

Is the Intellect the Devil?

Part 4 of 4

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This will be the fourth tape in the series of tapes for Convention on August 10, 1980.

In our discussion so far we have considered man under two aspects: first we considered that which we called the proto-human, and, second, that which we called the intellectual human. We found that there was a long period of development of the proto-human before there was an introjection of the intellectual being, which was brought down from a level of evolution above that of the human because of some mistake made by certain entities known as the *Manasaputra*. The result was that the intellectual, or higher mental side of man, is not a simple development out of latency by evolutionary process, but is something superimposed in his consciousness, so that he became, in a certain sense, a biune entity. Considered from the standpoint of the cognitive element in man, the biune entity can be identified in this way: the proto-human is sensuous, in other words, has a sensory equipment by which he achieves a cognition of the world about, and this we commonly call the principle of perception. But there is also another term applied to this, one which is particularly employed by Northrop in his *The Meeting of East and West* and also by Baumgarten and Immanuel Kant, and that is to call this side of our cognition the *aesthetic* principle, meaning perception, feeling, sensation, sensibility. In this case the word 'aesthetic' is not employed in the sense of meaning the beautiful, but in the sense of meaning the perceptual or sensational side of our cognition including the principle of feeling. On the other hand, the intellectual side, which was superimposed, involves conceptual cognition, and in Northrop's terminology is identified with the *theoretical* component or the component which we might call the *mathematical*, in as much as the supreme expression of the intellectual or conceptual in its greatest purity is found in mathematics. And I would rather suggest that we might speak of these two aspects as the aesthetic and the mathematical.

A very important question which has occupied the attention of philosophers over many centuries both in the West and in the East is this question: What is the relation between the sensational, the perceptual, or the aesthetic on one side, and the conceptual, intellectual, or mathematical on the other. The domain or division of philosophy which is concerned with this type of question is known as epistemology. And, actually, it is propaedeutic to the substantive discussions in philosophy, just as is logic. I shall consider only one suggested solution which happens to have a particular pertinence, but there are other statements of the interrelationship, or theories concerning it, that do exist in the literature. The one I shall discuss is known as the handling of this question by the pragmatic philosophers. As in point of fact, in certain discussions on tapes that have been recently held, a position was put forward that was essentially the pragmatic solution that is well known in the history of philosophy. A clear statement of the position taken by the pragmatic school of philosophy is given in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, and there are contributions by two

outstanding pragmatists, namely, C. S. Peirce and William James. I shall quote them into the tape. The first statement by C. S. Peirce is:

[Pragmatism is] (2) The opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the following maxim for attaining clearness of apprehension: ‘Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.’¹

The second contribution by William James is as follows:

The doctrine that the whole ‘meaning’ of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected, if the conception be true; which consequences would be different if it were untrue, and must be different from the consequences by which the meaning of other conceptions is in turn expressed. If a second conception should not appear to have other consequences, then it must really be only the first conception under a different name. In methodology it is certain that to trace and compare their respective consequences is an admirable way of establishing the differing meanings of different conceptions.²

The essential point in these definitions is the statement that the *whole* meaning of a conception is realized in sensible experience or in sensible conduct, that there is no other meaning than that; which means that the concept exists only as instrumental to a perceptual experience or conduct and that there is no other meaning involved in it.

Now, a major difficulty that has arisen in this connection is that if this were true, pure mathematics would be impossible, just as we found earlier that if the empiric point of view of John Locke, Bishop Berkeley, and David Hume were true, then pure mathematics would be impossible, as Immanuel Kant pointed out. But it is a fact that pure mathematics is possible, therefore the whole meaning of the concept is not contained in an experience pointed to. I do not suggest that this is not part of the use of the concept. It obviously is true that concepts can function as instrumental to experience. The objection is to the idea that the whole meaning of the concept is realized in experience, for there is the development of pure mathematics, which is purely conceptual in its highest reaches and serves an end not connected with sensual experience, but serves an end that is pure and conceptual in itself. There will be an additional element brought in later when I bring in a third type of conception connected with Realization, and then we’ll have to consider the relationship of the concept to this higher type of imperience.³

¹ Baldwin, James Mark, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1911), 321.

