

The Philosophy of Consciousness Without an Object

A Discussion of the Nature of Transcendental Consciousness

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Part 8 of 25

PART II

The Aphorisms on Consciousness-Without-an-Object

CHAPTER 3

General Discussion of Consciousness-Without-an-Object

(continued)

Section 13

That in some sense the *Object* exists cannot be denied, for it is unquestionably a datum for immediate experience. But to affirm further that the *Thing* exists is to add an over-belief which is not necessary for either experience or reason. As these terms are here employed, the 'Object' is to be regarded as always a content of consciousness, and thus implies a relationship to or within consciousness. In contrast, the 'Thing' is that which is *supposed* to exist, quite independently of any relationship to or within consciousness. Thus the Thing is to be regarded as a sort of thing-in-itself which stands apart from any dependent relationship to consciousness as a source of its existence. It is not the present purpose to attempt to prove that a self-existent thing is impossible but simply that the supposition of its existence is neither practically nor theoretically necessary, and also that its existence cannot be demonstrated.

That the existence of the Thing cannot be demonstrated is very easily shown. For demonstration never gives us anything but an existence, a relationship, a value, and so forth, for consciousness. Hence, that which is demonstrated to be is already a content for consciousness, and therefore, an object. Unquestionably, new and unpredictable contents can enter *empiric* consciousness. To assume that the sudden arising of the new contents implies an existence wholly independent of consciousness, in every sense, that merely happened to enter into relationship with consciousness, may be natural enough. But for logic this assumption is not necessary, and by hypothesis, it cannot be empirically verified. For, so far as experience and logic can determine to the contrary, it is as readily thinkable that when the new content of consciousness arose it actually, then, came into existence for the first time. No doubt, the notion of the birth of an existence quite *de novo* or *ex nihilo* is repugnant to the deep-seated conviction that all existences are traceable to causal antecedents. But, whatever validity may attach to this conviction, it yet remains something other than a derivation from either experience or logic. That it is not a derivation from experience has already been well established by the critical analysis of David Hume, and accordingly, further discussion of this point is not necessary here. That

it is not a derivation from pure logic is also clear, as we now understand quite well that logic supplies only the formal implications of the given material upon which it operates. The innate material of logic, itself, consists only of the original logical constants, and since the notion that every existence must have a causal antecedent is not one of these, it follows that this notion is neither a prerequisite of logic nor a consequence to be derived from logical process alone.

There remains the question of the claim imposed by the conviction that there is no existence which does not have an adequate causal antecedent, namely, that no existence can be *ex nihilo* or *de novo*. I assume the validity of the claim of this conviction as a component part of consciousness, which is not derived either from logic or experience. The question then arises: Does this conviction require that the antecedent of a newly arisen object in relative consciousness shall be a thing existing independently of consciousness in every sense? The answer is no, since another adequate source is thinkable, and in addition, has already become a working hypothesis of Analytic Psychology. We can conceive of the antecedent of the newly arisen object as lying in the psychologic unconscious. This interpretation is already commonly employed in Analytic Psychology in the exposition of the etiology of the phantasy products of introversion. In the case of the phantasy function, objects do appear suddenly from a hidden matrix, either in ideal or sensible form. Analytic Psychology has found it unnecessary to assume a causal antecedent of such objects in terms of things existing independently of the psyche in every sense. To extend this etiology to the objects of the objective senses involves no logical or empiric difficulty, and merely extends a principle of explanation with radical consistency.

It may be objected that in introducing the notion of the psychological unconscious as the causal antecedent of the newly arisen object we have merely substituted a logical equivalent of the Thing, existing independently of consciousness in every sense. But this is not so. For, as has been shown already at some length, the psychological unconscious does not imply unconsciousness in every sense. It is merely that which is unconscious to ordinary waking consciousness, which is quite different from saying that it is unconscious with respect to consciousness in every sense. For it is clear that consciousness which is not conscious of itself is indistinguishable from unconsciousness. Philosophically, then, it is possible to affirm the exclusive existence of all objects and their antecedents in consciousness and yet employ the notion of the unconscious in the psychological sense. [And it may here be added that the real meaning of the unconscious is *other-consciousness*.]

