

# **The Philosophy of Consciousness Without an Object**

A Discussion of the Nature of Transcendental Consciousness

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Part 21 of 25

## **PART III**

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#### **CHAPTER 6\***

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##### **Forward**

There is a difference in the composition in what follows from that which has preceded in the first five chapters of PART III. These first five chapters were of material in which one simply had to draw together his material and write at will; there was nothing of inspiration in it or of stream of consciousness. But in what follows, since we are closer to the Transcendent and Spiritual Values, stream of consciousness from time to time intervenes so that we have a combination of systematic writing along with stream of consciousness at times. It gives to it a form different from that which has preceded, and yet correction or modification does violence since often out of the stream of consciousness come the very most important ideas. This chapter is not rewritten or corrected but is in its original form.

#### **CHAPTER 6**

##### **Idealism**

Not many years ago I should not have hesitated to introduce a philosophy with the affirmation: No man can doubt that consciousness is. Of all statements that could possibly be made, I should have supposed that this would be the last that any intelligent human being would seriously deny. To me it stood and stands as the one indubitable certainty. But it appears that this is not the case with all men, for there are men of superior intelligence who have not only questioned whether consciousness exists, but have actually come to a negative decision. Particularly is one impressed when he finds that a man like William James has arrived at this same conclusion. What can it mean when I find that men not only doubt, but even deny the existence of that which I know with unequivocal certainty? No doubt, it becomes necessary to examine the question.

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\* This portion of the text comes from the reading by the author in 1959 and this version does not appear in subsequent printings. The final text was apparently rewritten by the author. —ed.

Now, there is a meaning which can be attached to the term ‘consciousness’ which is not seriously doubted. This meaning is substantially that which is described by Ladd in his *Psychology*:

‘Whatever we are when we are awake as contrasted with what we are when we sink into a profound and dreamless sleep, that it is to be conscious. What we are less and less as we sink gradually down into the dreamless sleep, or as we swoon slowly away; and what we are more and more, as the noise of the crowd outside tardily arouses us from our after-dinner nap, or as we come out of the midnight of the typhoid fever crisis,’ that is consciousness.<sup>1</sup>

Also as some philosophic surgeon has suggested there is an indubitable difference between the patient in the state of anesthesia commonly viewed as unconsciousness, and the normal waking state generally viewed as conscious.

It is not the actuality of this difference which James and apparently the Neo-Realists along with him doubt and deny. Something more subtle than that is meant. What is doubted and denied is the self-existential and substantive character of consciousness. It is not questioned that consciousness is a relation. This does make some sense even though it may seem most improbable to the reader. It does appear that thinkers of this class grant that elements of some sort do exist—be they terms, things, or parts of experience. But the relatedness of these elements is viewed as something other than existence. Thus consciousness being conceived as only a relation does not have existence; but it is in some sense a fact like other relations.

Now to me this whole way of thinking has something very unreal about it. Of course I can as an intellectual exercise call consciousness a relation and deduce consequences, but it would mean no more than if I called  $x$  a relation or even called  $x$  a  $y$  and proceeded to formal but quite meaningless deduction. But I assume that it actually does mean something to those who advance the idea seriously. Psychology does give us a key, for when consciousness is strongly extraverted, it is an experiential fact that both consciousness and the subject to consciousness are in a highly dependent relationship to the object. The something or somewhat which is generally called in philosophy the not-self, appears as original while consciousness and the subject seem dependent. Without the world-about, the latter would disappear. Now for my part, I simply do not find either my self or my consciousness subject to any such dependency. To be sure, I am acquainted with modification of content and state of consciousness which instinctively or as a matter of habit I attribute to a world-about, but I do find I know with the highest certainty that the pure Consciousness and the pure Self are quite unaffected by all changes of content and state. I can doubt everything else, but not this. Anyone who tried to prove the reverse of this to me would merely succeed in making himself appear silly.

