THE FOUR PILLARED ARCH

Chapter I
Introduction

Foreword.

Before all other objectives man should seek that Goal known as Enlightenment. Before the attainment of this Realization all effort, all experience and all knowledge has durable value only in so far as they may serve to bring nearer that consumation. All which serves not this End is, at best, empty or actively injurious. The life which produces no slightest advance toward this Goal is wasted and without worth. Such a life is like the journey of the squirrel in the rotating cage, which ends just where it started, or it is a descending course to the darkness of oblivion. That joy or pain, success or failure, gain or loss, peace or struggle, whether small or great, which leads on, little or much, to the luminous End is good. All else is not good. It is not good even though it be composed in a life that is full and powerful in terms of mundane evaluation. One objective only is valuable and that is Enlightenment.

Beyond the Gate of Enlightenment there may lie rich further possibility, but all this lies beyond the comprehension of the unenlightened. Enlightenment bears the Wisdom to guide the Enlightened Ones on any further Way there may be. For the rest Enlightenment is the only proximate Goal having any worth. Therefore, seek Enlightenment through all means and on all occasions for all creatures, scorning neither the little nor the great.

TADEATHA GATE GATE PARAGATE PARASAMGATE BODHI SVAHA
That the state of Realization known as the High Indifference and as Consciousness-without-an-object is basically similar to what the Buddhists call Enlightenment has been shown both in "Pathways through to Space" and in "Philosophy of Consciousness-without-an-Object". This similarity is largely revealed in the fact that the content of the State necessitated an anatmic and non-theistic interpretation of the ultimate Root of Being. This is identical with the primary teaching of traditional Buddhism. The writer determined the similarity by an objective comparison of his formulation, dictated by the necessities of the State, with the written Buddhist Dharma as given in the Sutras of the northern wing of Buddhism with which he became acquainted subsequent to his earlier writing. The State in its own immediacy defined no relationship to any literature or existence in the relative order, nor was its nature in conformity with any expectation of the writer derived from his readings up to that time. Actually it did violence to certain preconceptions derived from prior study, particularly in leading to the notion of a relative Nirvana. This latter conception was also, subsequently, found to constitute an integral phase of the Tibetan Dharma, thereby strongly reinforcing the conclusion that the State is fundamentally consonant with the ultimate sumnum bonum of Buddhism. Nothing has arisen, since the earlier writing, to throw into question the judgment that the two States are of primary similarity, but whether this similarity extends so far as to be a complete identity has never been adequately determined. On this question, doubt has arisen.

Apparent, if not real, discrepancy in the philosophy of "Pathways" and of "Consciousness-without-an-object" as compared to the doctrine
of the, so-called, nihilistic Mahayanistic Buddhist Sutras does arise in relation to the notion of the "Void". The Void or "Shunyata" is the central conception of this form of Buddhism. It is to be granted that the impression of absolute nothingness in every possible sense which the development of this notion suggests to at least the western reader is in error. The Sutras are explicit on that point and the logic of the negative dialectic is not hard to see. But it does appear that the ultimate conception rules out the idea of substantiality in every sense. Now, while it is true that in "Pathways" the idea of "Emptiness" and "Nothingness" was found necessary it was there explicitly stated that this voidness was apparent, being true only from the perspective of relative consciousness. Positively, it was affirmed that a real substantiality is to be realized when consciousness reverses its polarization and moves away from the Object and toward the Subject. In point of fact, the primary initiatory conception of the whole transformation process was ultimately formulated in the postulate "Substantiality is inversely proportional to ponderability". The High Indifference, or Consciousness-without-an-object, was realized as a Plenum, so profound as to render all else to have the value of emptiness. To be sure, there are several Buddhistic systems and it is not safe to conclude that the above discrepancy exists in the case of all systems. It does, however, appear to be real in the case of the more rigorous nihilistic Mahayanistic type of Buddhism.

In another and more definite respect the two philosophies do clearly diverge. While in the ultimate sense Buddhism, quite uniformly, affirms the unreality of both the Subject and the Object yet, with the possible exception of Tibetan Buddhism, the denial
of the reality of the Subject is prior to, and more emphatic than, the denial of the reality of the Object. Typical Buddhism is highly positivistic, phenomenalistic and nominalistic and, at times, reads very much like western materialistic literature. The impression one receives is that the Object has a higher relative reality-value than is possessed by the Subject. Now, both "Pathways" and "Philosophy of Consciousness-without-an-object" agree with the major theses of Buddhism to the effect that in the final State, both Subject and Object have a derivative status and possess only a relative and not an absolute reality. But the Subject is explicitly given a higher order of relative reality as compared to the Object. The creative movement, in world-production, is conceived as from the Subject to the Object and in the reverse process of Realization the Object is transcended first. In the fourth part of "Philosophy of Consciousness-without-an-object" the Subject is given the status of a parameter having relative constancy, with respect to which the Object is exclusively a variable. Consciousness-without-an-object remains as the only absolute constant. So, in this respect, the two philosophies do not agree in their interpretation of the hierarchy of relative powers.

Discrepancy is also apparent in the underlying incitement which led to the two searchings. Buddha was led to His search, as the records tell us, as a result of His first witnessing of suffering. It was as part of His effort to find the cause and cure of suffering, universal among all creatures, that ultimately He attained Enlightenment under the Bodhi Tree, as the tradition is. His four Noble Truths dealt exclusively with suffering and it is said He summed up the whole of His Teaching in the two
short phrases: "The fact of suffering" and "The destruction of suffering". This contrast, this was not the inciting motivation of the writer of "Pathways". In the beginning he had very little sense of either personal or general suffering. Deep knowledge of suffering as an essential part of the relative order came to him only after the Transformation. He was primarily motivated by the essentially philosophical objective of knowledge of Ultimate Reality. There was no drive as from a profound sense of pain whether private or general. There simply was not, in the beginning, any significant experience or sympathetic knowledge of suffering. Nor, even to this day, has the writer felt the desirability of the escape from suffering with the intensity that is generally ascribed to the Buddha. There is much that commands respect in the Spenglerian heroic acceptance of suffering. It does appear that there is more than one way of rising above suffering and the method of escape is only one of these. There are other ways that command moral respect as well.