From the foregoing it should be clear that the demonstration of the existence of the independent Thing is impossible. At the same time, in the latter part of the above argument, it has been shown that its existence is not a necessary assumption for logic, experience, or the conviction that every existence must have an adequate causal antecedent. For I have suggested a thinkable etiology which supplies what is necessary, and yet dispenses with the notion of a Thing existing independently of consciousness, in every sense. This completes the formal argument. Let us now examine the extra-logical considerations which may bear upon this proposed etiology.

The requirements of a physical science are fundamentally simple. Chief among these are the following:

1. The objective content of the science must be of such a nature that it can be perceived by the objective senses, either directly or indirectly, through the intervention of instruments, and these senses must be exclusively those that are active in the typical representative of our culture, or of the human race.
2. This material becomes a science when, and only when, it has become organized into a rationally thinkable system which possesses internal coherence and which, in addition, makes possible the prediction of future objective events in such a way as to render either observational or experimental checking possible.

These are the two principal requirements of a pure physical science. Applied science requires, in addition, that the organization of the raw material of a science shall be such that, at least, some degree of practical control of the object is achieved. Any theory as to the real nature of the objects which form the content of a science that does not interfere with the action of these fundamental requirements of science leaves to science the full freedom which science *qua* science can claim. If the behavior of the Object were wholly arbitrary or irrational in every sense, no science, pure or applied, could ever be possible. A science is possible only to the extent that the perceived object can enter into some relationship with a rationally thinkable system. It is not necessary that such a system shall be the only conceivable one or that it shall be the ultimately true or complete system. The objective of physical science is partial.

1. It does not aim to comprehend the totality of all possible knowledge. This is evident from the fact that it arbitrarily excludes all material which cannot be perceived directly or indirectly through the objective senses of the typical representative of our culture or our humanity. Thus, such material of consciousness as there may be which is available only through other doors or by other modes of consciousness is extra-scientific—in the Western sense—however much such material may be an object for knowledge.
2. It does not include in its structure those modes or aspects of consciousness which are not to be classed as knowledge of objective content. Thus Self-knowledge or the feeling of Love are not part of the *structure* of any physical science.

In contrast to the specialized demands of a physical science, philosophy has for its field all possible aspects of consciousness. It is concerned with the religious, ethical, and aesthetic values, just as truly as with the general problems which are vital to the existence of science. Further, its concern with the general problems of physical science is not greater than with the similar problems of any other possible type of science. That the existence of sciences other than physical science is more than an academic possibility is revealed by the development of the psychologies *with a psyche*.⁹ However, philosophy overlaps the motif of physical science in that it seeks a systematic objective.

All philosophies fail that do not take into account every conceivable possibility of consciousness and also grant to every possibility full freedom in its proper domain. The current schools of philosophy, known as Naturalism, Neo-Realism, and Pragmatism, have

⁹ The older psychology without a psyche is merely a crude physical science.

granted to natural science full recognition. In so far as the ethical problem is conceived as a matter of social relationship, Pragmatism has made valuable contributions to ethical theory and interpretation. But all these philosophies fail—some of them completely—to give adequate recognition to the necessities of the religious and mystical states of consciousness. They are, therefore, valuable only as partial philosophies. Much of consciousness-value they either ignore or treat with an unacceptable coercion. They are all psychologically one-sided. They represent, either exclusively or predominantly, the extraverted attitude in individual or social psychology. They either neglect entirely the values that are immediately apparent to the introverted attitude, or they treat such values with the condescension of extraverted pride that is quite unacceptable to any well-developed introvert. On the other hand, the systems of philosophy classified under Idealism, while they give with greater or less adequacy recognition of the introvert and the religious and mystical values, yet they have failed with respect to the extraverted standpoint. Since these four types of philosophic system cover the ground of Western philosophic contribution, we must conclude that the West has not yet produced the adequate philosophic statement.

