rather strong—even a contrast that can manifest a degree of hostility.

I first experienced this in a contact with a psychologist by the name of Waltmann. We were entertaining the idea of a cooperative effort, and it soon became evident that there was a kind of hostile difference in orientation, for here was clearly presented on the part of Dr. Waltmann the attitude of subordination of the mathematical, philosophic spirit to the psychological spirit, and he expressed this, at one time, in this form: to eliminate conclusion and retain decision.1 Now, in my personal pattern of procedure, in all situations, practical and theoretical, the procedure was, and is, in the form of a process of reasoning that leads to a conclusion and in the light of that conclusion decisions are formed. Decision thus followed a rational process. Decision without rational process is essentially anathema to me. However, I do not therefore conclude that Waltmann was necessarily wrong with respect to himself and his own type. But he was radically wrong with respect to the type which I represented. This I submit is something that must be taken into account.

I made a search for the Realization in which there was no success for 22 years. My approach was a mental one. Success came when I found Shankara, and I’d spent but a brief time reading him when the key emerged. I found that I had slipped into the position that I was producing a state of consciousness whereas the fact was that I was actually working toward a recognition of a state which already existed. The aim was, the goal was, a recognition not the creation of a fact. The procedure was rational throughout and it produced results of supernal importance at least so far as I am concerned. Now, it may well be that there are other ways of procedure, and I assume that there are other valid ways of procedure, but I know that this way works. I simply believe, without knowing, that there are also other ways, and I am open to recognizing

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1 See the audio recording, “On the Nature of Integral Consciousness,” part 4.
that they are valid for the appropriate types. But the way that I went, I insist, was the valid way for the type which I represent.

Now I may bring up a point here in connection with the Ch’an Zen type of Buddhism. I have read the reports of lectures given by the Sixth Patriarch in Goddard’s *Buddhist Bible*, and it is there reported that when he gave lectures many in the audience were Enlightened.² Now, the Great Buddha made first a six-year experiment in his search for Enlightenment and the experiment proved to be a failure. He put forth great effort in a direction that at first didn’t work. Then he changed his course, abandoned extreme asceticism, sat under the Bodhi tree, and ultimately had the experience of Enlightenment. Is it conceivable and reasonable to suppose that by merely listening to a lecture some individuals who heard it received in that brief time with minimum effort the same value that the Buddha achieved through a protracted and intense effort? That I submit is sheer nonsense. They did not get the same thing. What they may have received was an induction bestowed upon them by the one who lectured to them. So what is implied is that the word ‘Enlightenment’ has been corrupted, and the so-called Enlightenment of those who heard the Sixth Patriarch was only a faint reflection of the great Enlightenment which the Buddha attained.

Zen Buddhism, we are told, was derived from this Ch’an Buddhism, and there a method has been developed that is highly irrational, that is pejorative in extreme degree with respect to the rational mode of consciousness. It employs the method of the *koan*, asking questions like, “What is the meaning of one hand clapping?” with a view to discouraging a rational approach to the end of Realization. And they also employ the term Enlightenment in a diminished sense as when it is said that a certain *chela* had come to his master’s hut and had listened to his master. Then when he left it was dark and stormy outside and his master handed to him a candle and the candle was blown out by the wind. And at that moment, he was Enlightened. Is that the same thing that it took such supreme effort for the Buddha, the Great Buddha, to attain? Not for one moment do I believe it. There may be something that happens; but, in any case, this is not the way for me or my type. It may produce ultimate results. I give it the benefit of the doubt, but I do not know that it achieves that which Shankara achieved or the Buddha achieved. I know that the rational approach of Shankara works. I give presumption to the idea that other methods also work, but I do not know that they do so work.

Different schools of Buddhism are known to exist. I have also heard or read that members of different schools can quite happily and harmoniously abide in the same monastery. I suggest that this implies a recognition of the fact that there are differences between different types of individuals and that therefore these differences require different orientations. It thus would be a practical recognition of the validity of differences of type in our Western sense. The result being that what is valid as a way for one type, or as an orientation for one type, may be quite different from the way and orientation that is valid for another type.

In recent discussions with Dr. Brugh Joy the suggestion has been made by Dr. Joy that I should aim at the androgy nous condition. And he seems to suggest that this can be

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achieved by invigoration of the anima. Now, the conception of the androgyne is fairly familiar. It is to be found in Theosophical literature and, if I remember correctly, was discussed in the literature of the Temple of the People, which was a Theosophical offshoot. But the idea as there presented is usually affirmed as the state of very high beings and I recall that somewhere I have seen this thesis advanced: that all of us are ultimately androgyne beings, but that when we descended into incarnation from higher levels into this, that we divided and were separated into the two sexes and that there is a counterpart of everyone of us somewhere. But it is stated, as I remember, that this counterpart is rarely in incarnation at the same time as the individual out here is in incarnation, that if they do incarnate at the same time, then it is for the purpose of a special work, and it is also stated that they do not always get along too well with each other and that it is not an easy relationship. There are questions here that arouse in me a considerable doubt that the achievement of an androgyne state can be effected through the vitalization of the anima.