Further consideration of moral motivation may not be amiss at this time. We cannot here disregard the relativity of individual psychology. A standpoint of universal validity is hardly possible in the relative order. This statement is quite in consonance with the general philosophy of traditional Buddhism. Buddha’s accentuation of the escape from suffering is, beyond all doubt, valid enough, but it suggests a psychology more typical of feminine psychology than one would expect from a typical member of the warrior caste. Spengler has expressed more nearly the moral attitude which one would expect from the warrior as a type. Further, the genuine philosopher has an
attitude quite different from either of the foregoing. The search for the Real for its own sake carries its own brand of austerity. The seeker simply cannot impose the condition that the Real must be pleasant or comfortable. Privately, he may hope that it will be so, but his devotion must be single-pointed to the Real, whatever that may be. And he must be prepared to accept it though it prove to be devastatingly painful. To find that it is supremely joyful is simply a most fortunate largess.

Unquestionably valid moral attitudes exist. And concerning all of these which agree in the subordination of private self-interest to a general principle or good it is impossible to say that one alone is righteous or that one alone possesses superiority, while all the others are inferior or undesirable. Statements can be found in the written Buddhist Dharma which tend to confirm such relativity.

In "An Introduction to Mahayana Buddhism" W.M. McGovern has given us a quotation from the Buddhistic writer, Kaiten Nukariya, that reveals quite clearly the intelligent Buddhist's objectivity with respect to the objective Dharma. In part, the quotation runs: "Has then the divine nature of the Universal Spirit been completely and exhaustively revealed in our Enlightened Consciousness? To this question we would answer in the negative, for so far as our limited experience is concerned Universal Spirit reveals itself as a being with profound wisdom and boundless mercy; this nevertheless does not imply that this conception is the only possible and complete one. It goes on to disclose a new phase, to add a new truth." The implication is clear. The historic Buddhism, though grounded in Enlightenment, does not claim for its formulated Dharma exclusive validity. Perhaps
we may be justified in saying that the masters of traditional Buddhism would claim to have penetrated the ultimate Root of Truth and to have projected into the relative consciousness a part, only, of its total meaning. To others it may reveal additional meanings when reflected in the field of articulate expression.

In addition to all of the foregoing the writer found a pronounced peculiarity of the Buddhistic literature especially distressing. For very large part it seems quite unintelligible. To be sure, unintelligibility is by no means an uncommon feature of the literature produced by mystics. In general, the reason for this is not difficult to determine. But immediate personal experience of the Transformation resolves much of this unintelligibility since there is a direct acquaintance, in greater or lesser degree, with the common ground of mystical consciousness. The writer did find that a substantial body of mystical literature had become essentially intelligible, while formerly it had appeared strange and meaningless. Especially was this true in the case of the philosophies of Shankara and Plotinus. But in the case of Buddhistic literature, save with respect to the most ultimate reference, unintelligibility remained more the rule than the exception. The difficulty involved was not like that of the similar problem which one may find in reading unfamiliar recondite scientific or mathematical conceptions. In the latter case, the problem is amenable to the systematic application of conceptual thought. But the difficultly in the case of Buddhistic literature is of quite a different sort.

Often when one studies the written Dharma with the view to the resolution of some problem that is in the mind, although he finds
material that is relevant to that problem, yet over and over again he does not find the crucial or clarifying development. In contrast, it was found that the equally mystically oriented philosophy of Shankara generally did produce the pertinent and clarifying statement. But Buddhist DHârma seemed to specialize in saying, again and again in well-nigh endless repetition, just that which could be taken for granted, while the vital reasoning was left unsaid. And not only this. Many portions aroused in the mind no meaning whatever. They seemed like mere jumbles of words. One gets the impression that he could take several hundred words, shuffle them, and then cast them at random in the objective form of sentences and derive a somewhat similar effect. As a matter of fact the impression received has much in common with that one derives from the reading of James Joyce, though the latter is producing on an immeasurably lower level. At least the Buddhistic literature confines itself to words that can be found in some dictionary.

The effect of a sort of meaningless literary chaos is produced with considerably more intensity in the indigenous mystical literature of the Chinese. Perhaps a quotation would bring the point home with the greatest force. In the "Secret of the Golden Flower" Master Lü Tzu quotes from the "Book of the Yellow Castle" as follows: "In the field of the square inch of the house of the square foot, life can be regulated. The house of the square foot is the face. The field of the square inch in the face: what could that be other than the Heavenly Heart? In the middle of the square inch dwells the splendour. In the purple hall of the city of jade dwells the god of utmost emptiness and life, etc." The western man who
can derive an intelligent conception from such literature is a *rara avis*. But in the case of the Chinese the difficulty is not restricted to the specifically mystical literature. Literal translations, wherein there is not interpretation into the western form of understanding, produce much the same effect. Yet Chinese thought has produced a worthy and exceptionally durable culture. Somehow there is sense in all the apparent nonsense.

For some years the writer was deeply troubled by the various problems outlined above. There could be no doubt but that the Buddhistic and Chinese writers were intelligent men and even extraordinarily intelligent. Thus it was clear that here was a dimension of consciousness which needed to be understood. The illumination of the Transformation reported in "Pathways" did not prove to be enough by itself to cross the gulf of cross-understanding, though it did help in part. Now it appears to be impossible to rest in peace before an unresolved problem so the conundrum of cross-understanding had to be faced.

Fortunately, success had been at last realized in sufficient degree to suggest an integrating conception that may prove to be of rare value. And that is the reason for this book. But while the conception in its ultimate symbolic presentation will prove to be beautifully simple, the preparation of the mind for its acceptance and understanding affords more than ordinary difficulties. Much more is involved than the basic understanding of one's own racial culture. In addition the mind must be able to reach out to the cultures that are alien and strange and, with some measure of sympathy, in at least a basic abstract way. The difficulty in this does not lie alone in the understanding
of something alien. The comprehension of the roots of that which is basic in one's own culture involves problems which may be no less exacting. In general we tend to be grounded in them more or less unconsciously, or we feel that they are like self-evident truths native to all men. To see them at all and then to see them as relative implies a substantial development of self-consciousness. Not many men have attained this. So it may even happen often that the grasping of the roots of the alien will prove the easier task. By learning to know the other we may gain the ability to know ourselves all the better. To find that other men regard as self-evident and necessary something quite different from our own presuppositions must help in the realization of just what those presuppositions are and in the appreciation of their essentially relative character. Thus our task may well prove to be a dual one of coming to know ourselves in the effort to understand those who live in almost another world.