Why is it that the Western mind so predominantly attributes the reality-value to the material which is the peculiar concern of physical science? It is not simply because that material is given as objectively sensible. Ordinary phantasy often produces objects that are sensibly apparent, yet commonly these objects are considered to be unreal. It is not due to the fact that the material of science lends itself to a logically systematic statement. There are mathematical systems grounded upon freely created fundamental assumptions that have the character of logically coherent, systematic wholes. However, these are not commonly considered to be possessed of reality-value. It does not inhere in a positive demonstration that science deals with a knowledge of existent things independent of all consciousness as such, as has already been shown. There seems to be but one fact of experience that affords the explanation of this attribution of reality-value to the material of physical science and that is that this material is relatively common and constant with respect to the vast majority of observers, and that so far as is commonly known, no individual can successfully act as though this material were not. Here there seems to be an objective somewhat with which the conscious being must come to terms if he is so to adapt his life as to live successfully.

Certainly, there is something or somewhat, in some sense, with which the individual must make terms. But this fact by no means implies that that something or somewhat is an independent self-existent reality. For we can give it an interpretation which, while independent self-existence is denied of it, yet retains for it its conditioning character with respect to the functioning of conscious beings. We may regard it as a collective phantasy projected from the collective unconscious and possessing a relatively frozen or fixed form, which, in turn, is but a measure of the stability of the collective unconscious. This would give to the projected phantasy the characteristic of being an objective determinant, and thus it is easy to understand why it should have acquired the seeming of primary reality-value.

Is there any respect in which the above interpretation of the objective somewhat would be incompatible with the facts of experience? There seems to be no objection which will stand after examination. The objective material of consciousness is given

through the senses and only through the senses. But the senses supply merely the forms of one of the functions of consciousness, namely, that of sensation. Here we are forever confined to material which is reducible to sensation, save in so far as material from other functions of consciousness are added to it. Much material which has an objective appearance is given in ordinary phantasy, even though it is the general judgment that such appearance is not an objective existence-in-itself. By the technique of hypnotism, similar appearances have been produced in the consciousness of the subject through suggestion. Here, again, there is no question of a corresponding objective thing which is an independent existence-in-itself. Give to such a hypnoidal appearance the character of being a collective component of all human consciousness, and then we ask: In what way would it be distinguishable from the material acquired by ordinary extroverted observation? It would seem that every possibility of natural science which now exists would still remain. The significance of the scientific product, alone, would be changed. But this level of significance-evaluation lies outside the domain of scientific determination, as such, and thus there would be no interference with the freedom of natural science in the field or sector of consciousness available to it. We should be forced to interpret the facts and laws of science as being purely psychical existences, though of an order of relative stability. The laws, as well as the facts, would have their real abiding place in the psychological collective unconscious.

I believe this philosophy allows to science all the requisite freedom to develop in its own dimension. The interpretation of the significance of its facts, processes, and products, alone, is changed. I merely challenge the pretended right of the scientist to hypostatize the material of his science into a supposedly substantial and independent Thing. With the abandonment of this hypostasis, there falls all right to the claim of any peculiar reality-value attaching to the object of science or of sensation in general. There remains a relative or pragmatic reality-value which has validity within the restricted sector of consciousness involved, but only that. In a word, the accusation that a given content of consciousness has a phantasy-origin would no longer, by itself, be sufficient to establish inferior reality-value, as compared with the products of physical science, since this too rests upon essentially the same ground. Thus the argument which serves to undermine the reality of religious or mystical hypostasis would be a two-edged sword which likewise undermines the reality of scientific or sensuous hypostasis. Thus far, the content of mystical insight would have a right to claim reality-value which is not inferior to that which the scientist or extraverted consciousness may claim for his material. In a word, the extravert must renounce his arrogant claim to peculiar possession of the sense for reality. He is oriented to a sector of relative reality, and only that. It is by no means evident that this sector ultimately releases the greater power. At any rate, this question becomes an open one.