² *Ibid.*, 321.

³ For the definition of ‘imperience’, see the audio recordings “General Discourse on the Subject of My Philosophy,” part 10, and “On My Philosophy: Extemporaneous Statement.” In speaking of introceptual

In contrast with the empiric, pragmatic position that has just been outlined, let us consider the position advanced by Sir Isaac Newton. Quoting from Northrop's book *The Meeting of East and West*, p. 440, this sentence, "Sensed space and time, said Newton, are "apparent"; the theoretically known space and time are "absolute, true, and mathematical."⁴ In other words, we have the diametrically opposite position taken here as contrasted to the pragmatic, empiric position, that the reality, the objective space and time, are the mathematical space and time, not the sensed space and time.

I might illustrate the problem here by a hypothetical incident which is, nonetheless, experientially possible. An individual witness is located 5500 feet from one charge of an explosive and 1100 feet from another charge of explosive. These explosives are set off and the sound of them is heard by the witness at precisely the same time. The testimony of the aesthetic experience is they are simultaneous. But we know in terms of mathematical spatial relationships that sound travels at the rate of around 1100 feet a second, that the explosion that was 5500 feet, therefore, took five seconds to reach the ear of the witness, and that the explosion that was 1100 feet away took one second to reach the ear of the witness. Therefore, the explosions were four seconds apart in mathematical space and time; whereas, in terms of aesthetic or experiential space and time, they were simultaneous. Which is the true fact of the matter? Which position gives us the truer representation of reality: the aesthetic experience of simultaneity which suggests the explosions were simultaneous, or the explanation in terms of mathematical space and time? You may make your own decision. For my part, I follow the Newtonian interpretation as being the more realistic. Would Dr. Jung maintain that it was the devil who decided that the explosions were really four seconds apart, although they were immediately sensed as simultaneous?

A very interesting point which Northrop seems to have established quite thoroughly is that the primary orientation of Oriental man is to the aesthetic component, and even, in addition, this seems to be true of Mexican society, whereas the new orientation introduced by Western man, who is heir of the classical Greek culture, is an orientation to the theoretical component or that which we might call the mathematical component; and that these distinctions, therefore, are very necessary if we are to understand the use of language and of other forms of expression by these different groups of human beings. There's no question here as to better or worse, just simply as question of difference. We all use concepts in our intercommunication, but the reference of the concepts can be different in the two cases. The aesthetic component would tend to use the medium of art in very considerable degree as a means of communication; and I mean art in the sense of sensible art, such as music, such as the plastic forms of painting, sculpture, architecture, and the like, conveying value or meaning by an essentially artistic means rather than by an essentially conceptual means which in its purest forms is mathematical. On the other hand, while there is that portion of the West—and by the West I mean the culture that grew up under the influence of classical Greek man, and that involves most of Western Europe and North America—is oriented to the theoretical or mathematical component; and that the use of language in these two cases is correspondingly with a different reference or referent.

knowledge, Wolff says, "The third function therefore gives you imperience, not experience. It is akin to sense perception in the sense of being immediate, but is not sensuous."

⁴ F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West* (New York: Collier Books, 1966), 440.

Where, in the case of the use of language or means of communication of those oriented to the aesthetic component could be very well through sensuous art, correspondingly, those who function through the theoretical component would use mathematical formulation, which in its higher reaches has a quality akin to that of art.