The integration of the East and the West in terms of understanding is not only desirable. The time has come when it is an imperative necessity. The different parts of the human world must learn to live together, and that quickly, if disaster is to be forestalled. Science has supplied us with far too potent instruments of destruction for the continued quarrelling between nations and races to be any longer tolerable. Yet there will be grave conflict, sooner or later, if substantial progress in cross-understanding is not achieved. And it is just the cross-understanding between East and West that supplies the most fundamental and most difficult problem.
Chapter II
The Aesthetic and the Theoretic

The suggestion which with almost illuminating force opened the way to substantial resolution of the problem outlined in the first chapter came through the reading of F.S.C. Northrop's able work, "The Meeting of East and West." Although this book may not be free from the criticism of over-simplification and can hardly be said to have dealt with the whole problem yet it is a very important contribution and provided the writer with a key of profound importance. This key consisted in the identification of oriental culture with the aesthetic component in consciousness while, in contrast, occidental culture is grounded in the theoretic component. The distinction is not absolute but rather one of more or less, yet does involve more or less radical predominance in accentuation with respect to the good or true in life in the two cases. Since this differentiation is of critical importance it will be necessary to determine rather clearly just how we are to understand the aesthetic and theoretic.

The Meaning of the Aesthetic

In its more common usage the word "aesthetic" is understood to mean the perception of, or science of the beautiful, but while this is the meaning generally applied in common parlance, it is not the most fundamental meaning of the term. In much truer conformity with the original meaning of the Greek root we have the word "aesthesia", meaning, "Perception; feeling; sensation; sensibility." In philosophic usage the term "aesthetic" with a meaning signifying "the science of sensuous knowledge, supplementary and parallel to logic, the science of clear thinking". Kant continued to employ this meaning in his
"Critique of Pure Reason" thereby establishing a usage that has remained important for philosophy. It is in the latter more primary and more philosophical usage that we are to understand the term "aesthetic" in the present discussion.

It should be clear then that by the "aesthetic" we do not necessarily imply beauty. Beauty is rather to be regarded as the aesthetic ideal just as truth is the logical ideal. But the aesthetic includes along with beauty, the ugly and the aspects which are neither beautiful nor ugly. The aesthetic is the perceptual component in consciousness taken in isolation from any judgment or evaluation.

It will be necessary to extend the meaning of the aesthetic to include substantially more than purely sensuous perception. There are genuine and supremely important perceptions, i.e., ways of consciousness which are not judgments, that are, however, non-sensuous. Dr. Carl G. Jung has called these perceptions "intuitions", defined as "unconscious perceptions." By this it is not meant that the whole of the perception is necessarily unconscious but rather that the end-product is conscious, in general, while the root and process is unconscious. It is a perceiving without knowing the way of perceiving as we do know the mediation of the sense-organ in sense perception. "Intuition" in this sense, gives an immediately apprehended perceptual content but, when completely pure, involving no judgment. The word has several other meanings in which the common denominator is the immediacy of some factor in consciousness but the differences in these meanings is so considerable that it would serve clarity in discourse if other words were devised. Here we shall follow the practice of Dr. Jung and shall meaning by
intuition, without a modifying adjective, or by aesthetic intuition immediate unconscious perception. Intuition, in so far as it is a component part of the intellective process, will be differentiated either by the employment of another word or by the use of an appropriate modifying adjective.

An acquaintance with Dr. Jung’s systematic presentation of the functional psychologic types is a substantial aid in the understanding of our present subject. Though Jung’s attitude types of introversion and extroversion are quite widely known it does appear that the importance of his functional types is not properly appreciated. They may actually have the greater importance. In any case, they consist of the four functions of thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition each of which may appear predominant in a given individual and under either the extraverted or introverted attitudes. These four functions are divided into two groups, (1) thinking and feeling and, (2) sensation and intuition. Thinking and feeling are called the judgment, or rational functions, while sensation and intuition are called the aesthetic or irrational functions. The first pair involve relating or evaluation in some sense while the second gives sheer presentation. It is the two-fold division into the contrasting judgment and aesthetic functions that will be of primary importance for us here.

In concrete human experience the complete isolation of either the judgmental or aesthetic components is quite rare. Typical human consciousness is a complex state in which the four functions and two attitudes are more or less confusedly mixed. But differences in accentuation is notable when one makes a serious study of individual or racial psychology. It is this natural
difference in accentuation which will later prove important for us. By the appropriate effort some individuals have been able to isolate either the judgmental or aesthetic component to a high degree of relative purity. An instance of the former is to be found in the highly rigorous pure mathematics and of the latter in the severely impressionistic form of art in which there is a complete abandonment of the principles of perspective. This degree of purity is achieved only by great effort and outstanding instances of success are rather rare. As a rule, with artists and thinkers, both components are present with the differences consisting in varying degrees of accentuation. Pure aesthetic art means just itself and nothing while pure thought means beyond itself exclusively. But, more commonly, actual artistic creations mean something beyond the immediate presentation, in addition to the latter, and so involve some degree of the judgmental functions. Similarly, the predominate proportion of thought incorporates a greater or less degree of immediate or aesthetic content; the factor which can only be known by immediate experience.

The Theoretic Component

Judgment is the act or function of consciousness whereby it is possible to form a predication. A \textit{predication} is a relating of a subject to another subject, quality or attribute so that there is added to the pure original thatness of the subject more or less determinate whatness. Thus when we say, for instance, "that percept is a table and that table is a typewriter table," we have made an addition to the pure aesthetic experience of the original perception. The original perception in its purity had no meaning but by the judging function it has
acquired an operational value at least. This is a process in consciousness which is just as primary as the aesthetic component itself and yet cannot be derived from the aesthetic component. It is an irreducible fact that we do judge as well as perceive.