A vital consequence of the present thesis is that if there is any power which can consciously operate upon the psychological collective unconscious, then that power would be superior to any of the products of phantasy, whether religious or scientific. For it would be a power acting upon the root-source of all contents of consciousness of whatever nature. Theoretically, such a power would have the capacity of causing all the material of objective perception, as well as of religious phantasy, to vanish or to be transformed through processes which could not be objectively traced. Such a power, it must be understood, does not imply the capacity to destroy consciousness as such, but

simply to destroy, or rather, transform, all content. It should also be clear that such a power would lie closer to ultimate Reality than any of the content of consciousness over which it has mastery.

The practical question is: Does such a power exist? So far, at least, I do not find it possible to give an objectively satisfactory answer to this question. To my own satisfaction I have verified its existence, but I do not find it possible to do more than build a more or less satisfactory presumption for its existence, with respect to empiric centers of consciousness other than my own. It seems that there is a Transcendent Somewhat which must be sampled, at least, to be known. While I do affirm the reality of this Transcendent Somewhat and the existence of a conscious Power which can operate upon the collective unconscious of psychology, I do not claim the capacity to coerce recognition of either.

Section 14

The term 'Universe' is here employed with the connotation of the Buddhist term '*Sangsara*'. Thus I do not confine the meaning of 'Universe' to the totality of all objects of ordinary waking consciousness. It includes, as well, the so-called hallucinations, dream states, and any other possible states of consciousness during physical life or after death in which there is consciousness of objects. Opposed to this is the *Nirvanic* state of consciousness in which there are no objects, for the simple reason that in that State there is no subject-object relationship. Thus, *Nirvanic* Consciousness is not identical with the totality of all mystical states of consciousness, but on the contrary is the culminating point of the mystical Path into the *subjective pole* of consciousness. Only a few, even among the mystics, have gone this far, to judge from the available records. It follows that there are mystical states which do not transcend *Sangsara*, and in general, such are the more understandable to objective consciousness.

But the further the mystic goes in his penetration to subjective deeps, the less he can say in terms that are intelligible to ordinary consciousness, when trying to report the value of his realization. The higher the point of attainment, the less effective does concrete sensuous imagery become as a symbol of its value. Abstract concepts remain as effective symbols longer, but in any case all that can be said is of value only as a symbol. This is necessarily so, since the representation must be in terms of objects, whether sensory or conceptual, whereas the actuality is not an object. A so-called hallucination or phantasy may, in a given case, supply a truer symbol than one formed out of the material of social experience, though this is not necessarily so. In any case, the vital point is that from the standpoint of *Nirvanic* Consciousness everything supplied by the Universe or *Sangsara* is of symbolic or instrumental significance only. At this point I am in accord with the epistemology of the Pragmatists, but I go further than any Pragmatist with whom I am familiar, for I regard all experience, as well as intellection, as being, in the last analysis, of only instrumental value, and even regard experience as no more than a catalytic agent, valuable as an arouser of self-consciousness.

It is only recently that Western scholarship has begun to come to an intelligent understanding of the state of consciousness called "*Nirvana*." Recent translations of authentic northern Buddhist canonical literature should go far in the clarification of the