If one again turns to analytic psychology he will find that the personal assurance outlined above is characteristic of the more introverted attitude. Thus consciousness and

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted from Ladd’s *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory* as given in Baldwin’s *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*.

its subject are immediate data for one type of man, while the world-about or the object has the same immediacy for others. Consequently, since philosophers, like all other men, are conditioned by their own psychical organization, it is almost impossible to find ontological principles which would receive universal acceptance. The individual philosopher starts with what he knows with most complete certainty, and this is inevitable. But he cannot speak for all men since his certainty is not a part of the universal immediacy. This might suggest then that we would find something more ultimate in psychology, but here again the same difficulty arises, for the view of the psychologist is equally conditioned by his own individual psychology.

Having reached this point, it might occur to one, that we have to give up all hope of root synthesis and accept a disorganized pluralism as the final word. But this will not do since part of the immediacy which some men find or Realize is a radical monism, and how is one to combine radical monism with radical pluralism? Oh for the days when the thinker could be sure that what he found was immediately true for himself was also immediately true for all men if they only looked carefully enough. Under such conditions, philosophy was easy. But now, what a mess it has become. One is disposed to envy the attitude of the Scotch Quaker who, it is related, said to his wife: "All the world is queer but thee and me, though sometimes thou art a little queer." Well there is, I think, a way out of the woods, and I shall later offer what I can toward finding this way; but meanwhile let us see what happens to philosophy when the philosopher finds consciousness and the subject to consciousness as the most indubitable and original fact.

Today we commonly class as Idealists those who found their philosophy upon the base of a primary consciousness, usually, if not always, along with an equally primary self. Indeed, the general, if not universal, view is that the subject to consciousness is the self-existence of which consciousness is the attribute. So far as I know, the strict primacy and self-existence of consciousness has not yet been affirmed in Western philosophy, though I believe I am correct in interpreting the *anatmic* and *nastikian* doctrine of Buddhism as equally well employing the primacy of pure consciousness as of pure unconsciousness. As far as my knowledge goes, Indian thought does not dispense with the notion of the ultimate self-existence of the Self, or *Atman*, or of the Divinity, *Brahman*—these two being identical in the monistic form except in the case of Buddhism. Thus outside of Buddhism it does not appear that anywhere in the philosophies of the world is there a strict orientation to pure Consciousness. The alternative is the predication of a self-existent and Spiritual subject of which consciousness is an attribute. There is a fine philosophic question here as to whether such a subject is any more immediately known than the thing-in-itself. But at any rate those who begin with the subject and its consciousness as the primary immediate fact are classed as Idealists.

The word 'Idealism' is not an entirely satisfactory name for our present school of philosophy. The word 'ideal' strictly construed always carries a reference to the idea and hence is an existent in or for thought. It is also used in a secondary sense of the ideal desired or envisaged. But the Idealist in the philosophic sense does not necessarily give primacy to the *Idea* as is instanced in the case of the voluntaristic Idealists who place primacy in the Will. Further philosophical Idealism does not have any particular reference to the popular notion of Idealism. The thinker of this school may or may not

have ideals, like other men, indeed orientation to eternal Spiritual being is, if anything, inclined to render ideals, in the ordinary human sense, unnecessary. On the whole, Spiritualism would be a more correct and comprehensive designation since the philosophic Idealists do affirm the primacy of Spiritual being whether of the voluntaristic or cognitive wing. Spiritualism in the strict and primary sense is the true opposite of Materialism and of Realism generally. But this word unfortunately has a connotation in popular usage which is quite foreign to its fundamental meaning and which renders it psychologically objectionable. We shall therefore conform to general usage and employ the term Idealism, bearing in mind the reservations given above.

As pointed out, the Idealist affirms the primacy of consciousness along with its subject. This is not to be regarded as merely an arbitrary affirmation nor as a working hypothesis, but as a direct or immediate recognition, something which is beyond all doubt for the thinker himself. This is so fundamental that the Idealist finds it confirmed in the very denial of the denier, since the denial itself is an act of consciousness. That which is wholly unconscious simply could not deny anything, so when the Realist opposes the thesis of the Idealist, he has to invoke, however unwillingly, the very quality which the Idealist affirms is. It never occurs to the Idealist to charge the Realist with being unconscious, so he is perhaps temperamentally incapable of getting the Realist's point of view. To get his argument across effectively, the Realist should insist more explicitly on his own unconsciousness. In this way he might succeed in not adding fuel to the Idealist's fire.