Just so soon as we start to produce predications we introduce some measure of theory. In theory we depart, at first slightly but ultimately radically, from the pure aesthetic material. Generally theory is initiated by an originally given aesthetic material but after the start proceeds to soar more or less loftily from the perceptual ground. Very quickly theory abandons the percepts from which it starts and is born on by the instrumentality of the concept. Now it is just precisely in the concept and the conceptual order that we have the dimension or function of human consciousness which is wholly distinct from the aesthetic component. And since it is in the relative accentuation of this function of consciousness that we will find what is probably the primary differentiation between the East and the West it will behoove us to consider its essential nature.

"Conception" is defined as "cognition of a universal as distinguished from the particulars which it unifies", while the universal thus apprehended is called a "concept". Thus a conception is never the content of an immediate aesthetic experience. It is of quite another dimension bearing the mark of universality contrasting with the absolute particularity of perceptual awareness. The concept deals with a content which can never be perceived by the senses so in a very real sense it deals with an unseen world. Strictly speaking only thought in terms of concepts should be called intellectual thought while
processes of mentation dealing exclusively with aesthetic material are non-intellectual and may be called perceptual thinking. Conceptual thinking is probably an exclusively human function and strictly a fruit of culture as distinguished from nature. In contrast, perceptual thinking is natural though it is capable of high cultural development. In so far as animals may be said to think it would be a perceptual type of thinking. Perceptual thinking in its natural form, as distinguished from its cultural development, proceeds spontaneously and without effort and thus is not a fatiguing process. But contrasting again, conceptual thought requires more or less conscious willed direction producing fatigue which at the highest level may be extreme, though in some degree conceptual thought may become autonomous through habit.

The concrete or actual thinking of most men all of the time and of all men most of the time is a mixture of the conceptual and perceptual types. The dependence upon images so often found in the introspection of thought processes derives from the perceptual kind of thinking. Only with great difficulty is the image finally dropped in the development of pure imageless conceptual thinking. As the airplane builds the velocity to lift it into the air by employing the earth as a sort of fulcrum, so man acquires the power to soar into the intellectual atmosphere and stratosphere by use of his native perceptual thought as a corresponding fulcrum. But also, as the airplane is supported by the air and not the earth when once in flight, so to is it with liberated intellectual thought. The highest thought is without images and becomes progressively less and less dependent upon symbols which ever grow more and more subtle.
No feature of conceptual thought is more important nor more characteristic than its development as syntax. Though "syntax" is most commonly understood as a grammatical term it has the more basic connotation of "connected system or order; union of things." It is this larger sense, which includes logic as well as grammar, which should be understood as the basic characteristic of thought in the conceptual form. The aesthetic presentment is just itself and involves no relating or ordering when pure. The essence of the conceptual is the ordering or the systematic. Hence any extension of the conceptual becomes theory which stands in contrast to fact and practice both of the latter belonging essentially to the aesthetic. Pure theory is logical ordering taken in abstraction from the material that is ordered.

From the foregoing it is clear that a prime feature of the theoretic component is mediation, thus contrasting again with the aesthetic which, when pure, is wholly immediate. By mediation thought moves from this to that, from the seen to the unseen, and from the unseen back to the seen again. In all this there is a movement wholly outside the aesthetic and one which an overly one-sided aesthetic consciousness would hardly know existed. In such a case its reality-value might well be denied, but such denial would not present objective truth but would rather reveal the peculiar conditioning consciousness of the denier. As will be shown later, the theoretical movement produces innumerable effects falling within the aesthetic continuum that afford it even an aesthetic justification which cannot be ignored.

The theoretical component may be called the soul of the
physical science that is the prime offering of the West to world culture. Without theory we would have no real science. So the office of theory in relation to science is of such prime importance that understanding of it is the sine qua non of understanding western genius as contrasted to the genius of the East taken as a whole. We shall then process to sketch the main features of western scientific method.

Physical science starts with a sense experience. Very quickly the raw sense-experience is transformed into a concept by isolation and abstraction of a critical feature which now becomes an universal of which the raw experience is viewed as but a special instance. The fundamental assumption underlying the whole process is that all particulars of the aesthetic manifold are inter-related by law. The aesthetic presentment by itself does not give us knowledge of what the law is nor even that law, as such, is an inter-relating principle. On the other hand, the ontological actuality of law binding together all parts of the aesthetic manifold is not capable of theoretical proof. If the notion of such law is really genuine knowledge it is not known either by theoretical demonstration or by aesthetic intuition but by immediacy of another sort. Practically, belief in the ubiquity of law is an article of scientific faith, which has the logical status of fundamental assumption. But without this belief there would be no raison d'etre for the starting and continuing of the scientific investigation.

Material given from sense-experience, usually in the form of more or less extended data, poses to the searcher a problem of inter-relationship. The data by itself does not define what that relationship may be but does act as a suggestive agent
to the imagination of the scientist to arouse one or more hypotheses of inter-connecting relationships. In its turn the hypothesis consists of more or less complex postulation of unseen conceptual entities, behind the aesthetic data, that stand in certain logically thinkable relationships to each other. From this basis, when formed in accordance with known logical principles, systematic theory is developed.

So far we have outlined only part of the scientific process. But it should be noted that already we have turned away from the aesthetic manifold and are dealing with entities and relationships of an unseen order. We assume that the postulated theory is self-consistent and that it incorporates all of the abstracted conceptual data which posed the original problem. But so far we cannot form the judgment that the hypothesis is true nor have we defined a means of verification with respect to the aesthetic order. More is required.

Many hypotheses may be invented which would achieve all that was accomplished above. Which one shall be selected? Two principles govern the answer to this question. (1) The postulational hypothesis must satisfy the condition that it leads to a consequence which may be checked by simple observation or by some experiment. (2) If two or more hypotheses meet the first condition then that hypothesis is selected which has the greatest theoretical simplicity.

Assuming that a postulational hypothesis has been found which satisfies the above conditions then by theory a consequence is inferred, sometimes involving an extended chain of reasoning, such that a given perceptual event or constellation is predicted. This prediction is then checked by the appropriate kind of
aesthetic observation. If the datum from observation proves to be as predicted, the hypothesis has had a verification. Generally the hypothesis remains tentative until after extensive verification with no instance of failure in the verification.