older misconceptions. The etymology of the term ‘*Nirvana*’ is unfortunate. To be “blown-out” naturally does seem like total annihilation. But this is a great misconception. A truer understanding is reached by regarding the *Nirvanic* State as that realized when the powers of experiencing and thinking are anesthetized *without destroying self-consciousness*. It is a *way* of consciousness that is blown-out, not consciousness *per se*. To understand the idea in a form that is at all valid, it is necessary to think of all form or objects and all structures of thought [and] in consciousness, in general, as being in the nature of limitations imposed upon the play of consciousness. Remove the limitations, while holding to self-consciousness, and the *Nirvanic* State is instantaneously realized. Since this is a freeing of consciousness from limitation, it has been traditionally called “Liberation.” Thus “Freedom” is the prime keynote of the State. But from this Freedom, when realized, affective and noetic values are precipitated. The latter, in some degree, can irradiate both thought and experience, and thus be an illuminating and blessing force within the universe. Consequently, *Nirvana* is a State of consciousness which can and does produce a difference of fact within the universe of experience. This is sufficient to give it pragmatic value. But this pragmatic value is merely a derivative and transformed value and thus of only partial significance.

A critical study of the use of the terms ‘*Nirvana*’ and ‘*Moksha*’, in Buddhist and Hindu literature, reveals that the meaning intended is not always the same. At times one receives the impression that *Nirvana* is Absolute Consciousness, while at others one runs across a differentiation between different degrees or levels of *Nirvanic* Consciousness, and even the explicit statement that the *Nirvanic* State is not an absolute state. Clearly, some of the writers are stricter in their usage of the term than others. If we view the term as sometimes used to designate a genus, and at other times a species under that genus, the apparent incompatibility of usage is largely, if not wholly, clarified. The primary mark of the genus would be that it is a state of consciousness transcending the subject-object relationship, and therefore inevitably ineffable for relative consciousness. Differentiation of this genus into various species implies that within the consciousness transcending the subject-object relationship there are differences of level or phase, though these differences must remain unintelligible for the subject-object type of consciousness, as such.

At the time of the deeper level of Recognition which occurred to me spontaneously on the 8th of September, I was completely surprised. Up to that time I had found nothing in my readings which had suggested to me the existence of such a state. I named it, tentatively, from its affective *quale*, which had the quality of thoroughgoing indifference. It seemed to transcend *Nirvana* in the usual sense, since the latter is always represented as having the affective *quale* of supermundane Bliss. I had previously known such a State, but while on the level of the High Indifference, I realized Bliss as lying below me, as something in which I could participate or refrain from at will. Subsequent to the period of being immersed in the Higher State, while functioning on the level of subject-object consciousness, I was somewhat troubled lest I had made some error in my interpretation.¹⁰ To check myself I made a search of the available literature, but I found no clear verification until I chanced upon the translation of *Tibetan Buddhism*, which

¹⁰ The assurance of the transcendental state is by no means a certainty that the conceptual interpretation is the most correct possible. Interpretation is a relative function subject to criticism.

Evans-Wentz has edited and published in English. Here I finally found the references in which the Primordial Consciousness, symbolized by the “Clear Light” and in other ways, is represented as the container of the *Nirvanic* as well as the *Sangsaric* State. This supplied a conceptual form which confirmed my own interpretation of the culminating stage of Recognition. It made clear, also, that “*Nirvana*,” as sometimes employed, is made to include the “Clear Light,” a state which is neither subjective nor objective, while in other connections it refers only to the purely subjective State. Finally, I developed the symbol of “Consciousness-without-an-object” as a representation with a meaning or reference analogous to, if not identical with, the “Clear Light,” and thus was enabled to add a noetic designation to the affective one I had already found.

Consciousness-without-an-object is the keystone which completes the arch. It is the final step necessary to produce a self-contained system of consciousness. *Nirvana* stands as a phase of consciousness standing in contrapuntal relationship to the sum total of all *Sangsaric* states—the consciousness behind the Self which is focused upon objects. It is thus the “other” of all consciousness of the subject-object type. But the predication or realization of any state and its other, in discrete stages, is not a complete cycle, for the two imply a mutual container. This mutual container is found in Consciousness-without-an-object, and this latter affords a base from which *Nirvana*, as well as *Sangsa*, falls into comprehensive perspective. Consciousness-without-an-object is neutral with respect to every polarity and thus in principle gives command over all polarities. It affords the basis for a philosophic integration which is neither introversive nor extraversive. This implies a philosophy which, as a whole, is neither idealistic, in the subjective sense, nor realistic, but which may incorporate both idealistic and realistic aspects. It should be equally acceptable to religious and scientific consciousness.