Now, since one has the initial certainty of the subject or self and its consciousness, the basic problem of philosophy takes a characteristic form. So long as one focuses his attention inwardly, he has an immediate realization of perfect freedom. His will and thought are under no external constraint. Their activity is perfectly free. But when the focus of consciousness is turned outward, the freely willed act becomes an objective deed, which is confronted by all sorts of constraints. The deed is an action of what we commonly call an organism which simply cannot do as it pleases since it moves in a seeming environment which in innumerable ways restricts the action of the organism. In this way the freely willed act of the pure self is confronted with resistance. Ultimately practical paths for the will can be found, it is true, but these paths are, in part, determined by necessity so that in the final form they are only partly [in part] the expression of pure freedom. This necessity appears as the objective world of mountains, trees, oceans, buildings, and so forth, just precisely that which the Realist takes as in some sense the ultimate and basic reality itself. But the Idealist knows immediately the conscious self and its freedom, so the necessitarian character revealed in the object raises a problem.

Details in the offered solutions of the problem of necessity vary with the different Idealistic thinkers, but one feature is held in common by all representatives of this school. It is this, [namely] that the solution must be found in the nature of consciousness itself. Manifestly the only objective world we have is a world which exists in and for consciousness. If we say that it inheres in something independent and quite outside consciousness as such, then we beg the whole question by a speculative answer which can never be checked. For all checking is a conscious act dealing with material which is already inside consciousness and thus nothing is proved as to the existence of a somewhat absolutely outside consciousness. To be sure, one can affirm this somewhat and thus take

a purely arbitrary and dogmatic position, but this, the Idealist will say, is no true philosophic solution. The only being we know is necessarily known and that is the important fact. Therefore being is defined as identical with being-known or as being for, in, or of consciousness.

At this point the Idealist is vulnerable before the logical criticism, since he cannot prove that it is essential to being that it should be known or exist in consciousness. As a matter of strict logic he begs the question. Of course, the Realist is not slow to pick out this weakness and accuses the Idealist of failing to prove his thesis. It is perfectly true that the primary thesis of Idealism is not proven logically and so there is no logical compulsion to constrain all men to accept some form of Idealism as the only possible true philosophy. But the opposed philosophies face the same essential difficulty in a different form. Always one can find root assumptions which are not and cannot be proven logically. The Realist, for instance, cannot prove the existence of his independent reality and, so, also begs the question.

It is a fact that man has not and cannot build a rigorously self-contained system wherein every element is itself logically derived. The closest realization that we have of this is to be found in some purely formal mathematical systems in which the elements are wholly meaningless terms. But here logic is always assumed, since its first principles are not proven. Proof depends upon those principles, but they are themselves outside proof. It may be impossible to doubt them, but the ground of confidence in them is immediate and original. But accepting anything in this way is actually a begging of the question when we assert that it carries the quality of truth. So we must be content to start with something immediate, be it experience or insight, and then after that, rigorous logical demonstration is effective but [yet] always relative to the original immediate ground.

We must accept the fact that different philosophies, starting from different grounds given in some way immediately, will develop in different directions and exist side by side. Each one has at its roots a basic logical weakness, with the result that mutual vulnerability gives to all a right to existence relative to each other. So, while logical soundness is indeed an important part of every genuine philosophy, yet this is not the whole of the story. It is even more important that every philosophy should be [is] the expression of an orientation [a view] which is extra-logical [more primary than the philosophy itself]. A philosophy is the expression of a View which is more primary than the philosophy itself.

Now, although the Idealist cannot prove his primary thesis and must counter the Realist by bringing the same charge against the latter, yet the Idealist can make a point favorable to his position that is particularly strong. He can point out that when being is conceived as identical with being known or with existing in and for consciousness he has given a definition that has some meaning. On the other hand, the notions of being and existence have no intelligible meaning when they are predicated of that which is outside of consciousness in every sense. What in that case does it mean to be or to exist? If anyone tries to give an answer to this question he will only invoke a meaning which exists for consciousness. His very answering and the content of the answer is something in consciousness. So the Idealist may very well say that the only being and existence which can possibly have any significance is a being and existence which is for consciousness of some sort. That which is completely outside all consciousness is

simply indistinguishable from that which is not. So we may just as well disregard the whole matter.