Have we now established the form of an actual law which governs nature as presented in the aesthetic manifold? In earlier scientific experience the answer was often "yes", but painful experience has taught us that well tested hypotheses that have stood unshaken for many years, yet may fail in the light of some new and generally rarer type of observation. Sophisticated western science does not claim to have found any law of ontological validity. Thus, beyond truth in the sense of the inner consistency of the theoretical development, it cannot be said that any scientific theory is true of nature. Only warranted assertability has been authenticated, to use the phrase of John Dewey. But though the findings of science have fallen far short of the determination of absolute law, yet basic science has effected innumerable predictions of presentments in the aesthetic manifold. Hence, whatever reality value may be asserted of such presentments there is implied at least a contributory reality value for the theoretical component.

The step from basic science to applied science involves further theory and inventive imagination. But when the outcome of application is successful presentments and processes intercalated are incorporated into the aesthetic manifold, combined with the possibility of prediction. We have something here like a deus ex machina operating from the unseen theoretical continuum but effecting controlled modifications of the aesthetic
manifold. As a result of all this the implication is greatly strengthened that acceptance of the given in the aesthetic manifold authenticates the unseen theoretic component.

The highest development of the theoretic component is found in mathematics and especially in pure mathematics. Mathematics is the science of the implications of propositions involving variables together with logical constants and other constants and other constants. If there are other constants than logical constants it is applied mathematics, if not it is pure mathematics. As thus defined applied mathematics includes much that is popularly supposed to be pure mathematics, specific. Thus any system of geometry, since it involves essentially arbitrary postulates, other than the ineluctable logical constants, is a form of applied mathematics, even though it has no known application affecting the aesthetic manifold.

What is of special interest to us here is found in pure mathematics in the strict sense because in this case we have only that which remains after all aesthetically oriented data and arbitrary postulation has been removed. We have the science of pure ordering in the most general sense in complete from abstraction of all entities which may stand in ordered relation. Such a science does exist free from all aesthetic elements and all imagining.

Pure mathematics together with the principles of such logical processes as do not involve variables of the whole theoretical component taken in isolation from the aesthetic factors. Specific theories require in addition various postulations. If the theories fail it is the postulates that must be changed, not the logical principles or constants. In the latter, then, we have the invariant base of all theoretical thought, in so far
as that base has been rendered explicit. To be sure, this invariant factor has been differently understood in past discussions of logic as compared to current understanding, and doubtless the future will unfold different treatments. But through all this variation there remains unaltered an invariant core which conditions possible articulation with respect to logical theory. John Dewey significantly specifies this fact in the opening sentences of his "Logic". The proximate subject-matter of logic is accorded general agreement by logicians though there is wide variation in the theories concerning the nature of the ultimate subject-matter of logic. So the significant fact is that there is a central core of theoretic thought around which discussion moves while that central portion remains fixed. It might happen that with respect to the invariant core, itself, all formulation is subject to variation yet it would remain as the stable focal point like the hole in the hub of the wheel, that the Chinese sage pointed out was the most vital part of the whole wheel.

The crucial consideration in the present discussion of the theoretical component is that it is imbedded in a central invariant which constrains consciousness no less profoundly and ineluctably than the immediate presentation of the aesthetic component. Yet this invariant base is not revealed by the aesthetic insight even when driven to the ultimate realization of Buddhistic and Taoistic Enlightenment. It thus constitutes the neglected half of the ultimate Enlightenment possible to man at the stage of evolution in consciousness he has now attained. As this consideration lies at the very heart of the present thesis we shall return to it again and again in the sequel.
THE Aesthetic and the Theoretic in Relation to Language

The aesthetic and the theoretic as the two great moments or components in consciousness have left an indelible impress upon language. Some language, of which the Chinese is the outstanding instance, is so predominantly oriented to the aesthetic component that well developed theoretic thought and writing is nearly if not quite impossible. At the other extreme we have in pure mathematics a language which is so exclusively theoretical in its adaptation that it conveys little or no significance to the aesthetic consciousness. But for the greater part in all our common discourse and communication both forms of language are so indiscriminately intermixed as to lead to real semantic confusion. In our western syntactical languages preponderantly the substantives or nouns have both kinds of reference. Much of the criticism of the semanticists grows out of a recognition of the confusion but has a much restricted validity because so often because only one of the two significances of words is recognized as sound. But the semanticists have made a sound contribution in so far as they have drawn attention to a confusion which has had unquestionably damaging effects.

By natural tendency or by one-sided cultural development most individuals tend to understand words more or less exclusively in either the aesthetic or theoretic uses. When the real intended meaning of a statement is in one of the two senses while it is read or heard and interpreted in the contrasting sense the intended meaning is either not conveyed at all or it has been received in a badly distorted form. This confusion arises in especial degree when one trained in
western theoretic thought and formulation tries to read translations from the traditional Chinese. If the translation is simply a translation, and not an interpretation into the western way of thinking the effect may well be of no meaning being conveyed whatever. No basis may be established for either agreeing or disagreeing or even the entertaining of a possible point of view. One simply sees a collection of words that mean nothing at all. Doubtless the traditional Chinese would have a parallel difficulty in trying to understand modern western mathematical literature.

So it is highly important for several reasons that we should clarify our understanding of this two-fold primary use of language. In particular this is important for us since it will shed an enormously clarifying light upon the meaning of Eastern Enlightenment in so far as represented in oriental literature. Much confusion grows out of interpreting meaning in the theoretic sense when the composition was oriented mainly or wholly to the aesthetic sense.

The distinction in the meaning of words is well developed in formal logical literature but perhaps not adequately bringing out the more radical aesthetic usage. The distinction is between the **denotation** or **extension** of words and the **connotation** or **intention** of words. A word **denotes** when it merely designates members of a class or points to a specified otherness. A word **connotes** when it means a relational, implicational, or attributional signification. The one specifies an entity for consciousness, while the other signifies a quality.