One very interesting distinction that Northrop makes in the contrast between the Orientals emphasis of the aesthetic component and the Western emphasis of the theoretical component is that when it comes to testing ones thinking, those oriented to the aesthetic component tend to turn back to the earliest statement that exists in their history, such as the Upanishads in India or the still earlier statements that were in non-rational form; and in the case of the West, the test of an orientation is by reference to the latest development in our most advanced natural science, namely, physics. We would check it by reference to Einstein's Theory of Relativity or to developments since the time of Einstein. The latest, thus, would prove to be the most complete, the most reliable in the case of those oriented to the theoretical component, while the earliest would be that which would be the basis of comparison in East Indian culture or in Chinese culture. This is a point of some considerable importance, I suspect.

I think the distinction which I myself have introduced as between the pointer concept or the pointer use of the concept and the container concept or container use of the concept is quite pertinent here. The pointer use, as you remember, points to a meaning that is not itself conceptual; whereas, the container use of the concept pierces down into the soul, as it were, of the concept itself. And, as I shall point out later, piercing down into the soul of the concept can reach to a non-conceptual consciousness which is also non-aesthetic. I'll not develop this point at any length at the present time. As a matter of fact, if one is subtle enough in studying my own work, it has a mathematical type of approach, although it is not in terms of an explicit mathematical language as a whole. I start from postulates which are to be assumed and the development then follows from that. I do not dwell upon empiric circumstance that leads to the statement of these postulates, but they are taken as original, and that from them the development takes place. That is the mathematical approach, as such, whether it's done in typical mathematical language or not. These postulates are, to remind you: Consciousness is original, self-existent, and constitutive of all things; secondly, there are not only two organs, functions, or instruments of cognition, but three, namely, perception, conception, and introception; third, the subject to consciousness is antecedent over the object of consciousness, and not the other way around as is so often assumed. From these the philosophy develops. These are to be taken as assumptions. There is, of course, the derivation of them, and that I have indicated, namely, that they came out of a state of Realization which is neither an aesthetic state nor a conceptual state, but one for which I had to invent a term and called it an 'introceptual' state.

The yogic method which I recommend is dealing with the consequences of these assumptions in the development of a philosophy to the end that saturation of oneself with that point of view has a tendency to awaken in one the basis on which that philosophy is developed. There is, thus, a definite yogic method involved here, although it is quite different from the forms of yoga that are commonly known.

To a considerable extent, I have delved into the Vedantic *Shastras* of the East Indians and the Buddhistic *Sutras* of the East Indians, the Chinese, and the Tibetans; and

I can say that as a whole I find many of these not clearly defined in the Western sense, but there is one great exception, and that is the writings of Sri Shankaracharya. Here the language and development is almost mathematical. I have marveled at how near the thinking here is like the mathematical kind of thinking which we know in the West. However, this is evidently not the typical Indian expression. Robert Johnson, who is a trained Jungian analyst, has spent considerable time in India, and has told me that predominately the East Indian is an introverted, feeling type rather than a thinking type, so that Shankara would constitute an exception to the rule. His thinking is more like that of a Western mathematically trained thinker, and his language talked to me very effectively. In fact, he led me to a breakthrough in 1936 which had the value of Enlightenment of some degree. But, on the whole, as I go into the Buddhistic *Sutras*, particularly in the forms produced by the Mongoloid peoples of the Orient, there's an element in the thought seems to be quite obscure, lacks the clarity that is to be found in Shankara. Clearly here the concept is used more in the pointer sense than in the container sense, whereas in the case of Shankara, we find the container use of the concept that is akin to the theoretical work in the West.

The Oriental does have a form of logic. Some of it is a logical practice to destroy logical type of thinking, but there is also some that is oriented to the point-instant sensation, as in the case of the Buddhistic logicians Dignaga and Dharmakirti; but this is logic in a very different form from that of the Aristotelian or formal logic and especially of the symbolic logic of Boole and Bertrand Russell in the West. On the whole, however, my impression is that the Oriental uses his logic destructively with the exceptions of Sri Shankaracharya and Sri Aurobindo; whereas, in the West the logic tends to be used in much higher degree in a constructive sense as in the positive development of mathematics itself. This, I think, is a point of very considerable importance. Now, in my own work, I do not follow the Oriental method in this respect, but use logic in the positive constructive sense that is characteristic of mathematics.