In the discourses on the tapes carrying the discussion between Dr. Brugh Joy and myself, it is often stated by the former that the function of the conceptual order is that of a scaffolding which may help to lead to experience but experience carries all the authority. This statement has a familiar ring. If instead of the word ‘scaffolding’ the term ‘instrumental’ had been used it would at once have defined a philosophic point of view that is well known. The pragmatists take essentially the same position. This statement has been put forth essentially by William James, and I’ll abstract from it: that concepts lead either to conduct which is to be recommended or to experiences that are to be expected and that this is the whole of the meaning of the concept. This view is technically known as instrumentalism, that the whole function of the conceptual order is as a servant to the experiential order of sensation either in the sense of action or of perception. Now, there is no question in my mind but that very frequently concepts serve precisely this function, and in the case of the practical man it may be the only use he makes of concepts, but the difficulty lies in the use of the word ‘whole’, namely, that the whole meaning of the concept is either in conduct to be recommended or in experiences to be expected. I shall take up a counter case that suggests a virtual reversal of this position.

In one of the numbers of the defunct journal Monist, Henry Poincaré, who in his day was the leading mathematician living in the world, tells something about the processes that went on subjectively in him that led to a mathematical demonstration. He was working upon the problem of trying to show that certain functions, the nature of which I have forgotten, could not exist. And over a period of considerable time he had

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3 James Mark Baldwin, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1911), 321:

The doctrine that the whole ‘meaning’ of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected, if the conception be true; which consequences would be different if it were untrue, and must be different from the consequences by which the meaning of other conceptions is in turn expressed. If a second conception should not appear to have other consequences, then it must really be only the first conception under a different name. In methodology it is certain that to trace and compare their respective consequences is an admirable way of establishing the differing meanings of different conceptions.
made no progress. On one occasion he had been eating in a café and had drunk a considerable amount of coffee. Then after the meal he left the café and entered into a hansom cab, a horse-drawn vehicle. At the moment of stepping upon the step, suddenly there entered into his mind the solution of the problem and he worked this out in due course afterwards. Now, the experiential part of this picture was the eating of a meal involving the drinking of a large amount of coffee and from that a configuration was induced into his mind that led to the resolution of the problem. The sensuously experiential part here was the eating of the meal with the coffee. The product or result, the terminal value out of it, was a conceptual determination which was not developed for the purpose of performing any sensible function in this world but just for the purpose of a determination of truth. The objective was a conceptual truth determination. In this case, the empiric part, the experiential part, the sensuous part, was simply instrumental to a conceptual objective.

While the argument may be made that in the case of applied mathematics the function of the mathematical work is instrumental to a sensuous or experiential objective like, for instance, the putting up of a bridge that will stand or of a building that will stand, and so forth. But the work of Poincaré was in the field of pure mathematics which is a discipline so different from applied mathematics that at Stanford in my day the two fields were handled in separate departments. In pure mathematics the objective is truth of relationship as an end in itself. And very typically the mathematician that has produced a demonstration of a new relationship feels injured if it is given an application, just as a fine artist would feel injured if his product were used for the purposes of salesmanship in the handling of some product. Now, it is a known fact that nearly all original mathematical creation is in the field of pure mathematics and application follows. The one great exception was Newton’s development of the theory of fluxions, or the calculus, as an instrument for handling a cosmic problem; otherwise the history is that creativeness is possible only when the motivation is pure construction. And all mathematical construction is conceptual. We have there a situation in which one may reverse the relationship between the sensible or experiential order and the conceptual order and view the sensible order as instrumental to a terminal value that is conceptual. These are simply a couple of illustrations of the point that the instrumental interpretation of the function of the conceptual order taken in the exclusive sense is an inadequate view.

In so far as man is a sensuous being, he is essentially another animal and no more than that. But by the superimposition of the conceptual order, he became an entity transcending the animal; and only because of this transcendence does he rule the whole of the animal kingdom. He is lord over it. And there are animals more powerful than he is; and as merely a sensuous being he could not stand against them, but as a conceptual being he has the power to rule all of the brute force of the animal world. I am not inclined to view this essential differentiation of man-ness from animalness as only instrumental to that which belongs to the animal order.