In the strict denotative sense a word tends to have the value of only a pointer with no underlying substance in itself.
This is most notable when a word points to a meaning which can be known only by immediate experience. The word serves as a communication between two individuals if both have had the experience meant, otherwise it conveys nothing and hence may be quite truly called empty in itself. This consideration throws a highly revealing light upon the Buddhist's insistence upon the emptiness and meaninglessness of his words and discourses. The words merely point to a special immediate experience and may be thrown away after the office of pointing has been completed. They are definitely not to be used as blocks in a theoretical structure. That is why Buddhism tends to be philosophical only in the negative sense of dialectic of negation.

While denotive words in much of western logical usage may be called concepts, yet in the strict sense of the last paragraph they are not concepts at all. In this sense, and only in this sense, I think, is Korzybski correct in saying words are only words and there is no such thing as concepts. There that of existence is like the hare's horns and the barren woman's son of frequent Buddhistic reference. They are completely void in themselves.

But in the connotative sense words are the outer cloaks of meaningful concepts. Though it is difficult to think concepts apart from the words, it is possible to do so and it is necessary to do so to reach the greater depths of theoretical thought. Thus in this case the words are not empty but have a substantive background which we might call their soul. This soul is the pure wordless meaning behind the articulated word. As one composes his thought into language for communication he may, if he studies his thought, distinguish the conceptual
soul from the formal world. He will find that the meaning comes into his mind first but often he has to search around for the satisfactory word. Sometimes he may be forced to use poor substitutes or may have to invent words, but all this shows that he knows his meaning first.

In the connotative sense words are not pointers to an experience lying beyond themselves, thus quite empty in themselves, but they contain a substance in or behind their visible or audible manifestation. Thus connotation gives depth rather than extension. They are not voids but substantives. The connoting concept does not point to an aesthetic experience unseen as that which it intends. It is related to the conceptual order of relations, qualities, etc. It belongs to a dimension of consciousness other than that of the aesthetic rather than standing in a relation of dependent interweaving with the latter. To be sure, the two orders do collaborate and fight with each other, but each can stand alone operating according to the law of its autonomous nature. Necessarily there is a common root in which both vanish in their unique particularities, but from that common root each can draw its sustenance independent from the other. But this does not mean that each may have no effect upon the other. They do affect each other enormously and the concrete complex of relatively developed human consciousness is an intricately interwoven compound of the two. And perhaps the primary cause of the state of maya or illusion which so greatly envelopes the consciousness of man is to be found in the confused character this interweaving generally possesses. Shankara specifically emphasized the maya-producing power of confusion between the subjective and the objective and defined
the Way to Liberation as the clarification of this confusion. Similarly, we may find another Way to Liberation or Enlightenment by destroying the confusion between the aesthetic and the conceptual or theoretic.

A fruitful source of confusion lies in the fact that vast numbers of words have both kinds of reference. As one among many others we might consider the word "green". In the denotative sense this word points to a particular visual experience. No analysis of the word or of the verbal context in which it may stand will give any understanding of its meaning to one who has never experienced **green**. But for the physicist "green" means a particular rate or band of rates of vibration of electro-magnetic energy which spreads throughout a vast range of octaves. Neither the electro-magnetic energy nor the vibrating wave-patterns can be sensed in the terms the physicist has employed. Their ultimate definition is mathematical in of which the terms have no aesthetic meaning whatever. The result is that "green" in this sense can be understood as easily by one who has never aesthetically experienced green as by one who has. In fact the physicist's "light" or electro-magnetic system of waves embraces a far vaster range than that which falls within the field of visual experience, yet he thinks with equal assurance in all parts. So with respect to the greater part of the physicist's light we are all like blind men. Yet, if we have properly educated ourselves, we can all understand what the physicists mean whether we are aesthetically blind or not. Here the possibility of communication is not dependent upon a commonality of experience but upon a commonality of conceptual thought.
It is highly significant that while language in highly developed syntactical form is the best if not only medium for the communication of conceptual or theoretical meaning, yet for aesthetic communication it is far from being the only means. In fact, it really is an inferior means. Thus for pointing to the experience of green, rather than using the verbal pointer, it would be more effective to spread some green color upon a surface. The act itself points better than the word. This consideration will go far to clarify the Buddhist depreciation of the spoken and written word and the accentuation of artistic means which we find so largely developed in that peculiarly irrational school of Buddhism known as ch'an or zen. Here we find bodily, thus essentially artistic, activities valued as means above speech and written word.

We may lay it down as a general principle that when the purpose is the suggestion of an aesthetic experience art is a far better medium than conceptual language. Further, when the consciousness of a race is overwhelmingly aesthetic we would expect their language to be strong in the artistic component and weak in syntax. This we do find in the Chinese written language. The word symbols in this language are not symbols for sounds but conventionalized pictures of actual concrete experiences. The syntactical or relational component is absent or weak. It appears that the original word was an actual picture like the products of Chinese painting art we see today. The final word forms are conventionalized reductions from these originals. The result is that the Chinese written vocabulary is potentially as vast as the number of particular aesthetic visual experiences a whole race might have. Naturally
of course, there are limitations imposed upon this elaboration for practical considerations. Rare experiences could be communicated only rarely, since but few would hold them in common. But here we have a key to the special importance attached to the scholar in China. He is not a learned man in our academic sense, but a man whose aesthetic experience is rich. Only through richness of experience can the literature be assimilated to any wide extent.

But here we may fall into an error. The rich experience of the Chinese sage or scholar need not be exclusively in terms of immediate sensuous physical experience. The amount of this that is possible in any one life-time is too limited. There is another way to experience through evocation. It is the primary office of the aesthetically referring symbol to evoke the experience which it means. This is a sort of vicarious experience, but is none the less authentic.

To a western predominately theoretical mind it may not easily occur that words and sentences are evocative agents. They rather lead to a system of logical implication, developed in terms of concepts. But this other effect of words and sentences exists and it must be appreciated to understand the office of a considerable portion of language, particularly such as is found in the East. Now, when language is used in the sense of evocation it often loses most if not all of its intelligibility in the sense of syntactical and logical meaning. It consists essentially of fragments which acquire their completion in the evocated aesthetic content. In the absence of effective evocation in the consciousness of the reader the fragments may well seem no more than verbal nonsense which does not even convey a fantastic conception. A considerable body
of Taoist and Buddhist literature does have this effect.