But there is a difficulty which still remains. The inward realization of freedom is offset by an outward experience of necessity, as has already been noted. The notion of an independent [and] real world does have value in explaining the necessity, for if living and conscious beings are actually in a pre-existent and independent environment, then it is quite easy to see how they would be constrained by it. But this, in its turn, makes it difficult to see how consciousness can have any real freedom. The direct realization of freedom ultimately has to be reduced largely to an illusion. But those individuals who have the greater immediate certainty of the freedom and have only a secondary or derived experience of the necessity will not accept this view. They certainly will not sacrifice the more certainly known for that which is less certainly known. So they ask: Is there not some other way of explaining the necessity which will meet this difficulty?

Idealism does offer its answers and this leads us into a veritable sea of philosophic theory and discourse which many find quite difficult to follow. In the end the Idealist believes that he has met the problem in such a way as to save the freedom so that it remains as something absolutely real, and yet supplies a conceivable explanation of the necessity. In this process a good deal of conceptual simplicity is lost, as compared to the statements of the Realist, but at least the baby is not thrown away with the bath. And the Idealist considers the baby, freedom, to be so valuable as to be worth any effort to save it.

In contrast, the Realist, whether oriented to a mechanistic nature, to a logic of relations, or to an empiric life, seems to be lost when he has too much freedom. He seems to secure his comfort by anchoring himself to something outside consciousness. He may call this something "matter," "terms in relation," or "empiric life," but consciousness is an incident embraced by an enveloping necessity whose nature is other than consciousness. Of course, he too has the direct feeling of freedom, though it can hardly be as decisive as in the case of the Idealist, and he generally strives to find some room for it. But it never rises to a commanding position. He has, however, a very clear idea as to why he [we] cannot always do as we please.

Now an Idealist can never hope to be taken seriously if he merely affirms his unconditional freedom and lets it go at that. If he did that he would be highly subject to the charge of uncritical subjectivism. There is far too much evidence of a compulsive necessity which affects all creatures, be they Idealists or not. So the Idealist must take up the problem of necessity, and the great Idealists have given so much thought to this problem and have so largely written concerning it that they often give the impression of being necessitarians. But this is only the outside view of the Idealistic systems. The real heart is a profound feeling for freedom. Perhaps one would have to be something of an Idealist to be aware of this fact, but it is possible for anyone to find the evidence if he will but look far enough. I need but suggest the thought of the greatest of all the Idealists, namely, Shankara, with whom the *summum bonum* is explicitly given as Liberation, spelled with a capital 'L'.

To the philosophically naive consciousness of most men, it doubtless will seem harder to follow the more rigorous form of Idealistic philosophy than any other form of thought. They [He is] are finally led into regions where the familiar, so-called, real world

is left far behind and most of the judgments of their [his] highly vaunted common-sense cease to supply any genuine help. They [He] may be excused if they are [he is] disposed to feel like a man out in space with no planet to place his feet upon, nor solar system to give him bearings. And then the content of the thought may often seem as though it dealt with nothing that meant anything whatsoever and, least of all, had any bearing upon practical human affairs. But deeper reflection will show them [him] that the Idealist does have genuine anchorage, does employ an objective modulus, and is deeply concerned with that which in the end is of the profoundest vital interest with all men. The anchorage of the Idealist is, as already noted, the immediate fact of consciousness and its subject; the objective modulus is the logical structure of thought; and the practical interest has the deepest concern with the problem of death and immortality. On the whole, it is true, the Idealist as a philosopher is not greatly concerned with the practical problems of finite life in this world. He finds plenty of able men who are engaged with these problems and so rarely finds the call of duty in this direction. But he sees beyond the cycle of finite life a great problem which, if it is not solved, renders the solution of all other problems unimportant. So, I submit, there is plenty of [abundant] reason to bear with the intellectual processes of the Idealist if he can offer any evidence of certainty where most men only believe darkly within a cloud of doubt.