Another example is afforded by the case of a man who has been out on the desert and has exhausted his supply of water and now is facing the dangers of dehydration. He knows where there is a reliable spring, but it requires a very considerable walk and in the heat it could be a test of his endurance. As he travels toward this known source, he comes to a high point where he looks down into a valley and has the sense impression of a clear
beautiful lake and much closer than the source which he was seeking where there was certainty of water. Now, the sense impression is a lake; that is the experiential factor. But he stops to reflect: this is dry country where he is, and the rains are insufficient to produce a lake, and there has been no report of a cloudburst in the area. If he goes down to that which his senses tell him is a lake and finds that it is in fact a mirage, he might very well not have the endurance to go to where there was a known source of water. So he stops to think in conceptual terms: there is not enough rain in the country to maintain a lake and there has been no report of a cloudburst. He looks more closely and he finds that the water instead of lying level at its borders seems to make a curve and reach up on the opposite mountains. This is not a known situation into which water can form itself since it lies level so far as gross perception can determine. As a result of reference to his conceptual accumulative knowledge, he discounts the pure experience of the senses which tell him that there is water there and forms the judgment that it is a mirage; and therefore he refrains from diverting himself from his normal course to a known source and continues on his way, thereby saving his life. Here the authority of conceptual knowledge took precedence over the immediate experience with results of a positive sort. The empiric impression does not always wield the highest authority.

Sensuous knowledge is commonly called “immediate” in discursive practice, whereas conceptual knowledge is identified as “mediate”; and the word ‘experience’ is usually identified with sensuous cognition, whereas, conceptual knowledge is regarded as non-experiential. There is another kind of knowledge that employs neither the senses nor conceptual processes and this is the kind connected with the mystics’ Awakening, or the yogic Awakening, or Realization, or Enlightenment. In its most highly developed form it becomes what Aurobindo calls “knowledge through identity,” a knowledge which depends upon neither the intervention of reasoning or sense perception. This is obviously still more immediate than sense perception and it obviously is something other than conceptual knowledge. Now, with respect to this kind of knowledge, I readily grant that it takes precedence over all conceptual knowledge and that it wields ultimate authority, although as soon as it is interpreted and communicated it is set down and loses its pristine purity. In my study of this subject, I felt that the word ‘experience’, which is usually attached to the operation of the senses, was inadequate and that another term should be employed; and I have employed the word ‘imperience’ and also the term ‘introception’ to cover this field. This zone I definitely regard as wielding the highest authority before it is interpreted or communicated, but just so soon as it is interpreted or communicated it is open to criticism. Because of this study I have had to identify three sources of knowledge instead of the usual two, namely, knowledge through sense perception and knowledge through conceptual cognition, and in place have had to add a third component which I called introception; and I arrange, thus, these three zones in a hierarchy of authority. At the bottom, sense perception which gives us experience—and the term experience is restricted to this zone—and conceptual cognition, and third, introceptual cognition based upon the immediate imperience in the mystical or yogic sense. There is thus a hierarchy of cognitive principles. At the top wielding the highest authority, there is introception to which conceptual cognition is definitely subordinated, although conceptual criticism may be validly applied to the interpretation of introceptual cognition, and then below conceptual cognition there is sensational cognition, or experience, and this I give the lowest rating. The conceptuality transcends sensuality and experience, but in turn is
transcended by introceptuality. This subject has been developed in my philosophic writings so I give here only a brief abstract of it.

Now, we go to quite a different subject. A couple of days ago I recalled something that happened in the period when I dwelt at Halcyon, the headquarters of the Temple of the People.

Footnote here:
The Temple of the People is quite a different entity from that of the Peoples Temple which has been in the news recently. The Temple of the People was a portion of the general Theosophic movement which was started in 1875.

End of the footnote.

In the period from 1915 to 1922, I lived at Halcyon and was one of the members of this organization. While there I became associated with Sherifa and married her on June 25, 1920. In the organization of this entity, there was an inner esoteric head filled by a Mrs. LaDue whose symbolic name was Blue Star. She was called the Inner Head. The Outer Head was a Dr. Dower who was called Red Star. Mrs. LaDue at that time was in poor health, could no longer read, and was often read to by the different members. Much of the material was definitely of a light sort, and I often thought why waste time on this kind of material when there is serious material; but I’ve learned to understand the need for this light material. When one functions at high tension there is a need of relief from it. There is a human side even with the illuminati. This is something not generally appreciated. And she got relief from the tension of her basic work from the listening to material that was generally in the pulp magazines. But one day a story had been read to her which she recognized as a bit of imagination that had hit a fundamental truth and she emphasized the importance of becoming acquainted with this. It was a story entitled, as I remember, “The Blind Spot,” and developed the conception of what has since been called a “co-space,” namely, that the structure of the universe is such that one space can coexist with another space, as it were, occupying the same area, yet the life in the two spaces could be very different and not in relation to each other.4 The blind space was conceived of as a means for entering this other space back and forth where the conditions were right for such a process. She said this idea was an imagined representation of what is in fact a true relationship. Thus zones like the kamaloka and devachan are not to be found by some distant traveling in this outer space, but are to be found in a sort of co-space within occupying the same area.