We are now in a position to see how there can be value in the mantramic use of words and word combinations. A word taken as a denoter or pointer tends to arouse in consciousness that which it means, in terms of experience. Thus hearing, reading or thinking the word "green" may very well arouse an image of green as a subjective impression. Now, though this might not happen in the case of an individual born blind, yet we cannot exclude the possibility that an image would be experienced since the experience of green is well established in racial history. Being well-established it has a bedrock in the collective unconscious of humanity from which repository it could be evoked, and so it might well be that a man born blind could experience a subjective image of green. Thus a mantram, if properly chosen, repeated, intoned and meditated upon, can be expected, quite reasonably, to produce evoked effects in the form of aesthetic experience. It is interesting in this connection to recall the fact that in Sanskrit, which provides the greatest mantramic value of any language, a great many of the roots are taken from the natural sounds of the aesthetic objects which they denote. Thus the tone and sound value of the great word "OM" may be heard in the ocean, in the murmur of the forest, in the compound rumble of a city, etc. If one listens closely he can find it everywhere as a great common tone underlying the particular momentary variations of sound. Thus "OM" as intoned and contemplated tends to evoke as its meaning the aesthetic experience of the underlying common denominator of all that is. Later we shall identify this as the indeterminate aesthetic continuum.

The use of word-combinations in the form of affirmations and
denials is a phase of mantra which has for several decades been employed by several religious groups in the West. Effects are produced unquestionably or the practice would not continue, but the range of effectiveness and the limits of effectiveness are not too well understood. Effects can be produced can be reproduced in the sense of evocations in aesthetic experience, but nothing is effected in the dimension of the theoretic component. One cannot master scientific knowledge by means of mantra, nor can he thus gain control of the instruments or processes developed through science. For the latter purpose conceptual, syntactical thought is essential.

The denotative, aesthetic language is necessarily non-argumentative. There is no place for argument in it since, when pure, it has no syntactical or relational development, and hence is not a logical continuum. Since the aesthetic continuum advances no thesis there can be no pro and con, no counter thesis. The aesthetic presentation is simply itself without implication. Thus the word denoting such is not to be judged in the logical sense as either true or false, right or wrong. It simply is either effective or not effective.

Quite otherwise is it with the theoretical component. Here the substance of meaning lies in the argument. But it is essential to clarify the confusion as often found as to the meaning of this word before the real intention can be rendered explicit. "Argument" means "a reasoning in which the relation between grounds and conclusion is explicit". This is the process by which all scientific and especially mathematical conceptions are developed. When the argument has become so perfected as to remove all real doubt from a mind that apprehends it then it is called "proof". Proof is the finished argument. But
though this is the fundamental and proper meaning of the word yet in popular usage it is often given the connotation of contention or controversy. This is not the sense in which we say that the substance of the meaning of the theoretic component lies in argument. In controversy we have more a display of conflict of feeling in which conceptual instruments are employed something like weapons and there must be two or more parties to such a dispute. But argument in the true sense is an essential process of any theoretic thinker even though he is isolated in an ivory tower and never intends to publish his findings. Argument, though in part of its function serves to convey authenticated meaning from one individual consciousness to another, yet it serves a more fundamental office in the development of the meaning of the concept to the thinker himself. A concept without argument is at best a suggestion of a possibility which becomes a theoretic actuality only after the development of argument.

Probably the greatest contribution which was ever made to the science of mathematics was that made by Pythagoras when he introduced the principle of proof or argument. Prior to that time mathematics consisted of little more than a collection of empiric propositions and thus was not centered on its own true ground.

In both aesthetic and theoretic thought there is to be found the very important process of synthesis whereby given particularity is united in a larger whole. But there are very important differences in the processes in the two cases. The purely aesthetic synthesis does not presuppose a prior analysis, but begins with the given presentment and incorporates it
directly into a larger whole of aesthetic consciousness. This larger whole is not a logical integration of parts but tends to have the same elemental simplicity of the initial presentment. In contrast, theoretic synthesis presupposes the prior analysis of the initially given material into component parts, ultimately as simple or elemental as possible. Synthesis then is introduced as a reintegration of the simple or elemental into explicit systematic wholes such that the component parts remain recognizable and can be recovered at any time. Corresponding to these two kinds of syntheses there are appropriate differences in the form and use of language, but often because of the lack of sufficient care in formulation the different kinds of meaning are confused. This is a fruitful source of misunderstanding in the case of Buddhistic Sutras that have been translated and interpreted into western language from the Chinese. Since the final form is syntactical the reader tends to interpret the whole as a logical system from which the meaning can be derived by the process of implication. But by this means very little of clear positive conception is derived and the total effect is more one of confusion rather than of clarification. Actually the Sutras are denoting an immediate experience which alone can effect clarification and the seeming of a systematic meaning is no more than a false appearance. The Sutras should be read more in the way that a work of plastic art is viewed if one would find what they really mean.

But the difficulty encountered in the translation and interpretation of Buddhistic and Taoistic Sutras into western language is only a particularly aggravated form of confusion production.
The same difficulty extends very widely through our own indigenous literature, except in the case of formal philosophy and science. A syntactical language is used much of the time to present an aesthetic meaning and in much composition there is a great deal of indiscriminate oscillation between theoretical intention and aesthetic denoting. The resultant effect is often one in which there is a more or less strong appearance of theoretical intention, whereas the real purpose was an aesthetic denotation. The reader or hearer who is primarily or wholly impressed by the theoretical appearance feels the need of argumentative criticism and development by rational synthesis, to all of which the speaker or writer objects since he intended an aesthetic experience which falls quite outside the range of argumentative treatment. The ultimate result is a lot of lost motion and miscomprehension. If the writer or speaker had used an exclusively artistic medium the difficulty would have been avoided as then there would have been no suggestion of a theoretic meaning.