Let us, now, examine the main feature of the Idealistic treatment of the problem of necessity. If there is no world outside of consciousness and the essence of the self is freedom, how, then, are we to account for the experience of necessity? The Idealist answer to this question invariably takes us away from the material of objective experience. With the exception of the pragmatic Idealist, the resolution of the problem either invokes the Divinity or a transcendental SELF, which stands in such a relation to the empiric self that it may be called objective. But it is not objective in the sense in which sensible objects or even ideas are called objective. Here we have a notion that is quite subtle and which I think is quite generally misunderstood by the critics of Idealism. But first, let us see how the notion of the Divinity or the transcendental SELF can help us with the problem of necessity, leaving the problem of the reasonableness of the notion until later.

In the case of Berkeley the notion of the Divinity was invoked quite simply to account for the ideas experienced. Berkeley's ideas, it must be recalled, included all experiences, such as sensations as well as ideas in the conceptual sense. These ideas, he affirmed, were not produced by something outside consciousness, such as independent and real things, but many of them, at least, had a character being given quite independently of individual volition. How were they placed in the consciousness of the individual? The answer is that God placed them there. The actuality of God is not questioned by Berkeley nor is the Divinity a real philosophical conception with him. He seemed simply to have accepted the God of Christian faith, with the result that he left many logical problems unresolved. So this earlier form of occidental Idealism is mainly valuable for introducing the Idealistic approach to the problem of philosophy but does not leave us with a system that is highly satisfactory.

Before leaving this passing reference to Berkeley, it seems important to note the fact that this thinker, like Schiller and Bergson of the Pragmatist school, is not classed as a member of the school of Idealism. Like the two Pragmatists named, he accepts the

cardinal principle of Idealism but does not accept another principle which is of almost equal importance for the latter. Basically the ideas of Berkeley are not concepts but percepts. Thus his Idealism may be classed as an empiric or perceptual Idealism, whereas the great school of Idealism gives ascendancy to the concept relative to the percept. Berkeley's thought is anti-rationalistic as well as anti-realistic, whereas the main school of Idealism is anti-realistic but highly rationalistic even in its voluntaristic form. For Berkeley the concrete idea or perception has a reality-value which the abstract conception does not possess. He continues the psychological orientation of the Nominalists of the Middle Ages. But since the cleavage between Idealism and Realism is more fundamental than that between Sensationalism and Rationalism, there is a significant reason for classing Berkeley with Idealism in the generic sense, though not with a specific school of Idealism.

There is something naive about Berkeley's invocation of the Divinity in order to explain the necessitarian and orderly character of the perceived ideas. For this is the inherited Divinity of Christian faith. It is not the Divinity of direct realization nor as a necessity for reason. It is thus not the kind of God which can properly enter into any philosophical system as a true agent of integration. It is rather a general appeal to Providence for help when one's own individual resources prove inadequate. Now it does appear that no man ever quite succeeds in building a system of thought which completely avoids the appeal to something that is the logical equivalent of Providence, though he may call it by quite different names such as "Chance" or "*Nirvana*." This means that something extra-rational has to be invoked sooner or later, but some thinkers have been able to extend the limits of rational thought much further than others. This, indeed, has a great deal to do with the relative valuation of the hierarchy of thinkers. The greatest thinker is he who has been able to think furthest into the unknown. Among philosophic thinkers Berkeley did not go very far before he found his limits. The great Idealists went much further and gained profundity at the price of increasing incomprehensibility. As a result they have given us the most intellectually sound interpretation of necessity which avoids the pitfalls of Realism.

Now, by a sufficient degree of inward penetration in consciousness, one can find the self as an immediately known reality. This is not a process of simple introspection as is commonly used in experimental psychology. In fact, this introspection remains far too objective to lead to the discovery of the self and the result is that many psychologists never do find the true self. They do find something which they call the subject but they describe it in such terms as to show that they have actually found only a subtle object. In fact the Neo-Realists explicitly state that this subject may enter in the relation of an object for some purposes of thought. This simply means that such psychologists are talking of a subject of quite a different nature from the self of the Idealist. This difference may be suggested by the figure of a lamp with a light within it. The subject of the more empiric psychologists is only the lamp while the self of the Idealist is the light itself. Actually introspection, in the usual sense, can go no further than the lamp, since it is the light which illumines and makes possible the subtle observation of introspection. The light is back of the act of introspection and only the lamp is in the foreground. So in introspection, Consciousness has not really turned upon Itself but merely established a kind of short-circuit in the psyche. To find the self of the Idealist, one has to go a good deal further than this.