So far we have differentiated two aspects of the human being: the first is the proto-human, and the second, the intellectual human. This, however, is not the whole of the story. There is a third aspect which ultimately may be identified as the spiritual human or the divine human, so that in the last analysis we have a triune being. This last step is most important step of all—something not yet developed in considerable degree in this humanity. It is related to those instances studied by Maurice Bucke in his *Cosmic Consciousness*. He made a search through known literature and current observation to find entities that had this third characteristic. He found only 50. This probably is far too small a number, for he clearly did not recognize one very important figure, namely, Shankara. But in any case, it is by no means certain that all such figures would be found on the pages of history. But in any case, the implication is that so far in the development of this humanity, this third element in the constitution of the total human being is very little developed. Maurice Bucke differentiated three types of consciousness, namely, the Simple Consciousness, which he attributed to the animals; Self Consciousness, which he attributed to the human in the sense of the intellectual human; and, third, the Cosmic kind of Consciousness.

I've made a somewhat similar differentiation in which I spoke of the perceptual type of consciousness, the conceptual type of consciousness, and the introceptual type of Consciousness—the word 'introceptual' being coined by me. There is manifestly some

important difference between the consciousness of the animal and consciousness of the proto-human, but I've not found any clear identification in what this difference consists. It might be that animal instinct has become so differentiated in the proto-human that it manifests as a kind of sensory-like intuition, but this is only a suggestion thrown out for what it may be worth. There does seem to be in the proto-human something like thinking, but as I have suggested, probably a thinking in terms a pointer-like conception rather than the deeper kind of conception. This, however, is only a suggestion. It is a problem yet to be resolved so far as I am concerned. But what we are interested in now is the development of the third aspect corresponding to introception. This is quite definitely correlated with that which happens when one has a Fundamental Realization or an imperience of Enlightenment. This is, as a matter of fact, the greatest thing that can happen to a human being.

I shall here deal only briefly with the third or introceptual component in the total entity which is man. The implication is that the human being is triune essentially, namely, the proto-human, which includes the elements in human being which are held in common with the animal; the intellectual human or *Manasic* human, which is the essentially human *qua* human aspect which differentiates a man from an animal; and, finally, there is the introceptual or spiritual or divine human, which is indeed the immortal aspect of the total entity which we call a human being.

The introceptual form of Consciousness is neither like sensation or like conceptual process. It is as though the conceiver is fused with the object of conceiving, or the fusion of the subject to consciousness and the object of consciousness; in other words, a *knowledge through identity* between the knower and the known. This idea is to be found in other literature, specifically in the case of Sri Aurobindo where he used a similar phrase, *knowledge by identity*. The quality of this state of Consciousness is threefold. Affectively, it is a state of a well-nigh inconceivable bliss or *ananda*, a delight so strong that it could very easily sweep one off his feet, as it were. It is a delight that makes the satisfactions given through the sensuous and the conceptual life almost seem like something painful in contrast. It's beyond the imagination of anyone who has not had the immediate imperience itself. It also is a state of the very highest noetic value, that is, the value as knowledge—but not either a sensational or a conceptual kind of knowledge. It is non-particularized, extremely universal, and utterly satisfactory. And, third, it's combined with the strongest possible feeling of benevolence, or the quality of an all-encompassing love, or an all-encompassing inclusiveness in which there is no difference of interest between my self and other self. It is ineluctably superior to any other consciousness ever reported by any representative of mankind. It is the resolution of the ultimate problems of life. It is the last word of redemption. It is the quality of the *nirvanic* state and is most utterly precious. It leads one to know that behind the appearance of things as we see them in this universe there is an inner soul, as it were, of unutterable beauty, sweetness, and wisdom. It is the ultimate answer of the quest so far as that answer is available to man. I shall not here, however, dwell upon this. This is the goal of the effort and it is the central concern of my writings and my tapes. And the various problems connected with the attainment of this Consciousness and of interpretation of this Consciousness is an effort that I put forth in all my writings and in all my tapes.