Pure aesthetic presentations never involve the issue of self-contradiction since they stand on the basis of simple immediacy and do not involve any theoretic relatedness. Likewise, the medium of communication or suggestion of an aesthetic value or content, if it is adequately adapted to its office, would never suggest an issue of self-contradiction. But when a syntactical, and therefore essentially logical, medium is used for the purpose of aesthetic suggestion the language may well raise the problem of self-contradiction. This does produce a good deal of confusion and misunderstanding. In this case the linguistic medium is validly open to criticism although the intended purpose is quite sound in its own right.
Logos-Eros and the two Components

Since the time of the Greeks the two words, "logos" and "eros" have served an important office in isolating complementary opposites in the total complex of human consciousness. The contrast corresponds to the difference between reason and love, the latter being understood in the more primary sense of which the biological love, symbolized by Cupid, is merely a special manifestation. At times the correspondence has been given as between reason and feeling. But if we are to understand by "feeling" a judging function in the sense in which Jung used the term in "Psychological Types" then "feeling" is hardly an adequate equivalent for "eros", since the contrast between logos and eros is really too radical to be embraced under the general conception of "judging". So it appears truer to the real meaning to identify the theoretical component with logos and the aesthetic with eros. The correctness of this becomes clearer when it is recalled that "feeling", if used without appropriate discrimination, means an affection, a sensation and intuition and thus embraces all of Jung's four functions except thinking. But two of these meanings fall in the aesthetic field.

The identification of eros with the aesthetic casts a clarifying light upon the fuller meaning of this component. The aesthetic is not simply presentment which, taken in abstraction, could be quite colorless emotionally, but it is the immediately given filled with feeling. Thus it is not hard to see why the Buddhistic aesthetic Enlightenment is inseparable from an equal all-embracing Compassion.
We have already noted how Beauty enters into the aesthetic continuum as the ideal, just as Truth is the ideal of the theoretic. But a deeper insight into the aesthetic reveals that no less is Compassion part and parcel of the Supreme Good. If now we orient ourselves deeply to the aesthetic we find that this is not a matter of two competing ideals but something which appears to the differentiating thought as a compound Beauty-Compassion, but which is in reality an inseparable whole. While this includes pity for suffering, — a motive that is primary in Buddhism, — yet it incorporates a deeper meaning which goes beyond the conception in western ethics. The compound Beauty-Compassion is the very essence of the all-embracing wholeness of the undeterminate aesthetic continuum. It is there even in the absence of all suffering. To appreciate this one must at least glimpse the Buddhistic Enlightenment and find himself in continuity with the whole aesthetic field and all it embraces. It is part and parcel of the bliss of the ecstatic state. The unity of the Buddhistic Enlightenment is the wholeness of Beauty-Compassion, rather than the logical unity of the theoretic continuum. This consideration brings out both the strength and limitation of traditional Buddhism.

An Illustration of Aesthetic Enlightenment

Much of the ch'an or zen Buddhist canonical literature consists of stories of events and even paintings without discursive explanations and in this sort of material we find an especially illuminating opportunity of viewing aesthetic Enlightenment in a setting of high purity. It becomes clear that here Enlightenment means something different from the
western conception of "a lighting up or enlargement of the understanding by means of acquired knowledge and wisdom", although not incompatible with this. In one of the stories a disciple is pictured as having spent an evening in the home of his master. When the time came for the disciple to leave a dark and rain-filled night had descended and the disciple had not brought with him a means of lighting his way to his own habitation. While he opens the door to leave the master lights a candle and brings it to the disciple. As the latter is in the act of reaching out for the candle the master blows out the flame. At that moment the disciple is Enlightened.

In connection with this incident there is no discursive explanation, yet it is intended to advance the possibility of Enlightenment among the unenlightened. In the face of this a western theoretically trained mind is to be excused if it feels somewhat dazed. There is nothing explained and no elucidation of knowledge. But the key to the importance of the incident can be found if one views the incident in its purely aesthetic denotation.

The dark and stormy condition is the state of the unenlightened consciousness of the disciple. The candle lighted by the master is a borrowed illumination. This is the denoting pointer which is replaced by that to which it points at the moment the candle is extinguished. The particularized agent is effective at the instant of its destruction.

A somewhat similar situation is suggested by imagining an disciple individual standing on a scaffolding beside a temple. In this case the disciple is basing his security upon the scaffold which
has been constructed by his master. The master is standing below near a key supporting member of the scaffold. Suddenly he strikes out the key member with a heavy hammer and the disciple leaps into the Temple and is secure.

This destruction of the support is a recurrent step in the more discursive Sutras. Again and again the Buddha is represented as having elaborated the meaning and way to Enlightenment before his disciples and then winds up by denying the validity of the conception to which the discourse has attained, affirming that all of this consists only of empty words which have no more meaning than the notion of hare's horns or of a barren woman's son. The whole point is the breaking of dependence upon or attachment to the scaffolding of discourse which was valuable only as a pointer. The consciousness must leap on to the immediate aesthetic realization. Only this is possible by breaking all other dependencies whatsoever. There is no compromise here with a progressive increase of understanding. The breaking off of all dependences on mere scaffolding is radical. The Enlightenment is sudden and absolute.

Clearly, Enlightenment in this sense is not the fruit of the laborious acquisition of theoretical understanding. As a matter of fact an individual consciousness that is highly cultured in this sense may have more difficulty than a simple, unlearned but pure-minded barbarian, as illustrated in the case of the Sixth Patriarch in China. All of which suggests that if Enlightenment is the only goal having real worth and it can be attained suddenly in an absolute form by the simple and unclouded, then all of our laborious achievement of theoretical
understanding has been a sheer waste of effort at best, and possibly even a real disadvantage. If Enlightenment in the aesthetic sense were the whole meaning of Enlightenment this conclusion would be quite valid. But that such is not the case is just precisely the point which indicated the writing of the present book. The absoluteness of the aesthetic Enlightenment is real enough in its own dimension, but it does not embrace the whole possibility of consciousness. The aesthetic Enlightenment unifies and supports every possibility of the aesthetic continuum, but by itself it does not support the theoretic continuum. We have come to the time when we can realize that the total meaning of Enlightenment includes at least another dimension and, mayhap, many other dimensions, each absolute in its own sense, and each realized by its own proper means. In other words, the West does not have to deny its own peculiar genius to achieve the summum bonum and, in the end, the Crown of the East may be added to the Crown of the West eventuating in mutually enhanced Royalty of a world that at last has become truly one.