The turning of Consciousness upon Itself is a very mysterious process. To account for it I have become convinced that we have to introduce the notion of a function which is other than the four functions of analytic psychology, namely, thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition. I hold the thesis that it is the activity of this function which constitutes the real base of Idealism in the grand sense. Further, it is the more or less complete inactivity of this function that destroys the force of the Idealist argument for so many thinkers and psychologists. Also, it would appear that even with the Idealists in whom the function is [was] active there is [was] a defective knowledge of it as a distinct function, the result being that they often try [tried] to explain by pure reason something which involves more than logic itself. It is right here that I would locate the greatest failure of the occidental Idealists. But the failure in terms of presentation does not imply unsoundness of fundamental insight.

The above point is well illustrated in the case of Fichte who may well prove to be the purest example we have in the West of the [an] Idealist. From the standpoint of sheer insight I find Fichte very convincing, but his attempt in *The Science of Knowledge* to derive that insight as the necessary underlying implication of the logical laws of thought seems strained and far from convincing. Very possibly he has the substantially correct view as to the source of the laws of thought, but it is quite another matter to say that from the use of logical principles he has proved the source. I am pretty well convinced that Fichte did not discover the self, or “ego” as he calls it, by the method in which he sought to prove it. I would say that he really knew the self though what we might call the fifth function, though it is entirely possible the Fichte did not differentiate this function in his analysis. In such matters the psychical analysis of the Orient has gone much further than either the philosophy or psychology of the West.

Elsewhere I have suggested the word ‘introception’ to represent this fifth function. It is to be understood as the process whereby Consciousness turns upon Itself and moves towards Its Source. It is not the same as introspection wherein consciousness merely short-circuits itself to observe more subtle psychical objects, which are generally unconscious for the extraverted attitude. Introception, when successful, leads to a stage wherein consciousness becomes its own content, that is, a consciousness which is divorced from its objective reference. By this means the self as source of consciousness can be realized and without being transformed into a subtle object as a *me*. This is identical with the Indian notion of “meditation without a seed,” which is absolutely essential for the attainment of Liberation or Enlightenment. The Buddhistic use of the word *Dhyana* suggests very strongly that it also refers to such a [refers to an analogous] process. So it may be said that by “introception” I mean substantially the same higher psychical function as “meditation without a seed” and “*Dhyana*.” It is this, I conceive, to be the real source of the assurance of the originating Idealistic philosophers and as the ground for differentiating Idealism proper from the mere intellectualistic Idealism which latter is more a reflection of a Light than an incarnation of the Light itself. Introception gives immediate content just as perception does but diverges at least as radically from the latter as does conceptualism. If one divides the functions of consciousness into two classes with perception on one side, including feeling, sensation, and intuition, and conception on the other, then introception would appear lumped with conception. In this case a successful critique of conceptualism would undermine the foundations of Idealism, particularly in the case of the Absolutistic school. But if the real [true] base of Idealism is

the activity of a function which ordinarily is latent and inactive, the real root of Idealism is untouched by a critique of conceptualism considered in separation from introception. "Introception" is definitely not thinking, feeling, nor sensation. It is also definitely different from "intuition" as that term is generally understood, though translators from oriental sources have often used this [the latter] word. This, however, only helps to confuse the situation, for then we think of intuition as it appears in analytic psychology or in usage such as that of Bergson. It is a content coming into consciousness out of the dark of unconsciousness, hence we have Bergson speaking of grasping indefinite fringes around the core of conscious ideas as intuition. But introception is a function operating in the intensest kind of Light wherein one is more completely conscious than ever before. Consciousness turning upon Itself is a very different matter from contents rising into consciousness from out the unconscious.