Now, this makes of man a triune being; that the various highest or introceptual being is eternal. There is no guaranteed eternality for the proto-human being or the

conceptual human being, although there is such a thing, it is said, as a conditional kind of mortality or, at least, a great extension of the continuation of our lesser aspects, but that is another subject which is not to be dealt with here.

There is a finally question, how is this divine human related to the proto-human and the intellectual human? My experience is that its affinity to the intellectual human is closer than its affinity to the proto-human, but there is evidence that this is not the universal experience or imperience. The Zen Buddhism suggests that there are others for whom the relationship to the proto-human is closer than its relationship to the intellectual human. But, I have a suggestion here in connection with my determination of a pointer conception and a container conception. If the conceptuality of the individual is developed mainly or wholly in terms of the pointer conception, that then it may well be that the interconnection with the proto-human would be the stronger, and this seems to be the case in the instance of Zen Buddhism. But in my imperience and experience this has not proven to be the case; but, rather, by penetrating into the concept in the form of the container concept to the greatest depth possible, one emerges into this other wonderful Consciousness, and that the kinship, therefore, is closer to the intellectual side of man than to the perceptual side of man. Whether the quality of the state of consciousness is the same or different in the two approaches, I do not know from immediate experience. I think the answer to this would require the passing over both methods of yogic discipline in order to realize both consequences. I suspect there is a difference; that in the ultimate attainment, something of the path by which it is attained colors the attainment.

There is a discussion in *The Secret Doctrine* of the *Taraka* yoga doctrine in which man is conceived of as an *Atman* overshadowing three *Upadhis*, and these are *Karanopadhi*, *Sukshmopadhi*, and *Sthulopadhi*. And it is there stated that it is possible for an Adept to divide himself into three parts and function on three levels at the same time, and this would seem to correspond to this possibility indicated in the *Taraka* system.⁵ In such functioning he might be conscious of all three aspects at the same time or function separately in them and be conscious of the three aspects only when he returns fully to himself. I'm suggesting here, mainly, two possibilities. But the point that I wish to emphasis in all this is the fundamental threefoldness of the total human being. On the outer plane, the human being as we see him has an animal-like nature, though something that transcends the animal, and this we call the proto-human. In the middle region, he is an intellectual being and is in a subtle way correlated with the *Manasaputra*, and this is the intermediate principle. And above all this, he is a divine and immortal being. But in the field of practical action a very critical part is performed by the intermediate being. It is said that when Shankara was born, his own intermediate principle was withdrawn from him and the intermediate principle of the Buddha replaced that, and that is what made him, in a sense, a return of the Blessed One, in this case, specifically to the *Brahmans*, who had been persecutors of the disciples of the

⁵ H. P. Blavatsky, *The Secret Doctrine*, vol. 1 (Wheaton, Ill.: The Theosophical Press, 1893), 182.

Though there are seven principles in man, there are but three distinct Upadhis (bases), in each of which his Atma may work independently of the rest. These three Upadhis can be separated by an Adept without killing himself. He cannot separate the seven principles from each other without destroying his constitution.

Buddha—the compassion of the Buddha being sufficiently great to embrace those who had offended as well as those who suffered the offense.⁶

This, then, is the end of this series of tapes for this Convention. May my blessing be extended to all of you and through you to all those who are knowingly or unknowingly seeking.

My blessing be with you.

⁶ H. P. Blavatsky, *The Secret Doctrine*, vol. 3 (Wheaton, Ill.: The Theosophical Press, 1893), 376. See the audio recording, “On *Tulku*” (Part 2 of 2) for a more detailed account of this material.