The actual working consciousness of man is not purely *Sangsaric*. Man’s bondage to subject-object consciousness inheres in the fact that, characteristically, his analysis of consciousness has succeeded in capturing only the *Sangsaric* element. For most men the *Nirvanic* element moves in the darkness of the not-self-conscious, such as dreamless sleep. In our Western philosophic analysis of relative consciousness we have always come ultimately to a blank wall, though even at that limit consciousness is found to be a stream. Whence this stream and whither? For ordinary subject-object consciousness the final answer is the Unknown and the Unknowable. But this is correct only for the type of consciousness in question. Consciousness in the sense of Gnosis can and has gone further, driving the Unknown far back into the Transcendental Plenum. And who is there that can place a final theoretical limit on this recession of the Unknown!

The *Nirvanic* State is not far away, but near at hand, in fact far closer than the universe of objects. There is no difference between the purely subjective element of the subject-object consciousness and *Nirvana*. And what is nearer to man than his most immediate Self, that which he calls “I,” and which is always present, however much the content of consciousness may change? Man has the power to see, yet he constantly projects himself into the objects seen, and complementarily, introjects the object into himself, thereby superimposing upon himself the limitation of those objects. Every human problem grows out of this, and the never-ending stream of unresolved or half-resolved problems cannot be eliminated until this vicious habit is broken. Every other relief is meliorative or palliative and no more. Mayhap melioration does more harm than

good. I am often inclined to think so, for individual man might often try harder to escape from a trap that had become completely unendurable, and thus succeed in the resolution of the life problem more frequently than he does. Merely making the trap more endurable by melioration may well have the effect of delaying the crisis, and so result in an increase of the sum total of suffering. Let man so change the polarization of his self-analyzing consciousness that he may see his seeing, [as it were,] and at once, he breaks the participation in objects. Of course, this seeing of seeing is expressed in the language of subject-object consciousness, because we have no other language. In the actual seeing of seeing, the self and the object become identical.

When an individual has at last learned the trick of dissociating his "I" or subject from the whole universe of objects, he has, seemingly, retreated into a bare point of consciousness. But the moment he succeeds in doing this, the point is metamorphosed into a kind of space in which the Self and the content of consciousness are blended in one inseparable whole. I have called this the Spatial Void. Now it must be understood that this is not a state wherein the individual merely finds himself *in* space, but he is, as a Self, identical with the whole of Space. It is not consciousness as functioning through bodies and aware of objects, but a subjective state dissociated from all bodies and not concerned with objects. Yet it would be incorrect to regard it as a purely homogeneous consciousness in the sense of a fixed state, totally devoid of variety. For consciousness and motion, in some sense, are inseparable.

To arrive at a symbolic concept which may fairly suggest motion in the *Nirvanic* sense, it is necessary to analyze motion in the universe of objects and then develop its inverse. The consciousness of objects is atomic. By this I mean that it is in the form of a series of discrete states or apprehensions, in the sense in which Kant spoke of the manifold given through experience. This is well illustrated by the cinematograph, where we actually have a series of still photographs thrown upon the screen in rapid succession. The spectator is not actually witnessing motion, but merely a series of still images. Only a fraction of the original drama was actually photographed. Yet the effect upon the spectator is very similar to that produced by original scenes enacted by living actors. Now, actually the camera reproduces essentially the process of visual seeing. A certain amount of time is required before an image can be seen, and thus the sensible motion of external objects is really no more than a series of images with gaps between. All of which means that we do not see continuity. The same is true of the other sense-impressions, as there is always a time factor involved in any sensible recognition. Again, when we analyze motion we always give it a granular structure, even though our ultimate fixed elements are infinitesimals. Thus, both experience and thought deal with manifolds, and never with true continua. In this connection the analysis of Weierstrass is profoundly significant. By very careful thinking Weierstrass reached the conclusion that there is no such thing as motion, but only a series of different states or positions occupied by objects. As a judgment or interpretation concerning the universe of objects in its purity as abstracted from the whole, I do not see how this statement can be seriously questioned. It simply means that the ceaseless becoming and endless dying, which mark the universe of objects, are series of instantaneous states rather than true continua. This would be the rigorous interpretation of being as it appears to objective consciousness in isolation from other dimensions of consciousness, and thus radically non-mystical. It reveals beautifully the absence of depth or substance in the universe when taken in abstraction as only