I submit that "turning inward," in the sense in which Fichte speaks, must be understood in the sense of introception rather than that of simple introspection. Thus no amount of bare introspection would be competent to challenge what Fichte found. Introception is an exceedingly profound act of introversion and the evidence would indicate that it is quite rare. If introversion is carried very far *without the turning of the Light of Consciousness upon Itself*, the effect is of something inchoate feathering out into the darkness of unconsciousness. But with the turning of the Light of Consciousness upon Itself consciousness becomes vastly intensified with the quality and ground of assurance much better established than in the case of anything derived from experience. This is something that must be borne in mind if one is ever to understand Idealism of the grander style.

Introception renders the actuality of the self far more indubitable than any content given through perception. This is the key to Idealistic assurance and explains why all the necessitarianism which inheres in the environment takes on the quality of subordination. In fact, the intensified Light of the introceptive process gives to all experience a dreamlike or unreal character. It is like the sun quenching the light of the moon, or like the waking state quenching the consciousness of the ordinary dream. This is not a speculation; it is something which actually happens. The shift from introception to perception is like the sun going under while the moon takes over. The memory of the light of the sun, when the moon is shining, is stronger than the memory of the light of the moon, when the sun is shining. This alone gives a determinant meaning as to which is relatively most real.

The first immediate content of successful introception is the realization expressed by the words 'I am'. This is not an inference from conscious activity, such as that of Descartes when he inferred the being of the self from the fact of thinking. The being of the self is an absolutely immediate datum requiring no further support. I repeat, the actuality of perceptually experienced content, taken in its most complete immediacy, is much less decisively certain.

The being of the self, which for introception is more unequivocal than the being or actuality of perception, is like an unsupported Light. It is "the Flame which burns without wick nor oil." But it is so pure as to be quite without the taint of personality. One may conceive of it as like a self-supporting Light within a more or less differentiated lamp. The latter carries the individual characters of personality. There is

thus something about the pure self which gives it the character of real impersonality. While in the rigorous sense it is highly subjective, it is not a personal subjectivism. This is a point of the very greatest importance for philosophy since the impersonality of the self gives it a universal value. It is the ground for something a good deal more than a merely personal philosophy.

We are quite right in valuing physical science because it gives us something more than merely the private experience of the individual scientist. It gives general truths whether they are interpreted in realistic, pragmatic, or other terms. It is for this reason that we call it objective. Commonly we oppose to this, subjective judgments that are so largely colored by personal feeling tones that they have only a restricted appeal. That which we call objective is believed to be in some sense true for all men, while that which is subjective is not true for all men, and may not be true at all. The self of introception, being quite pure and impersonal, is not subjective in the latter sense. It supplies a generally valid base. Thus it is conceived by those who know it, and, if the non-Idealist is ever to arrive at an understanding of the inner meaning of the Idealist, he must grant this point. The only possible verification is by the path of introception itself.

The last statement implies a radical departure of the Idealistic theory of verification from that of Pragmatism. The Pragmatist dictum that a difference of truth must make a difference of fact here, namely, in the world of perception or experience, implies an exclusive one-way reference of ideas. The idea means exclusively a terminal content having a perceptual *quale*. Thus there can be no verification save through experience. But the conceptual content of the Idealist *qua* Idealist is purely introceptive. If, incidentally, this produces a difference of fact in the field of experience, that is merely an addenda which adds nothing to the essential truth-value. Actually, the introceptive verification may have repercussions upon the empiric life of the individual with the result that the latter may, more or less widely, influence other lives. These effects may or may not be valued positively or negatively in the pragmatic sense. But all this is beside the point from the perspective of introception. Introception supplies its own authority and may very well, in some of its ramifications, move into zones quite unrelated to empiric consciousness. In such cases a difference of truth would produce no difference of fact in the perceptual field. Often, it is true, a difference that is introceptively significant does have effects that are significant for the perceptual field, and may even be of momentous importance. Thus the Buddhist introceptive insight has led to empiric ways of life that are notably different from the ways of life of most men. One effect is the reduction of militancy. This is something that does have a pragmatic value. But it would be a vital mistake to regard such effects as the underlying objective of Buddhist teachings. They are, after all, only incidental. The real objective is the attainment of *Nirvana*. If it were true that attainment of this end implied violent militancy in the empiric field then, I submit, that Buddhism would have to accept such violence.