Now, according to the fundamental teachings, particularly developed in The Mahatma Letters, when one dies he passes into kamaloka, a portion of him, he drops certain principles, the outermost principles, and remains as a five-principled being for a time in kamaloka. Later, passing on into a deeper state, he drops two more principles which form a shell just on the kamaloka plane just the same as he dropped the physical body with two principles when he left this plane. Now, there is a sense in which we feel

4 Austin Hall and Homer Eon Flint, “The Blind Spot,” serialized in six parts in Argosy-All-Story Weekly from May 14 to June 18, 1921. A sequel, The Spot of Life, was written by Hall alone; it was serialized in Argosy from August 13 to September 10, 1932.
these entities are at a distance. But in the quantitative sense of distance, since this plane is to be regarded as a co-plane filling the same area, as it were, where this plane is, not something at a distance, actually the vehicles of the departed may be very close to us so far as quantitative distance is concerned. Though so far as state of consciousness is concerned they may be, or ultimately may be, at a very considerable distance.

Once in a discussion with Senior, he spoke of the difference of the relationship to the planets which existed in the subtle or adept world as he called it. He said the planets represented states of consciousness, which, however, while not distant in the sense of quantitative distance, nonetheless might be difficult to reach because it required a shift in consciousness which might not be easy. I suggested to him that we might call this qualitative distance as contrasting to the quantitative distance of the planets as seen from our present plane and he accepted the designation as quite valid. So I shall apply that here, that the one that has passed over may be at a qualitative distance from us particularly if they have advanced into devachan and perhaps gone pretty far into that state of consciousness. In that case they are at a qualitative distance from us, but in terms of quantitative distance, they could be right here around us. Applying this to Gertrude, she might be in this very office or even intersecting my own body in another form of space, though the state of consciousness, if it is devachanic, could be not easy to reach. And one could even have a sense of presence, of nearness, even though the companion has passed through the channel of death and even beyond the second death that drops the shell. This is a thought that came to me and I’m putting it forth for what it may be worth.

In the discussions with Dr. Burgh Joy, one of the most difficult problems which we have to face has been given a considerable attention. If the ultimate is One, that is, non-dual, as is affirmed by Shankara and many others, then how do you reconcile certain of the pairs of opposites. These are the pairs of opposites that have particular moral force. There are other pairs of opposites that are essentially technical and do not involve this problem, at least not in the same degree. But let us consider some of those forms of behavior that are generally regarded as most obnoxious and consider their opposites. We have murder, rape, cruelty—including extreme forms of torture—thievery, lust, and drunkenness; and their opposites, which would be the spirit of life preservation, scrupulous truthfulness, respect for the rights and property of others, a state of consciousness in which there is no lust, and continuous sobriety of consciousness. I have here listed the five items that were considered by the Blessed One himself according to the record. How do we unite these pairs of opposites in the process of ascension to the non-dual state? How do we unite the spirit of murder and the spirit of life preservation? How do we unite truthfulness with falsity? And, also, how do we unite the other pairs that have a strong moral implication? Are they to be handled in precisely the same way? Are they to be regarded as equally valid?

Now, in my experience of those lucid days in 1936, I saw, or experienced, a method of handling this, and that was, at a certain point in ascension the good became transformed into a higher kind of good, that is, the relative good of our experience here in dualistic order became so transformed and so also was the evil of our relative order transformed into a higher kind of good, and these two higher kinds of good became one. That was a solution that seemed to me satisfactory. It did not become necessary to find a justification for murder, falsity, thievery, lustfulness, and intoxication, but in the
ascension these all became transformed and that left me with no problem in respect to this question. But when you bring these negative functions into immediate contact with the good functions and regard them as fusing, you do have a very difficult problem. It becomes necessary to try to justify the negative functions, justify killing, lying, thievery, lust, and intoxication; and in those terms the resolution does not seem to me to be satisfactory. But with the passage through the process of transformation before fusion the problem seems to me to be clarified.

This is the end of the portion of this tape which is planned for public use.