objective. The series of states are no more than dead pictures, having no life or substance, but are merely empty terms in relation.

The inverse of the phantasmagoric series, which constitutes the universe of experience and thought in its purity as abstracted, is the true continuum. The one is a granular manifold, the other a flowing unity. Now it is true that man has arrived at the notion of continuity, although, as Weierstrass has shown, he never really thinks it. Continuity is the inverse of the manifold and is, of necessity, recognized at the moment man became conscious of manifoldness, but this recognition involves more than the action of consciousness in the objective sense. Continuity belongs to the hinterland of consciousness. This simply illustrates the eternal fact, namely, that the actual consciousness of man continually operates in a *Nirvanic* as well as in a *Sangsaric* sense. However, analysis has grappled fairly well with the *Sangsaric* phase, but has remained generally not-self-conscious with respect to the *Nirvanic*.

This all leads us to the point that the unity of the *Nirvanic* Consciousness is better symbolized by the notion of the true continuum than by the finite number 1 (one). For the number one is a fixed entity representing a single empty term, which in turn always implies the manifold of all numbers. In other words, the unity of numeral one is an abstraction and not a concrete actuality. It is the unity of the continuum, in the true sense, that symbolizes the unity of the *Nirvanic* State. The *Nirvanic* Consciousness is not granular but flowing. It is without parts, in the sense of finite proper parts, but is a ceaselessly flowing and self-contained stream. It is not a stream from past to the future, that implies division by the point called the “present,” but a flowing which comprehends the totality which appears in the universe of objects as the temporal series.

That which appears in man as the persistent Self—the Witness of the universe-drama—is the dividing and uniting point of two worlds of consciousness. Before our consciousness lies the universe of objects, but behind is the hinterland of the Self, and this is *Nirvana*. But the hinterland of the Self is also the hinterland of all objects. In this hinterland we do not have merely empty terms in relation, perceived by the Self; we have a continuum in which the inverse of the Self is identical with the inverse of all objects. Here consciousness, substance, and energy, or life, are interchangeable terms. Here, also, the sterile and empty terms-in-relation are replaced by a pregnant Meaning. Without this Meaning man simply cannot live. The more closely man identifies himself with objects, or mere empty terms-in-relation, the more starved he becomes, and in the end, if this condition is continued too far, real death must follow. By real death I mean the loss of self-consciousness.

Actually, man has rarely succeeded in *completely* isolating himself from the inflow of consciousness from the hinterland. For the greater part, he has simply received this inflow and has not succeeded in being self-conscious with respect to it. Unknowingly, he has received some nourishment, otherwise life in the universe of objects would have failed ere now. Yet, except for a few among the human whole, the stream of nourishment has been so poor that man suffers the travail of slow starvation. Great is the need that the stream be increased. Now, this increase is accomplished by opening the gates to the hinterland through at least some degree of Recognition. This means becoming self-conscious, in at least some measure, of the stream of *Nirvanic*

Consciousness and realizing oneself as identical with it. We need more philosophy conceived as a Way of Life and less emphasis upon systems of bare terms-in-relation.